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P r e fa c e

In 2000, around the time of the G8 summit in Okinawa, another impor
tant event was unfolding. Higa Malia,1 a woman born to an Okinawan
mother and U.S. military–affiliated father on Okinawa, was in the midst
of a modest yet powerf ul social movement. A
 fter a group of m
 others established the AmerAsian School in Okinawa in 1998 in partial response to
racial discrimination their c hildren experienced in public schools,2 Higa
inaugurated the Children of Peace Network in 1999 as the first network
organized autonomously by such individuals.3 The network was momentous b
 ecause the powerful anti-base culture in Okinawa, often evoking
tropes of local w
 omen v iolated or exploited by American soldiers, had
overshadowed mixed-race individuals to the point where it was difficult to
share a conversation about this identity among t hose who experienced it
firsthand.4
Keenly aware of t hese dynamics, Higa focused on disassociating mixedrace identity from base politics and empowering individuals by helping
them locate their long-lost f athers. However, a day before the G8 summit
convened, she was taken aback by her young daughter’s wish to join in
peaceful protest by forming a h
 uman chain around Kadena Air Base. In
response, she wrote:
Personally, I wanted to oppose the bases and join hands with others,
but I simply couldn’t. By participating, many hāfu5 w ill say, “Hey,
Malia is opposing bases. If you go over t here [to her network], you w ill
be made to do the same t hing. Opposing bases with an American face
is embarrassing for Okinawans, so I d
 on’t want to do it.” Feelings such
as t hese keep me at bay. In other words, people in need of consultation
w ill cease to confide in me, and no one w ill come to the network.
Since my priorities lie with t hese more vulnerable individuals, I could
not participate in the h
 uman chain around the bases. In spirit only.6

Higa identified an incommensurable gulf between public anti-base
protest and the private lives of t hose who intimately embody the reality of
ix
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U.S. military bases in Okinawa. Concerned with alienating the very individuals she was interested in starting a collective conversation with, she
held back from her own d
 aughter’s invitation to join the protest.
Shortly after the G8 summit, the network ceased to exist, and Higa
moved to mainland Japan. She contributed a fourteen-segment series of
short articles to the Okinawa Times newspaper over a decade later from
July to December 20127 and then posted a long poem on her public Facebook page entitled “U.S. Military Base” on July 19, 2013, that garnered
more likes and shares than her publications.8 It was this poem, uninhibited by newspaper form, that hit a deeply entrenched cultural nerve. In it,
she returned to the disconnect between mixed-race identity and the politics
of U.S. military base protest. Only this time, she was not speaking as the
representative of a social movement, but as an individual.
The question that drives this poem is, what happens when the insertion of the cold machinery of institutional violence (i.e., U.S. military
bases) into the fecund soil of Okinawa produces a new life force that
threatens to grow wildly into its cogs? Or, how w
 ill Higa, who was “born
precisely b
 ecause of [the existence of] the base” on Okinawan soil, whose
life painfully trellised alongside its barbed wire fence, come to terms with
this t hing that names her poem, the “U.S. Military Base”?
The first part of the poem operates through a dialectic of mutual exclusion where she is e ither a product of institutional violence or a private
individual completely separate from it. Each side—t he Okinawan and the
U.S. military—assumes one at the expense of negating the other, leaving
Higa bankrupt of a way of articulating her own existence as simulta
neously both.
From the Okinawan side, she problematizes the objectifying language
she associates with anti-base sentiment.
A child sent from the base, a child who got dumped by the base9
Those words that describe me
Could be heard even if I covered my ears
Those words that look down on my m
 other or other m
 others like
her as an Amejo10
Flowed everywhere
Saying that my m
 other and I were a shameless and humiliating nuisance

 ere, she and her m
H
 other are made to stand in for the U.S. military. She
is either a “child sent from the base,” suggesting that is her original point
of creation, or her m
 other is an “Amejo,” a w
 oman of the Americans, suggesting that is where she belongs. With both being treated in this way as
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objects of substitution, Higa responds by speaking of a life of unintelligibility. Born and raised in Okinawa, as products of Okinawa’s historical
condition, by what sleight of hand do they suddenly become a stand-in for
an institution from which they are both alienated? Is t here any room in
their existences to not be completely determined by the U.S. military?
Could they be both victims of U.S. military violence and also women who
had loved a G.I. at the same time? The sovereign power that is suggested
here is not the cold machinery of the U.S. military base, i.e., its weapons
of death and destruction, but the violence of substitution that works performatively through language to erase the irreducibility of her life force
as she shudders in response to “Those words that describe me.” In other
words, sovereign power h
 ere functions through the censorship, exclusion,
and exception of the possibility of a life irreducible to institutional vio
lence, which ironically operates through the very claim of its total victimization to sovereign power.
This drives Higa to the other extreme of a hyperidentification with her
father as a stand-in for the U.S. military base to which she feels compelled
to return. But when her father never comes for her as a young child, she
pursues him during the summer of her final year of school and writes of
her visit with her American f amily.
I couldn’t get through to them well with my shy English
I was made to realize that I was not one of the people from over there
The family with whom I was connected by blood was nice to me
on the surface
But I could not sense in them even a modicum of remorse toward me
My f ather, of course, was not a U.S. military base
He was nothing more than a completely ordinary man

 ere, her American family cannot see how her life was impacted by the
H
public institutional violence that her f ather partook in and reduces the business of her birth to a private family affair. She recognizes this as a privilege
that neither she nor other Okinawans have. Hence, she is “not one of the
people from over there” because they can monopolize a clean-cut distinction
between the public and the private. The ability to carry on with the messiness of private life in America is a stark contrast to the unchanging reality
of the U.S. military that awaits her when she lands back in Okinawa.
Even when her father visits her in Okinawa years later in her adulthood, he does not waver in this distinction. He expresses the civilian wish
that “Okinawa goes back to being a quiet island,” but nonetheless surrenders his opinion on politics to the state.
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“I do not have any words on the question of the U.S. military presence
And this is not something that I should talk about
Since this is a decision for the state
I have not lost my pride as a soldier”

The irony h
 ere is that while her f ather claims to surrender his words to the
state, he can only do so by using words. His ability to act as a cog of state
machinery is predicated on his capacity for language, which as he shows
himself, takes on a life of its own to the potential dismay of the state. Yet
he censors this life. Not only can we get a glimpse of the potential dilemma of a conscientious objector who does not self-censor, but Higa registers her own “disappointment” in her father’s statement. What is at stake
here is not so much whether he supports or opposes bases in Okinawa as
it is how he, too, exercises sovereign power by censoring, excluding, and
excepting discrepancies not only within himself, but also within the relationship with his daughter by deflecting them onto the higher power of
the state where they become neutralized. This is where he locates his “pride
as a soldier” years after military serv ice.
Higa is trapped by two mutually exclusive positions: one that diminishes the possibility for her private life to be undetermined by institutional
violence, and one that diminishes the effects of institutional violence in
her private life. Similar to the symbol “∞,” the two are like diametrically
opposed circles that touch at a point. What connects them at this point
is a logic that censors, excludes, and excepts the discrepancies internal to
each side. But instead of owning up to the consequences of this act—of
embracing a life that lives the contradictions of the here and now—it is
instead deferred to a higher sovereign power that distracts with promises toward a utopian future. In this way, the anti-base sentiment that
discriminates against Higa interprets any mark left by the U.S. military
base in Okinawa as a mark of its victimization that must be erased for
the sake of recuperating the homogeneity of an ethnic community that
awaits liberation in the future. The U.S. military culture that Higa
evokes interprets any mark of suffering it inflicts on o
 thers as a necessary sacrifice that must be made for the sake of protecting the integrity
of a democratic state. Discrepancies that arise in everyday life are deferred to faith in the purity of this sovereign power and neutralized for
the sake of internal coherence; in the absence of faith in this sovereign
power, they would deflect back into the inner space of the circles of the ∞
symbol and implode from within. Precisely because she is foreclosed
from accessing this transcendental notion of purity, Higa is left with no
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way to ground her existence, and is driven to what some might call a “social death.”
“You shouldn’t have been born”
How could I go on living with my head up
I did not know
If I could even be here
I wanted to erase myself
I felt as if living itself were a shame

Yet Higa does the impossible and not only continues to live on, but
continues to thrive in her thought. Fast forward to 2000 when her
daughter wishes to join a peaceful protest around Kadena Air Base the day
before the 2000 G8 summit. Her daughter exclaims:
“If grandpa was on the other side of the fence I would say Hi
I love grandpa but I hate bombs that kill p
 eople
That’s why I’ll say bases aren’t necessary
Even if you c an’t go Mom, I still want to go!”

In this remarkable moment, Higa’s daughter allows for the coexistence of
the “grandpa” whom she loves as a private individual with the institutional
violence of the state that she hates. In failing to decide on one over the other,
she refuses to ground her expression in faith in a higher power and instead grounds it in her own life force from within, in the here and now.
W hether she realizes it or not, she exposes sovereign power as not merely
the capacity to annihilate (although Okinawans have certainly been targets of military death and destruction), but also as the imperative to direct this life force away from the contradictions of the h
 ere and now to an
abstract promise toward the f uture.
Once Higa is able to grab hold of this inner life force, t hings start to
change, and her life starts to matter. In turning away from the logic of the
exception, she refuses to allow her life force to be pruned back to ensure
the smooth operation of the machinery of the U.S. military base and instead allows for it to grow into the cogs so as to threaten its composition
with transformation from within.
Flowers w
 ill also bloom in the U.S. military base
Those seeds always go over the barbed wire fence with ease
They sprout on this side
And soon
They w
 ill bloom
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Higa’s poem does not end triumphantly with the assertion of mixed-race
or female agency predicated on the recuperation of a self-determining
w ill, but enigmatically with the nonhuman agency of morphing matter.
These seeds are the living matter that is not guided by any higher princi
ple other than a life force internal to it. Although “[t]hose seeds always
go over the barbed wire fence with ease,” they nonetheless haphazardly
arrive t here without premeditated direction. The U.S. military base is not
something that is willfully taken down by a sovereign subject, but it is something that is disengaged by allowing a life force to change its composition
from within.
Higa’s poem comes out of thirteen years of painstaking meditation on
the contradictions of a short-lived social movement. Although much has
been said about what is arguably the most contentious issue in U.S.-Japan
politics—the presence of U.S. military bases in Japanese territory—her
poem gives us a glimpse into the more intimate realities of life on both
sides of the fence in Okinawa. What it demands is not so much that we put
a softer h
 uman face to the cold and impersonal calculations of international politics. Rather, it demands a fundamental reconsideration of the
nature of sovereign power based on the logic of mutual exclusion on both
sides of the fence.
In their imagining of the trans-Pacific, Naoki Sakai and Hyon Joo Yoo
suggest what such a reconsideration might look like. They urge us to turn
away from focusing on the absolute power of individual sovereign states
and instead turn to developing a better analysis of the systematicity of a
network of states that they term the “global sovereign state.”11 Furthermore, this systematicity is driven by a logic of nationalism that discursively
produces power from the bottom up through its dispersal throughout the
population. In this way, they, like Higa, focus on how t hese macropolitics
are channeled through the intimate and identify the common assumption
of the United States as an imperialist institution of “oppression or repression”
that, in turn, fans a very sexualized “victim fantasy” integral to “anti-
colonial nationalism.”12
Higa’s poem offers a powerf ul testament to the real-life implications of
this anti-colonial nationalism for mixed-race individuals who can never
become purely Japanese. But by identifying t hese limitations, she simulta
neously stumbles upon the impossibility of Okinawa’s position vis-à-v is
the global sovereign state. That is, Japan’s “victim fantasy” is a useful decoy that diverts attention from its role in securing Okinawa as a U.S. military fortress of the Asia Pacific. And hence, to what degree can Okinawans
really partake in anti-colonial Japanese nationalism when Okinawans have
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never been treated as first-class nationals by Japan in the first place? Higa
writes:
No m
 atter how imperviously the U.S. military acts t oward the locals
It is due to its diplomacy with Japan
Now I am able to see clearly
All that I have turned my eyes away from thus far

Okinawa is only intelligible vis-à-v is global sovereignty u nder representa
tion of the Japanese state, yet the Japanese state fails to represent Okinawa, allowing the U.S. military to act “imperviously . . . 
toward the
locals.” Although Higa could only see Okinawa’s discrimination of mixed-
race subjects growing up as a child, through her long journey, she comes
to realize how this discrimination is informed by Okinawa’s precarious
position vis-à-v is not only Japan, but Japan in collusion with the United
States, in the formation of a global sovereign state.
The point h
 ere is not to argue w
 hether or not Okinawans are really
Japanese. Rather, it is to show how the unintelligibility of Okinawan life
gets channeled into a national political platform whereupon it emerges as
evidence of the violation of a pure victim or the actions of a compromised
collaborator. B
 ecause the most direct and intimate point of contact between the U.S. military and Japanese state comes through sexual relationships between U.S. military personnel and local women, their lives, as
well as the lives of their mixed-race c hildren, are excessively politicized as
one or the other. But all this does is sanction the qualification of the “po
litical” in terms of an intelligibility before the law. As suggested by Sakai
and Yoo, even the mobilization of the so-called pure victim in this “victim fantasy” tends to collaborate with “anti-colonial nationalism.” What
it neglects to consider is the politicality of the alegal, or that which is unintelligibile to the law itself. It is this life force that harbors the potential
of a more fundamental insurgency as that which dares to live irrespective
of its intelligibility to the law.
Higa’s poem, as a piece that somehow failed to reach published form
ready to be consumed by area studies knowledge producers, performs the
difficult task of articulating a sovereign power that is experienced most
viscerally in the intimate spaces of everyday life. It is the product of years
of struggle to find the words to articulate a life unintelligible to the state
in a way that circumvented the danger of being targeted by a censoring
violence. It forces us to consider the nature of sovereign power, not as the
wheeling and dealing of faceless organs of the state, but as the censorship,
exclusion, and exception of a life force that has always already been t here.
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Higa quit waiting to become intelligible to the norms of the publishing
industry in order to exercise her own life force, but by writing of this unintelligibility, she took it back for herself. And it spread like wildfire. It is
this life force that this book names the “alegal,” and it is this life force that
this book attempts to unleash.
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N o t e o n T r a n s l at i o n s a n d R o m a n i z at i o n s

Throughout this book, all translations from Japanese are mine u nless
otherw ise indicated. The titles of Japanese texts are automatically given
in English translation with the original given in the citation. For example,
the English title of the newspaper Ryukyu Shimpo is given in Japanese romanization as Ryukyu shinpō in the citation.
Japanese and Korean names are provided as family name first and given
name last when their corresponding texts are written originally in Japanese,
while the reverse order is followed for all o
 thers. In romanizing Japanese
and Korean, I follow the Hepburn and McCune-Reischauer systems respectively. For romanizing Okinawan, I alternate between the Hepburn
system and indigenous Okinawan variations, such as “Ifa Fuyū,” depending on historical usage. Terms in Japanese, particularly place names that
have an established usage in English (for example “Ryukyu” and “Tokyo”),
are not modified with diacritics.
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GRI
Government of the Ryukyu Islands
JCP
Japanese Communist Party
MP
Military Police
OFNCA
Okinawa Federation of Night Clubs Association
OPP
Okinawa People’s Party
RAA
Recreation and Amusement Association
SCAP
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
USCAR
U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyus

xix

153-75549_ch00_3P.indd 19

10/13/18 12:56 PM

153-75549_ch00_3P.indd 20

10/13/18 12:56 PM

Introduction

Alegal
Alegal. The simplest definition of this unusual term that w
 ill be developed
throughout the pages of this book is as follows: that which is irreducible
to a binary of legal versus illegal or extralegal. The “a” preceding “legal”
is analogous to the “a” preceding “moral”; alegal is neither legal nor illegal/
extralegal, just as amoral is neither moral nor immoral. The function of
the “a,” therefore, does not refer to what or where the law is not: Words
already exist for that—namely, “illegal,” meaning that which is against the
law, such as a criminal act, or “extralegal,”1 meaning that which is outside
of the law, such as an area in which other states exercise extraterritoriality.
Rather, what this enigmatic “a” gets down to is an incongruous relationship between the alegal and the law.
On the one hand, alegal is discontinuous with the law b
 ecause it always
exceeds its intelligibility. Alegal can exist in the absence of the law, but on
the other hand, the law cannot exist without the alegal. This is because
the law does not exist a priori; it is not a preestablished, positive, or natural
entity that is set in stone from time immemorial. The law is something
1
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that must be made up, and it is in the process of this fabrication that the
alegal comes into play: Sovereign power arises by calibrating the infinite
possibility of the alegal into a finite binary of l egal versus illegal/extralegal.
In other words, when Carl Schmitt defined the sovereign as “he who decides on the exception,”2 he elucidated the ability to censor, exclude, or
except an infinite array of possibilities so as to produce a spatiality (i.e., a
nomos) in which territories become legible in terms of their legal codification. That which is irreducible to the law—t he alegal—is drawn into a binary of the legal versus the illegal/extralegal.
The crisis of alegality, of that which is impervious to the law and hence
a constant threat to sovereign power, is actually an enabling possibility, or
a condition for the possibility of the emergence of sovereign power. Simply put, without the alegal, the sovereign would have nothing to do and
no way to prove itself. Anyone can make up a law, but only sovereign power
can enforce it through some form of complicity with the p
 eople, or a dy3
namic process called the “force of law.” In sum, the law, and by extension
sovereign power, cannot obtain without the theoretical marker of the “a”
in “alegal” that refers to not a property, but a performative operation of
the calibration-c um-containment of the infinite possibility of the alegal
into a legal intelligibility.
This distinction between the law as an a priori given of a static entity
and an a posteriori effect of a performative operation is crucial for telling
the story of miscegenation between U.S. military personnel and local
women in Okinawa. Okinawa, also known as the Ryukyu Islands, is an archipelago that lies south of Kyushu, Japan, and east of Taiwan. Although
it is but a few speckles on the world map, its geopolitical significance is
enormous. Within the context of the United States, many have heard of
Okinawa either through the news or through firsthand knowledge of it in
relation to the U.S. military. This is for good reason. The United States
has the most powerf ul military in world history, and Okinawa arguably has
the most intense concentration of U.S. military bases in the world.4 Put in
numbers, this means that 46,334 active duty members of the U.S. armed
forces (military personnel), civilian components (foreign civilians who are
employed by the U.S. armed forces), and dependents (family members of
the U.S. armed forces)5 roam t hese tiny tropical islands of approximately
1.4 million people.6 And they have been d
 oing so for over the past seventy years since the 1945 Battle of Okinawa. Although women are increasingly represented in the armed forces, they still only make up about
16 percent of the military today.7 Rather, a predominantly male institution founded on a culture of hypermasculinity is put into contact with an
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island p
 eople who have historically been subject to a feminizing Orientalist gaze. As a result, stories about Okinawa in the United States often
circulate around contentious sexual encounters between U.S. military
personnel and local Okinawans. The widely reported rape of a twelve-
year-old girl by three U.S. military personnel in 1995 was but one chapter
in a never-ending story that founds the U.S.-Okinawan relationship.
The central concern of this book is how American-Okinawan sexual encounters and, by extension, miscegenation become problematically narrated through a certain grammar governing trans-Pacific discourse, that
is, the grammar of international law. The term “miscegenation” originates
in the context of adjudicating the legality of interracial sex between whites
and blacks in the United States.8 Within the context of this book, miscegenation is defined as any type of sexual encounter between U.S. military
personnel or their affiliates and local Okinawans that could (although not
inevitably) result in the birth of mixed-race offspring.9 In line with scholarship on critical race and postcolonial theory, this book does not assume
that miscegenation is simply the mixing of subjects based upon sexual, racial, and national difference. Quite the contrary, it is examined as the
performative process through which t hese differences become established
as an effect of the contested encounter. While the politics of sex and race
are predominant in mixed-race studies in the United States, the politics of
national difference are exaggerated in discourses surrounding American-
Okinawan miscegenation precisely b
 ecause of Okinawa’s precarious position vis-à-v is international law.
For starters, many today are still unclear about Okinawa’s geopolitical
disposition. U.S. military personnel commonly refer to Okinawa as the
“Rock” and have thought of it as a g
 iant U.S. military base protruding out of
the Pacific Ocean instead of a group of Japanese islands that happen to contain U.S. military bases. Flights from China or Taiwan to Okinawa, furthermore, w
 ill be listed in the Chinese characters“琉球,” reflecting a historical
understanding of the area as a state that paid tribute to imperial China before it was annexed by Japan and turned into “Okinawa Prefecture” in 1879.
In prewar Japan, public establishments often hung signs stating “No Koreans or Ryukyuans Allowed,” while in postwar Japan, many mainlanders
have assumed Okinawans can speak English because of the densely concentrated U.S. military presence. This differential treatment oddly coexists
along with the official textbook answer to Okinawa’s geopolitical disposition
that it is one of the forty-seven prefectures of the Japanese state.
Okinawa’s geopolitical ambiguity becomes a central concern for miscegenation because every time the law is evoked to adjudicate a sexual
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transgression, the question of Okinawa’s very relationship to the law is
thrown open to inquiry. Yes, the U.S. military may have infringed upon the
law, but the law of . . . what state? As this book w ill show, interlocutors
across the Pacific have gone to great lengths to make Okinawa fit into the
system of international law by arguing that the U.S. military infringes
upon Japanese sovereignty in Okinawa. In this bilateral configuration, the
irreducible third space of Okinawa is but a subset of Japan in its relation to
the United States. However, the problem is that Okinawa has always existed in a semi-colonial relationship with Japan and has never enjoyed the
full protection of Japanese sovereignty. In fact, as this book w ill show, the
greatest irony of this claim lies in the history of Japan’s attempt to protect
the sexual and racial integrity of so-called pure Japanese w
 omen and, by
extension, its political sovereignty by sacrificing Okinawa to the United
States so it could serve as a military outpost for a purportedly “monoethnic” Japanese state. Hence, different from literat ure predicated on the
bilateralism of international law whereupon an American empire of military bases violates the sovereignty of its military colony in Japan, this book
instead examines how both actors in the United States and Japan collaboratively translate Okinawa’s alegality into the grammar of international
law. By positioning Okinawa in terms of the alegal, this book therefore
refuses to allow sovereignty to seduce it into a legal discourse so it can be
manhandled by its trans-Pacific keepers.
In this way, Okinawa’s alegality is not positioned vis-à-v is only the
United States, but vis-à-v is the United States, Japan, and the larger network of global sovereignty that they constitute together. As shown in the
next section, the so-called Okinawan problem is not about its denial or recuperation of sovereignty. More than anything, it is about the exercise of
a part icular kind of legal discourse—whether coded as a state that violates
sovereignty (United States) or a state whose sovereignty is v iolated ( Japan)—
that allows for Okinawa’s alegality to be collaboratively managed according
to the whims of American militarism and the Japanese political economy.
The next section introduces how this trans-Pacific triangulation operates
through the problem of miscegenation.

Triangulation
On March 25, 1952, Takada Nahoko, a member of the Japanese Socialist
Party, delivered a passionate speech before the Japanese Diet. Referring
to the so-called occupation baby—t hat is the offspring of U.S. soldiers and
mainland Japanese women—she proclaimed, “the atomic bomb is not the
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only t hing that can destroy a race.”10 The United States had dropped atomic
bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki just six-and-a-half years earlier that
decimated the civilian population in what many believed was an act of
genocide. Takada evoked these still fresh wounds in order to portray a
second genocide perpetrated not by bombs during the war, but by U.S.
soldiers during the occupation accused of sexually contaminating a purportedly pure Japanese population and producing a generation of mixed-
race children. Her use of this term “occupation baby” to allude to the
lives yet to come was politically charged because, technically speaking,
the Allied occupation of Japan was about to end a month later on
April 28, 1952, when the San Francisco Peace Treaty was to go into effect.
At the time of her speech, Japan was on the eve of its liberation as a sovereign state with a U.S. military presence that would go on to be operated
u nder the auspices of the accompanying U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. By
suggesting that Japan would continue to be occupied nonetheless, Takada
argued that irrespective of the formalities of international law, the ongoing
U.S. military base presence would be evidence of Japan’s compromised
sovereignty and that the threat it faced therein took multiple forms, including a sexual one. At that time, many Japanese leftists claimed that the
Administrative Agreement (renewed as the Status of Forces Agreement in
1960) referred to in Article 3 of the 1952 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty granted
the U.S. military impunity from Japanese law and therefore conferred extraterritorial status. This meant that U.S. military personnel w
 ere able to
conduct military operations without the hassles of interference from the
Japanese government and were also given free rein to commit egregious
crimes such as rape without fear of punishment u
 nder Japanese law. Takada
added a gendered perspective to this criticism of extraterritoriality by attacking what I call “extraterritorial miscegenation.” This refers to sexual
assault, prostitution, and even so-called free-will romantic relationships between U.S. military personnel and Japanese women that purportedly take
place in the absence of full protection u
 nder Japanese sovereignty and often lead to the birth of “occupation babies.”
Takada’s speech was a harbinger of the troubled politics of sex and race
that continue to haunt postwar Japan today. Her valiant resistance to
racialized sexual oppression by the U.S. military certainly resonates with
contemporary transnational feminist movements against militarized vio
lence. Yet, at the same time, her reduction of the “occupation baby” to a
bilateral U.S.-Japan issue problematically leaves out the entire postcolonial legacy of Japan’s multiethnic empire. B
 ehind this omission lies a story
to what w
 ill become, following Takada’s demands, a systematic containment
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of the production of the “occupation baby” in mainland Japan that is intimately connected with the elimination of its imperial legacy. The voice of
this story comes from the islands of Okinawa which, as the final destination of mainland Japan’s unwanted miscegenation, became the vanishing point between Japan’s multiethnic imperial past and its monoethnic
democratic f uture.
This story began when the U.S. military moved into the vacuum opened
up by the collapse of Japanese empire and found an opportunity to actualize its role as a leader on the stage of world history. The coast was clear for
the American hegemon; across the Atlantic, Europe waned as the center of
power as it was devastated by war and deteriorated from successive waves of
colonial liberation.11 Across the Pacific, the fallen Japanese empire offered
access to the infinite potential of Asian markets. The problem, however,
was how to access t hese markets without resorting to outright colonization.
Given the principle of nonterritorial aggrandizement of the Atlantic Charter
(1941) and the Cairo Declaration (1943), outright colonial rule was not only
politically unfashionable, but also administratively unfeasible. For a solution, the U.S. military did what any other corporation would do after accomplishing a hostile takeover: Look to its predecessor for guidance.
The U.S. military sought to reinstate a modified version of the prized
project of late Japanese empire known as the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere. In place of a spread of formal and informal colonies that w
 ere now
allowed to openly display their animus for their former imperial master,
came a network of U.S. military bases committed to forming a regional
trading bloc centered on the reemergence of the Japanese economy. This
new arrangement avoided charges of colonialism—both old and new—as
the incoming U.S. military claimed to liberate each area from the clutches of
Japa
nese colonialism in the name of ethnic “self-
determination” for all
peoples based upon notions of national essence.12 What emerged was the
blueprint for a network of racialized territorial sovereignties across the Asia
Pacific that revolved around a core of white supremacy in the U.S. synced to
the “myth of monoethnicity” (tan’itsuminzoku no shinwa)13 in Japan.
The so-called occupation baby was the discursive bond that held the racial politics of the U.S. and Japan together through a process of mutual
exclusion. It was shunned by the U.S. at a time when anti-miscegenation
laws were still in effect in the white-supremacist American fatherland. It
was also shunned by Japan at a time when the popularization of the myth
of monoethnicity was instrumental in suppressing the legacy of its multiethnic empire. The outcry against extraterritorial miscegenation is but one
example of the multiethnicity of Japanese empire being suppressed in the
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name of protecting the purported purity of the Japanese race against racial mixing with U.S. military personnel.14 The greatest irony, of course,
is that while protest appeared to attack the U.S., it was entirely consistent
with the U.S. military’s common interest in eliminating the residual alegality from Japanese empire, or in other words, the multitude of subjects
who were ethnically, linguistically, and/or culturally heterogeneous and
unable to “return” to essentialist notions of a pre-imperial identity at the
tap of a magic wand. W hether coded as for or against the integrity of
Japanese sovereignty, both discourses unwittingly reinforced the assumption of its ethnic purity at the expense of obscuring how Japan was able to
shed its multiethnic colonial legacy and emerge as a sovereign state in 1952.
One answer to this “how” is none other than Okinawa.
It is well known that through the 1947 “Emperor’s Message,” Hirohito
offered Okinawa to serve as a U.S. military outpost in exchange for the
eventual recuperation of Japanese sovereignty.15 But this was only the beginning. Takada’s speech delivered after the Allied occupation in 1952 was
an early indication of what was to come. She continued, “In order to protect
the purity of Japan, this contamination cannot be washed out until all foreign troops are turned away.”16 In the decade following her statement,
activists across mainland Japan launched a largely victorious anti-base
movement that was animated by protest against extraterritorial miscegenation. Chapter 1 details how U.S. military facilities in mainland Japan w
 ere
reduced to one-quarter of their original size in the late 1950s, only to reappear in Okinawa where 70 percent of all U.S. military bases in Japan are
concentrated even though the prefecture makes up only 0.6 percent of total
state territory t oday. And with t hese facilities followed a culture of miscegenation. Today, the percentage of international marriage (between an American citizen groom and Japanese national bride) and mixed heritage birth
(between an American citizen father and Japanese national mother) in Okinawa Prefecture is approximately five times that of the national average.17
Whereas Japan was able to displace the discord with U.S. military bases
onto Okinawa, I argue that the relationships engendered by sexual encounters and the resulting mixed-race offspring in t hese islands embody a fundamental aporia within the U.S.-Japan network of global sovereignty: Both
are at once the purported evidence of Japan’s victimization by the United
States that bore upon their transfer to Okinawa, and at the same time, both
are the impediments to Okinawa’s ability to become fully integrated into
a monoethnic Japan as first-class nationals. Setting aside the legacy of
Japanese racism toward the “darker,” “hairier,” and “more barbaric”
Okinawan, one can see that the mixed-race subject is an unsightly reminder
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of Okinawa’s inability to “become Japanese,”18 hence suggesting the reason for the choice of Okinawa as a place to concentrate U.S. military bases
in the first place. And while one may certainly argue that the myth of
monoethnicity has given way to a more politically correct climate of multiculturalism in the post-reversion era, the celebration of mixed-race
Okinawan entertainers in Japanese popular culture t oday has done l ittle
to extricate Okinawa from its exceptional status. When the mixed-race
queen of Japanese pop Amuro Namie sang “Never End” at the 2000 G8
summit in Okinawa, many Okinawans wondered if she was singing about
the never-ending U.S. military presence on her native islands.
The question of miscegenation in Okinawa begs for an examination of the
biopolitical dimensions to the U.S.-Japan network of global sovereignty.
That is, what is the part icular logic of population management in postwar
Japan that benefited from U.S. military bases only insofar as the burden
of the physical presence of the bodies that operate them was exported to
Okinawa? It w
 ill be helpful to consider how biopolitics in Japan, as a continuing trajectory from the prewar era, came to terms with the postwar
U.S. military basing project for the purposes of framing the rest of this
book. While the U.S. military presence was useful to the continued development of the postwar Japanese economy, the next section resurrects
discussions on biopolitics put forth by Marxian scholars in prewar Japan
to suggest that miscegenation posed a threat to the continued growth of
the Japanese m iddle class formed along the lines of patriarchal monoethnic normativity.

Biopolitical State
The variety of biopolitics referenced in this book is perhaps closest to the
thread Michel Foucault explored in his 1978–1979 Birth of Biopolitics lectures
delivered at the Collège de France. It was t here that he brought biopolitics
most intimately into the heart of sovereignty and illuminated a groundbreaking theoretical shift from sovereignty keyed to reason of the state
(raison d’État) to sovereignty keyed to reason of the market, or what I call
a “biopolitical state.”
A fter the 1917 October Revolution, mounting economic unrest threatened states around the world with instability and drove a fundamental reconsideration of the relationship between the state and capitalism from the
perspective of a new political actor that Foucault, in a larger trajectory, would
go on to identify as the population. In this vein, he traced developments in
the United States amidst the Great Depression to the U.S. military occupa-
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tion of the Anglo-A merican German Bizona after World War II. The crisis
that assaulted Japanese empire, however, was already unfolding over a decade
earlier. Japan was hit with a series of rice riots in 1918, the emergence of
Korean independence movements in 1919, and mass unemployment on an
unprecedented scale a fter the manufacturing boom of World War I.19 How
would Japan amend the relationship between the disproportionately large
number of farmers and small and medium-sized enterprises on the one hand,
with a small handful of g
 iant zaibatsu20 that monopolized capital on the
other, precisely at the moment when Japan was being inundated with colonial surplus populations from the corners of its empire?
Living t hese historical conditions in real time, Marxian scholars in Japan
such as Uno Kōzō and Tosaka Jun started to theorize biopolitics long
before Foucault, even if they did not use the term. Uno reconceptualized
the “law of population” ( jinkō hōsoku)21 by problematizing the limitations
of “finance capital” and its perceived corrective, i.e., the “controlled economy” (tōsei keizai) of a socialist state.22 Because capitalists assumed a constant reserve of labor power ready for consumption, they paid little heed
to unemployment in times of recession and dismissed it as a problem to be
corrected by the “mechanism of the commodity economy.”23 But when economic depression threatened social unrest on a global scale, the continued
flow of labor power could no longer be taken for granted. The reproduction, management, and commodification of labor power became a central
conundrum for the biopolitical state. The conundrum, he argued, is that
capital is contingent on labor power for its continued operation, but at the
same time “labor power cannot be produced as a commodity by capital.”24
How would this “impossibility” (muri) be overcome?
Uno argued that the state needed to assume the role of organizing the
population for the commodification of l abor power through “social policy”
(shakai seisaku), 25 or what Michel Foucault would go on to identify as
“institutional frameworks”26 over twenty years later. This is the first
characteristic of a biopolitical state. He writes that “states w
 ere naturally
compelled to intervene to some degree” to the “vast number of unemployed workers” since it could “no longer simply leave it to the mechanism
of the commodity economy.”27 In this context, Tomiyama Ichirō and Katsuhiko Endo have respectively argued that the state intervened with spending policies to regulate the production of surplus populations in agrarian
villages28 and foster the development of small and medium-sized enterprises as the “primary absorbers of the relative surplus population” through
“industrial policy” and “administrative guidance.”29 Ken C. Kawashima
and Tomiyama have respectively shown how surplus populations from
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Korea and Okinawa became racialized as cheap labor against the formation of an ethnically “Japanese” middle class.
Yet, while social policy was essential, Uno himself writes that “it could
not provide a fundamental solution to the problem.”30 When taken to the
extreme, social policy could result in a controlled economy of a socialist
state such as that of Nazi Germany that ended in ruins.31 In his study on
the development of social policy in the interwar period, Katsuhiko Endo
reads Uno alongside Tosaka Jun to trace the emergence of a second, more
essential component of the biopolitical state. That is, “socialism as idealism,”32 or the ideological structure of a different kind of “socialist state”
that serves a “new form of capitalism.”33 Common to Uno and Tosaka is
an emphasis on the formation of a middle class that overcomes the contradictions of capital present in everyday life through serv ice to the ideal of a
Japanese state. At the risk of being reductive, this means that the middle
class took upon itself the task of managing the reproduction of l abor power
in serv ice to the state for capital.
Tosaka argues that the Japanese middle class was at the heart of the ideological form of “Japanism” (Nipponshugi) that inspired wartime fascism.
Not only was it the primary beneficiary of social policy, but it came to see
the biopolitical state as an ideal that would protect it from the greed of
monopoly capitalism and, hence, internalized the need to protect it from
perceived threats. In this way, Tosaka, in a similar vein as Foucault, introduced the biopolitical mechanism of social defense. Foucault wrote that
the “[p]olice is a set of interventions” that “ensure that living . . . can in fact
be converted into forces of the state,” or in other words, ensure that all life
“will be effectively useful to the constitution and development of the state’s
forces.”34 In his essay on what Tosaka called the “spirit of policing,”35
Kawashima goes a step beyond Foucault and shows not only how the police
function shifted to transform the act of living into a state force, but also
how this function came to be internalized by the masses, or what he calls
the “massification of the police, and the policification of the masses.”36 For
Kawashima, the police function dispersed throughout the masses, aimed
to care for and discipline life so that certain populations deemed “unproductive and superfluous to capitalist production . . . did not interrupt the
process of commodifying l abor power. . . .”37 Endo further articulates this
deadly mechanism as the “working class desire to become a member of a
community of the same that enables the State to utilize violence against
t hose who are ‘different,’ and who threaten to cause social disorder. . . .”38
This means that the “working class” targets life that is unintelligible to the
biopolitical state as a m
 atter of its own survival. By d
 oing so, Tosaka
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writes that “[f]ascism is precisely the political mechanism that” ironically
becomes useful to “monopoly capitalism” by taking “advantage of the petit bourgeois, or the middle class in the broad sense.”39 This is why he locates the heart of fascism in the “various medium-scale farmers, or the
rural middle class” that subscribed to idealist notions surrounding “feudalism” such as “agrarianism” and “familialism.” 40
It is at this juncture that biopolitics intersects most intimately with the
sovereign decision: Capital is contingent upon the integration of something
both irreducible and external to it (i.e., labor power), just as sovereignty is
contingent upon the integration of something both irreducible and external to it (i.e., the alegal). The commodification of labor power comes together with the sovereign decision to translate an unintelligible life force
into units of “difference” that become intelligible to the state for consumption. In this way, the sovereign decision is not monopolized by the state,
but as Stephen Legg writes in his rendering of the biopolitical dimension
of sovereignty, it becomes the “prerogative of the swarming sovereigns
within the population.” 41
While the ascent of the Japanese middle class had already set afoot before the end of the war, the economic reforms of the Allied occupation
expedited correctives to the limitations of Japanese empire and allowed for
its full-fledged emergence in the postwar era. The passage of the 1945
Labor Union Law that guaranteed workers the right to organize, engage
in collective bargaining, and strike,42 and measures taken in 1946 to dissolve the zaibatsu 43 widened the possibility for workers to take on a central
role organizing capitalist production. In an essay written one year into the
occupation, Uno identified the reemergence of biopolitics u nder the name
“industrial democratization.” 44 He argued for a two-way street in which
the worker weighs in to the production process and, by doing so, becomes
vested in seeing that capital makes returns to the very workers responsible
for its growth so as to avoid the catastrophe of unemployment. Hence,
more than s imple state intervention into industries from above, he argued
for a “management of capital by the state [that] is surveiled and reined in
by a powerf ul organization of workers.” 45
In this way, Uno not only provided a preview, but also a biopolitical
backstory to what Chalmers A. Johnson would go on to call the “developmental state”46 that intervened into industry in order to achieve “substantive social and economic goals,” 47 or what Bruce Cumings would go on to
discuss as “administrative guidance” that shaped prewar colonial society
as much as it did postwar Japanese society.48 As Johnson notes, these
industries were interfaced with social policies starting with the “three
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sacred treasures” of the lifetime employment system, the sen iority wage
system, and enterprise u nions that made the success of the industry integral to the very stability of the worker’s life. Work, then, was not a nine to
five job, but an economic expression of nationalism for which they w
 ere
quite literally willing to die for through overwork or karōshi. Hence, as subject and object of industrial production, work became a holy mission for
the state, for the company, and for the family—that is, the Japanese middle-
class family as the very locus of the reproduction of labor power at its
most literal level.
Scholars such as Johnson and Cumings have tracked the continuity of
state-implemented economic and social policies from the prewar to the
postwar period. Although not comprehensive, the implementation of major institutional frameworks designed to foster a mutually beneficial relationship between the U.S. military and the Japanese economy are traced
in this book, with focus on the management of sex around U.S. military
bases. While it is useful to understand how t hese institutional frameworks
became implemented from above, this book does not address them as part
of a comprehensive empirical history. Rather, this book contributes a study
of the second component of the biopolitical state: how sovereign power dispersed through the Japanese m iddle class governed by norms of monoethnicity continued to target life unintelligible to the state from below as
a cultural problem. Of course, the life that this book is most interested in
is Okinawan life and, more specifically, Okinawan life at its most extreme
point of unintelligibility—in the embrace of miscegenation.
The alegal that names this book, hence, is not just a state that is excluded
from sovereign power, but it is more fundamentally a form of life that exists in a condition of unintelligibility to the biopolitical state. Furthermore,
this unintelligibility is not reduced to the finality of a death sentence. In
other words, Alegal: Biopolitics and the Unintelligibility of Okinawan Life is
not an elegy that laments the tragedy of a p
 eople excluded by sovereign
power. Certainly, Okinawans have endured unspeakable acts of violence
and continue to live with them in their daily lives. Yet, as Ariko Ikehara
writes, Okinawans “neither reject nor accept their lives, but cope with and
negotiate the mundane in making life possible. . . .”49 To cope means to develop a strategy for living in the h
 ere and now, or what Ikehara calls a
50
negotiation with the “mundane.” This book looks in unexpected places
to articulate this philosophy of coping so distanced from the ideal of the
state that it is compelled to enhance its life force by other means. It traces
the excess of a life force that cannot be contained by the state, the capacity
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of that life force to transform the world in the absence of self-determination,
and the attempt to reclaim autonomy from the biopolitical state that monopolizes it.

Chapter Breakdown
Chapter 1 on mainland Japan in the 1950s and Chapter 2 on Okinawa from
1945 to 1952 contextualize the respective responses to U.S. military bases
in both locations in terms of debates surrounding sex work that catered to
the U.S. military. T
 hese two chapters act as complementary opposites:
Chapter 1 depicts the success of Japan’s anti-base protest as symbolic in
structure, while Chapter 2 depicts Okinawa’s failings of the same as allegorical in structure. Chapter 1 specifically shows how activists and politicians in mainland Japan launched a largely victorious anti-base movement
in which they protested “extraterritorial miscegenation” as the racial contamination of the Japanese nation through the literary genre of reportage. It
reads this reportage alongside Tosaka’s description of protest t oward private prostitution in the context of prewar Japan, where he located the formation of “familialism” (kazokushugi) as the symbolic substitution of the
family for the state. Chapter 2, by contrast, shows how Okinawans, surviving in a vacuum of sovereignty in the immediate postwar, had no choice
but to eke out life with an all-encompassing U.S. military presence. It shows
how their historical failure to be included in the biopolitical order in the
prewar era informed a tenuous and duplicitous attitude toward sovereign
power in the postwar era. Okinawans did not experience a sense of loss of
sovereign power that was assumed by mainland Japanese interlocutors discussed in Chapter 1, but rather a continuing fear of being excluded from
the biopolitical order in which they w
 ere exposed to the ongoing brutalities of death and sexual violence. This fear informed an instrumental obedience to the legal order that could be reinforced just as easily as it could
be disarticulated. Instead of judging Okinawan complicity or resistance to
the postwar order from the seat of sovereign power, Chapter 2 reads the
failure of recognition by, and failure of identification with, sovereign power
in terms of Benjamin’s notion of allegory. Allegory, for Benjamin, is the
antidote for symbol, and it attempts to forge a different relationship with
transcendental power. It does not assume that Okinawa’s failure to become
sovereign subjects before the law is disempowering, but instead seeks to
reclaim the field of Okinawa’s alegality implied by failure as the place of
the political.
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Chapter 3 on Okinawa during the period of the all-island struggle from
1952 to 1958, and Chapter 4 on Okinawa during the reversion era from
1958 to 1972, both show the limitations of resistance toward an assumed
single-state imperialism and instead depict Okinawa within a U.S.-Japan
led postwar regionalism. These two chapters are also complementary in
that both describe how workers in the base towns centered on the sex industry became impediments to the Old Left’s attempt to unify b
 ehind a
Japanese ethnic nation (Chapter 3), and the New Left’s attempt to unify
behind a Japanese proletarian class (Chapter 4). Chapter 3 reads the sex
worker as a lumpenproletariat subject who constantly fails representat ion
before the state, and it reads the potentiality for this kind of subject to inspire political transformation amongst the masses through the story of
Okinawa’s underground communist party. Chapter 4 reads literary and
filmic representat ions of the sex worker allegorically in order to question
the ways it is possible to hear her speak. It shows how the one segment of
Okinawan society that came to be despised for its inability to be mobilized
into anti-military protest became the very spontaneous agents who led a
moment of unplanned anti-military violence during the Koza Riot.
During the period between 1972 and 1995, discussed in Chapter 5, the
complicity between U.S. militarism and the Japanese political economy became unavoidably clear and prompted many Okinawans to conceptualize
a different kind of autonomy unmoored from promises of the Japanese
state. This was also a time when the anti-prostitution law went into effect
in Okinawa, and mixed-race individuals born to U.S. military personnel
and Okinawan women started to come of age and speak for themselves. In
place of self-determination that is predicated on the stability of a unified
self or unified nations as the precondition for individual agency or state
sovereignty, Chapter 5 considers a different sense of agency implied by
morphing matter. This refers to the material dimensions of Okinawa as a
borderland of the Pacific, where bodies continually mix. It does this through
a close reading of a rare published mixed-race memoir to show how the
author documents her failure to unify as a subject before the state. This
failure leads her to a different way to appreciate her life, not as a material
object that unifies as a subject before the state, but in the character of its
mutability that disengages the force of sovereign power. In this way, life
comes to matter for herself and not for the state.
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Japan in the 1950s: Symbolic Victims

This chapter addresses sexual labor in serv ice to the Allied forces in postwar Japan through the 1950s. Although the Japanese government organized
prostitution for the Allied forces in 1945, it was abolished in less than six
months because the U.S. military favored its operation in the sphere of the
f ree market. So-called private prostitution, however, was already fraught
with a history of controversy stemming from its operation during the Japa
nese empire. Here, this controversy is read through a 1935 essay written
by Kyoto School philosopher, Tosaka Jun, entitled “An Analysis of the Restoration Phenomenon.” In this essay, Tosaka showed how ethnic nationalists considered private prostitution inimical to the Japanese family system
that formed the basis of the middle class. In fact, it was in this context that
he theorized fascism as the logic of substitution, whereupon the family
came to symbolically stand in for the larger society or state through quasi-
religious feelings of “primitivism” or “mysticism.” This chapter examines
the postwar reincarnation of this kind of ethnic nationalism through reportage that focused almost obsessively on the private prostitute and repeated the logic of substitution of the Japanese family for the state. That
is, the sex worker, again, came to symbolize the victimization of Japan by
15
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“Western” capitalism, this time figured in terms of the imperialism of the
U.S. military basing project in Japan. This reactionary ethno-nationalism
registered on various points of the political spectrum and informed a largely
successful anti-base movement in the late 1950s. Concerned with the social stability of Japan, the United States shut down many mainland bases
and concentrated them in Okinawa.

Unmanageable Sexual L
 abor
The question of postwar sexual labor in serv ice of the U.S. military was a
question about the emergence of a postwar biopolitical Japanese state. How
would the state care for its population in serv ice to the U.S. military while
not only recuperating lost economic power, but also taking it to new
heights? Both states w
 ere unsatisfied with their respective solutions: The
United States would not be managed by Japan’s state-licensed system of
prostitution, and Japan would not be liberalized by America’s regulatory
system of private prostitution. In other words, this story starts with the
rapid rise and fall of the Recreation and Amusement Association (RAA) in
1945 that followed the prewar model of state-licensed prostitution and continued with the privatization of sex work through the emergence of street
walkers, called “panpan,” before ending with a large transfer of U.S. military
bases to Okinawa.
In preparation for the arrival of the occupation troops, sex topped the
Japanese political agenda directly after the war. Japanese frightened of the
“ghosts of the ‘Nanjing Massacre’ ”1 now feared not only the same sexual
violence they unleashed onto the conquered in China, but also the prece
dent set by territories Japan left vulnerable to American invasion, such as
Okinawa and Manila, that would translate into sexual violence for Japanese
women. Accordingly, on August 18, 1945, just three days a fter surrender,
the Police and Security Section of the Home Ministry sent a message to
all police departments “Regarding the Establishment of Special Comfort
Facilities for the Occupying Forces.”2 This resulted in the formal establishment of the RAA on August 29, 1945,3 backed by a 100 million-yen
budget equally split between business investors and the Japanese government.4 Ikeda Hayato, then director of the Finance Ministry’s tax bureau
and later prime minister credited for realizing Japan’s “economic miracle,”
approved the budget with the statement “100 million yen is a bargain if it
can protect the pure blood of the Yamato race.”5
In many respects, the RAA was an extension of the system of state-
licensed prostitution (kōshō seido)6 instituted shortly after the establish-
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ment of the Meiji state. The Japanese government issued licenses to
establishments engaged in the sex trade from which it then collected taxes.
The w
 omen often came from the poorest sectors of Japanese society and
were circulated throughout Japanese empire along with its expansion. No
different from other empires, Japan exported this system to its colonies
where not only Japanese women, but also colonized Taiwanese and Korean
women w
 ere pushed into the trade. After the 1937 Nanjing Massacre, Japan’s
system of state-licensed public prostitution quickly organized into the so-
called “comfort woman” system in which Korean, Taiwanese, Chinese,
Southeast Asian, Japanese, and Dutch w
 omen w
 ere forced into brutal
sexual slavery for the Japanese Imperial Army during the Pacific War.
Then shortly following defeat, the RAA replaced its precursor and forced
Japanese women to serve not the Japanese, but now the Allied forces. Instead of coercing mostly colonized w
 omen to serve a multiethnic Japanese
empire, Japanese women w
 ere now mobilized as a “breakwater of flesh”
(nikutai no bōhatei)7 to protect the “racial purity” of the Japanese population.
Class also became a f actor as Japanese officials targeted destitute w
 omen8
who had lost their families and homes as a result of selective air raids that
gutted poor neighborhoods while leaving wealthy homes and buildings
available for the incoming occupation forces.9 In an official RAA statement, recruits w
 ere “to protect and cultivate the racial purity (minzoku no
junketsu)” of the Japanese people for “a hundred years in the f uture” and
become the “unseen subterranean pillar that holds up the foundation of
the postwar social order.”10 Deputy Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro had
similarly requested the superintendent general to “Please protect the
daughters of Japan.”11
At its height, about 70,000 women serv iced the RAA.12 Despite its popularity amongst the soldiers, the RAA was short-lived. In January 1946,
less than six months a fter its establishment, the Supreme Commander for
the Allied Powers (SCAP) issued a memorandum stating “The maintenance of licensed prostitution in Japan is in contravention of the ideals of
democracy and inconsistent with the development of individual freedom
throughout the nation.”13 That same month, the Police and Security Section of the Home Ministry ordered that RAA be officially disbanded with
55,000 prostitutes in serv ice.14 SCAP was reluctant to participate in state-
licensed prostitution b
 ecause, simply put, it looked bad. As Lisa Yoneyama
has convincingly argued, managing the trans-Pacific politics of sex was integral to the emergence of a Cold War regime centered on a system of
“Anglo-A merican-centered international security,” whereupon the U.S.
touted democratic norms of a f ree nation in order to justify its elimination
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of an “absolute evil.”15 Patronizing organized prostitution was difficult to
pass off as a moral virtue. And, as if to corroborate this point, Michiko
Takeuchi has similarly shown how the RAA was damaging to the United
States, which was engaged in ideological warfare with the Soviet Union as
it jockeyed for the role of global leader.16
In addition to ideological concerns, RAA was also taxing the health of
the soldiers with venereal disease (VD) sharply on the rise. But, in economic terms, the abolition of state-regulated military prostitution paved
the way for the privatization of the sex industry. As John Lie writes,
“[p]rostitution was . . . not abolished but simply continued in a new privatized form.”17 The U.S. military needed prostitution to occur in the
sphere of the f ree market where it could wash its hands of institutional
responsibility.
First, in response to the prohibition of sexual slavery, the security chief
of the Home Ministry reiterated on February 22, 1946, that “lewd acts
committed by an individual’s free w
 ill” were a “different m
 atter.”18 On
November 14, 1946, the Yoshida cabinet designated “special areas for
restaurants” (tokushu inshokuten no chiiki) which were really a cover for prostitution without formal legal recognition.
Second, the privatization of the sex industry further shifted from management by private industry to self-management. The attempt to manage
and contain the mobility of sexual labor gave way to the iconic “panpan”
or sex worker who took to the streets. In contrast to the history of socio
economically and geographically limiting prostitution to certain sectors
of Japanese society, these streetwalkers came from more diverse backgrounds and were afforded more liberty to navigate the terrain on their
own accord. As Sarah Kovner assesses in her study on sex work in postwar
Japan, “One reason the panpan phenomenon was so disturbing was that
it appeared to mean that any w
 oman—even an educated, middle-class
mother or d
 aughter—could find a place in the sex industry.”19 Surveys conducted during occupation corroborate this assessment as well. According
to a 1948 survey of two hundred streetwalkers, t hose who had either started
or graduated from elementary school, m
 iddle school, high school, and
post-secondary school figured in at 27.5 percent, 18 percent, 47.5 percent,
and 5.5 percent respectively.20 As the survey notes, different from sex
workers confined to brothels, the entrepreneurial streetwalkers capitalized on a high level of intellectual and English language skills to manage
negotiations directly with patrons. The streetwalkers’ self-cultivated abilities yielded higher profits that w
 ere retained by the worker. Making more
than their brothel counterparts,21 they took their profits and reinvested in
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themselves by buying the latest fashion and cosmetics. Robert Kramm
estimates that t here were between fifty thousand and seventy thousand
sex workers who catered to U.S. military personnel in Tokyo alone during
the occupation period.22
Certainly, the streetwalker was a nuisance to public sanitation as the
U.S. military and the Japanese police attempted to crack down on them
by hunting them down and subjecting them to forced VD inspections. But
while much has been said about the brute institutional power that bore down
on the lives of these women, there is also an argument to be made about the
bottom-up formation of a Japanese middle class that saw the streetwalker
as a social threat. This was not an entirely new phenomenon, but as discussed in the next section, Tosaka Jun had already started to consider how
the so-called private prostitute was targeted by Japanist ideologues integral to the formation of a m
 iddle class in the mid-1930s.23

The F
 amily as the State
In 1935, Tosaka Jun published a piece of social commentary on prostitution that would go on to become part of his well-k nown Japanese Ideology.
Earlier that year, a group of brothel o
 wners attacked abolitionist forces who
worried that the state’s public involvement with licensed prostitution (kōshō
seido) looked bad in the eyes of “Western civilization.”24 The brothel o
 wners
instead praised the glory of preserving this purportedly native tradition,
pitched as an extension of the traditional Japanese family system (kazoku
seido),25 and gestured t oward the criminalization of private prostitution.
In his commentary, Tosaka was not shy to point out the “comical” irony
of this nostalgia for a precapitalist past when it was not only produced by,
but was also an aid to, monopoly capitalism in Japan.26 For him, t here was
no temporal continuity from the feudal family system of the Tokugawa era
to Japan in 1935, but only an attempt to force social cohesion amongst the
multitudinous masses whose communities had been cataclysmically uprooted by capitalism. Far from antagonizing capitalism, their collective
fantasy of the days past actually enabled it by providing a logic of social
cohesion as servitude to the state that not only aided in the organization
of labor power for consumption, but also provided foot soldiers from the
countryside to fight in its imperialist wars. Hence, instead of examining
the contradictions of capitalism through historical materialism, an emerging middle class indulged in a historical idealism that assumed a “trans
historical” (chōrekishitekina) Japanese essence rooted in a primitive past.27
Whereas prostitution should have been addressed as a problem of poverty
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amongst “proletarian farmers in shackles,”28 it was instead recuperated as
the patriarch’s ability to manage his f amily as a “symbol” (shōchō) or “meta
phor” (hiyu)29 of the state’s ability to manage its people.
Here, Tosaka’s evocation of symbol is closely linked to Schmitt’s concept of sovereign power. If the sovereign, as defined by Schmitt, is “he who
decides on the exception,”30 then the sovereign becomes a symbolic standin for God: The decision is a performative act that sutures the gap between
an entity that is both of the p
 eople (and therefore must abide by the law),
and an entity that is simultaneously above the people (and therefore capable of deciding when a special exception can be made to the law based
on faith in God). Symbol, as well, is characterized by a gap between the sign
and the referent that is sutured by transcendental power. For example, in
his reading of the notion of symbol in Benjamin’s Trauerspiel, Lutz Koepnick writes that t hese “metaphorical substitutions disrupt or transcend
the given continuum of meaning, fueling it with external significance, and
thereby elevating it to some higher poetic stance.”31 Here, the sovereign as
a stand-in for God interrupts the secular “continuum of meaning” by virtue
of appealing to the “external significance” of transcendental power, whereupon it becomes elevated “to some higher poetic stance.” The important
insight here is that the burden of interpreting the gap—of the individual
capacity to connect the dots between two points of sign and referent—is
surrendered to transcendental power. Koepnick continues:
According to Benjamin’s Trauerspiel book, symbolism ultimately
becomes complicit with myth b
 ecause it hides the very mechanism of
signification upon which it is based. As it invokes totality and closure,
classical symbolism seeks to transcend time and history, thereby
displacing the anguish of life with images of stabilized harmony and
eternal perfection.32

According to this passage, symbol, along with myth, “hides the very mechanism of signification upon which it is based,” or in other words, hides the
fact that it is denying the individual the agency of interpretation and feeding the people preassembled narratives that seductively glow with the
phantasmagoria of “stabilized harmony and eternal perfection.”
Of course, different from Schmitt, Tosaka is not writing of a sovereign
entity that rules the masses, but sovereignty of a biopolitical state, whereupon the decision becomes “prerogative of the swarming sovereigns within
the population.”33 Reading the piece carefully, we can see that Tosaka notes
the state’s intervention into the population as state-licensed prostitution,34
but places his analytic emphasis on how power operates from the bottom-
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up on the level of symbol. In this way, he writes that the familialists relied
on “hermeneutic expression” (kaishaku hyōgen) to argue that the attack on the
family system was r eally an attack on society and, by extension, the state.
This “idealistically (kan’nentekini) alleviates the trouble” caused by the
“problem of unemployment and poverty” that encroaches upon the “family
system.”35 In other words, the contradictions of capital that present in the
here and now are “alleviate[d]” or deferred to a higher power, i.e., the
Japanese state in the image of the feudal f amily system that is to be recuperated from the past as “fukkoshugi”36 (restorationism) toward a utopian
f uture. He describes the logic of substitution in detail as follows.
In a family, for example, two members who are of two hearts and two
bodies can be of one heart and one body, or one heart and two bodies.
That feeling is beyond analytic explanation and must be completely
intuitive and immanent. While the logic in which two different t hings
can be directly and intuitively thought to be one is completely that of
symbol or metaphor, it is as if the logic of familialism was such that
the family is nothing more than a metaphor for society.37

The feeling of communion in the intimate sphere of family life is substituted for a feeling of communion amongst members of society, or as he
states elsewhere, subjects of the state.
Here he suggests that the substitution is sutured by a “religious feeling” that is found in “mysticism” (shinpishugi) or “primitivism” ( genshishugi).38 And while he agrees that Japan is different from liberalist states
founded on Rousseau’s social contract, the “primitivism” of the former
is nonetheless common to the “naturalism” (shizenshugi) of the latter in its
“historical idealist content.”39 It is in this sense that he argues that while
Japan may be more socialist than individualistic, it nonetheless subscribes
to the same liberalist tenants of idealism.
Against the popular assumption that Japanese fascism was defeated
alongside the military defeat of imperial Japan, Tosaka’s linkage of fascism
to liberalism as socialism is useful in tracing the triad’s reemergence in the
postwar era. While fascism was replaced by democracy (or what Nomura
Kōya w ill go on to call “democratic colonialism,” as discussed later), the
ethos of social cohesion and servitude to the state was not only alive and
well in the postwar era, but reinvigorated in modified form. For example,
Chalmers Johnson cautions against assuming that the “Japanese consensus” integral to Japan’s well-k nown “industrial policies” that drove its postwar economic success is rooted in an essentialist cultural trait. Rather, he
attributes it to the “mobilization of a large majority of the population to
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support economic goals” during the 1930s.40 The biopolitical state that was
in gestation during interwar Japan was now guided through a safe delivery in the postwar era. Emerging as the developmental state that works
closely with the middle class for economic prosperity, socialism had now
found new ground for expression.
Understanding this continuity is crucial for contextualizing the implications of extraterritorial miscegenation in the postwar era. As Tosaka
showed with the attack on private prostitution in the 1930s, the attack on
the streetwalker had immense, perhaps unsurpassed symbolic value. An
examination of anti-base reportage in the next section shows how the issue struck the heart of the m
 iddle class by most directly affecting its
children. Not only could any middle-class woman potentially become a
streetwalker, but reportage incited the fear that any middle-class child living around the numerous military bases throughout mainland Japan
could be adversely placed u
 nder her cultural influence to the detriment of
the entire nation’s f uture. In this way, the streetwalker became a powerf ul
symbol for the victimization of the Japanese family as a stand-in for the
victimization of the state by the U.S. military.

Anti-Base Reportage
At the end of an almost seven-year occupation, Japan was released from
the censoring eyes of the Allied Powers and overcome by a wave of social
unrest expressed most powerfully through the trope of extraterritorial
m iscegenation. A Washington Post article indexed this new discursive
trend by stating “Japan’s independence was signaled by a rash of articles
critical of the Occupation. A favorite theme was illegitimate children fathered by occupation soldiers.” 41 This topic was particularly popular in
anti-base reportage, a literary genre invested in the nonfictional depiction of experience designed to speak truth to power in serv ice of political
protest.
Reportage itself was part of what Toba Kōji calls the “1950s age of the
document” that witnessed a proliferation of documentary films, photo
graphy, and reportage art.42 Within the literary reportage genre, Toba
catalogs the documentation of protest in various social movements from
dam construction to opposition to U.S. military base operations.43 The
earliest years of 1952 and 1953 that I focus on here describe the U.S. military
as infringing on Japan’s sovereignty and document the impact the U.S.
military bases have on the everyday lives of the Japanese people as a cultural
problem.
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Kanzaki Kiyoshi, a central figure in the early anti-base reportage
movement who quickly became an authority on U.S. military prostitution, opens The Town That Sells Its Daughters by characterizing the U.S.
military base presence in Japan as a form of colonialism. He writes, “. . . to
protect children from an environment that has been quasi-colonized is to
protect Japan’s f uture and to do the work of completing the independence
of the race (minzoku).”44 Similarly, editors of Children of the Bases quickly
follow suit and argue that “. . . Japanese nationals who have long looked
down upon the Asian races have fallen into a new colonial condition” vis-
à-v is the U.S. military.45 This “new colonial condition” resonates closely
with the 1951 Japanese Communist Party (JCP) manifesto which designated Japan as a “colony/dependent state.”46 It depicts Japanese sovereignty
wounded by colonialism that results in the successive loss of autonomy over
the economy and then society. This trickle-down erosion is what foregrounds the trope of extraterritorial miscegenation within anti-base reportage as a manifestation of colonial violence that had penetrated Japanese
society to its innermost core.
Inomata Kōzō, a Socialist Party politician, provides a concrete definition of the violation of Japanese sovereignty in his coauthored book Camp
Japan very early on in 1953. He writes that the grounds for U.S. military
extraterritoriality in Japan can be found in the Administrative Agreement
referred to in Article 3 of the 1951 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. As commonly known, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was signed just hours after
the San Francisco Peace Treaty that terminated the Allied occupation and
formally actualized Japan’s independence as a sovereign state. The Security Treaty allowed for a continued U.S. military presence in Japan, and
the Administrative Agreement (renewed as the Status of Forces Agreement
in 1960) stipulated the specific terms of the arrangement. According to
Article 17 of the Agreement, members of the U.S. armed forces, including
its civilian components and dependents, fall u nder the “exclusive jurisdiction” of the United States when arrests are made on “all offenses which
may be committed in Japan.” U
 nder such circumstances, the “United States
serv ice courts and authorities shall be willing and able to try and, on conviction, to punish all offenses.” 47 Inomata and others make their case for
the existence of extraterritoriality based on the second and third points
regarding the arrest and prosecution for criminal offenses in which the
U.S. military is guaranteed virtual impunity from Japanese law. The aim
of extraterritoriality in the Security Treaty was to allow the United States
to treat Japan not as a state, but as a military base that could be freely used
without the entanglements of the law. As General Douglas MacArthur of
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SCAP stated, the “entire area of Japan must be regarded as a potential base
for defensive maneuver with unrestricted freedom reserved to the United
States as the protecting power through her local commander. . . .” 48
Unlike the San Francisco Peace Treaty that was rigorously debated in
the Japanese Diet, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru failed to introduce the
content of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty as required by Japanese law. In
fact, he was only given the details of the Security Treaty in English the
night prior to its signing, whereupon his advisors worked on a Japanese
translation.49 He took it upon himself to sign the treaty as the sole representative of Japan without anyone outside his immediate circle knowing
the content. According to Inomata, this was the moment that “Japan lost
its total independence.”50
Kimura Kihachiro, also a politician from the Socialist Party, argues that
this compromising of Japanese sovereignty subsequently led to “economic
extraterritoriality.” He writes, “With no autonomy a fter the so-called ‘Accords,’ we lost our independence and fell under the rule of America’s military
economy which can be assessed in one word as a [military] ‘base economy.’ ”51 As he points out, a base economy is not simply the local accommodation of the military while the state maintains its overall economic
autonomy. Rather, it is an overhaul of the entire economic infrastructure
in support of military basing operations.
To support his claim, Kimura argues the “postwar resolution funds”52
that Japan paid annually to the occupying forces for the purchase of goods
and labor amounted to extortion that contributed to Japan’s rampant postwar inflation.53 The procurement of goods for the U.S. military also altered the inherent structure of the Japanese economy so that its main
directive was skewed toward the needs of the U.S. military, particularly
during the Korean War. This not only led to the “loss of autonomy in the
Japanese economy,”54 but also tied it directly to U.S. political interests. Fi
nally, he describes Japan as a “military colony of America” which “castrated the autonomy and independent spirit of the Japanese nation”55 by
“preserving Japan’s feudal and monopolistic institutions.”56
If the erosion of political sovereignty led to a loss of economic auto
nomy, then reportage detailing the realities of military base life revealed
how the social fabric of Japan was unraveled to the core: “Just as the Japa
nese economy in its entirety is a base economy, Japanese society in its entirety is a base society.”57 In a society of military bases, not only are
farmers displaced from their land and forced to open up businesses that
cater to the agent of their displacement, but they must also facilitate a local
base economy centered on the sale of sex. Hence, the rally against extra-
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territoriality quickly became expressed in the most visually explicit,
sensational, and immediate form as a movement against U.S. military
prostitution.
Following the arguments against political and economic extraterritoriality, I call this phenomenon “extraterritorial miscegenation.” In this first
sense, it refers to miscegenation that occurs u nder conditions in which it
is assumed that sovereignty is either absent or compromised. With the loss
of sovereignty, Japan was afforded little to no legal recourse in cases of sexual violence. This fostered widespread resignation to the perceived threat
of sexual violence and incited appreciation for the need of sex workers who
supposedly “sacrifice themselves for ordinary w
 omen.”58 Economic extraterritoriality provided the structural conditions for a booming sex industry around the U.S. military bases that made significant contributions to
the economy. As a banker remarked in a speech on the economy of Sasebo, a
major U.S. military base town in Nagasaki Prefecture: “We shouldn’t despise the streetwalkers, we should thank them. According to my calculation,
they earn approximately $1,000,000. This money circulates according to the
dictates of economic principle and serves the people of Sasebo.”59 Not only
did women earn money through the various forms of fraternization, but the
entertainment establishments and housing areas that accompanied the sex
trade created a local economy centered either directly or indirectly on it.
However, we get a fuller sense of what is implicated by extraterritorial
miscegenation in other parts of the texts. Regarding political and economic
extraterritoriality, reportage assumes a set form: It provides information
to buttress the repetitious political slogan of sovereignty v iolated. However, it switches form when suggesting that the effects of extraterritorial
miscegenation are detrimental to the reproduction of Japanese society. The
social fabric of Japan, as a purported patriarchal monoethnic state, starts
to unravel as it loses its ability to mobilize its own c hildren into the postwar national effort. Hence, many works such as Children of the U.S. Military Bases draw heavily on quotations, essays, or poems from children
because they argue that “youthful eyes are able to keenly see through the
problem.”60 The narrative structure of unmediated language that speaks
truth to power allows the reader to directly wrestle with the contradictions the c hildren face, to feel the weight of innocent yet refreshingly clear
criticism of the U.S. military, and also to decry an ominous Japanese f uture.
For example, a second-g rade elementary school girl from Yokosuka
states she “wants to become” a streetwalker b
 ecause they “always appear
fashionable” and “get a lot of money and chocolate from the Americans.” 61
However, a male high school student has different feelings when he sees a
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“streetwalker breastfeeding her baby, and then moves on to call on clients
as her husband walks away nonchalantly with the baby on his back.” For
him, she encapsulates “contempt and pity, poverty and the problem of evil,
and contradictions within society.” 62 In any case, the streetwalker is so
ubiquitous that c hildren “play around, pretending to be panpan and pretending to kiss.” 63 One sixth-g rade elementary school girl from Sasebo
thinks this inappropriate role play is the “panpan’s fault” and states that “it
would be nice if they would just hurry up and go away.” 64 Another third-
grade elementary school boy from Yokosuka writes that the woman who
rents from his house “creates huge disturbances” with the soldiers, causing him to get “so upset” that he “can’t study anymore.”65 W hether out on
the streets, at home, or at school, t hese children impart a sense of urgency
in an i magined community of parental readers to improve the social conditions in which they come of age. It is consistent with other media portrayals in which, as Kovner notes, the panpan is presented as a “threat to
the nation and its c hildren.”66
Finally, the purported racial contamination of the Japanese population
is depicted as the final frontier in a long line of violations. A sixth-grade
elementary school girl from Tottori Prefecture writes:
We have two of them [panpan] at our house. Two of my classmates
come from homes that rent out to them as well. The mixed-race
children who are born between the panpan and soldiers go to daycare
with my younger b
 rother and younger s ister. T
 hese are the characteristics that define our village.
Next year, t hese mixed-race children w ill enter elementary
school. . . . I don’t remember the exact number, but it is something like
2,000. I can’t believe we w ill be studying alongside this large number
of mixed-race children in the same school.67

Through the logic of substitution, t hese mixed-race c hildren are a standin for their parents’ controversial relationship and are not seen as deserving of the same rights to participate in society, starting with the right to
an education. A life beyond the conditions of their birth is foreclosed in
the f uture.
One middle school boy from Yokohama writes that the “8 million yen”
G.I.s leave behind each month during their R & R from the Korean War is
good for an impoverished Japan, but “the [mixed-race] humans they leave
behind are not appreciated.”68 Even in her sympathy, a m
 iddle school girl
from Aomori Prefecture reifies the assumption of racial purity by lamenting
the tainting of blood flowing through the veins of young Japanese women.
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When the U.S. military exercises are done
children are given gum and pocket money, and [the G.I.s] seek
out the dwellings of young w
 omen.
As [one] wonders if this is okay,
blood is tainted
and [a woman] is made to have a baby.
How pitiful that baby.69

An essay written by a middle school boy from Aomori Prefecture speaks
of the other side of such sympathy by depicting mixed-race c hildren as unwelcome intruders in the population that should be contained.
If the status quo continues, then I worry that all of Japan w
 ill be overtaken by mixed-race children within the next few years. American
G.I.s and the panpan will turn the present Japanese race into an AmericanJapanese hybrid . . .
If mixed-race children continue to be born, and if American
culture is integrated [into Japan] without careful thought, then I
suppose that the unique Japanese culture handed down to us from our
ancestors w ill disappear. We need to protect Japanese history and
Japan’s unique beautiful culture.70

 ere the child evokes an ancestral Japanese culture encroached upon by
H
the “American G.I.s” in a similar way that the Japanists evoked a primitive
culture encroached upon by “Western enlightenment.” Furthermore, the
implication of the disappearance of Japan’s racial purity and the erosion of
its native cultural forms replicates Takada Nahoko’s linkage of the “occupation baby” to the atomic bomb described in the Introduction. If it
seems that the claim is duplicated, it is: Takada had in fact referred to reportage on prostitution in her statement. The intertextuality between reportage and political speech speaks to the authority this genre of writing
carried in the formation of policy in Japan.
Yet, at the same time, the child suggests that the problem of extraterritorial miscegenation is not only about the violation of sovereignty from
above, but the way it interferes with cultural production from below: “We
need to protect Japanese history and Japan’s unique beautiful culture.”
The child hits on a critical theoretical slippage. Is the streetwalker victimized by the top-down violence of American imperialism, or is she socially excluded by the bottom-up violence of an emerging working class
that seeks repossession of the sovereignty to collectively manage the reproduction of its own labor power? Just as Tosaka showed how the threat
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of the private prostitute to the f amily system was symbolic of Japan’s victimization to “Western enlightenment,” the threat of the streetwalker to
families attempting to recover from the war was symbolic of postwar Japan’s
victimization to the U.S. military. By reporting the “fact” of miscegenation in reportage—as opposed to depicting it in fiction—t he degradation
of the Japanese family was allowed to most directly substitute for the victimization of the Japanese state. In short, postwar anti-base reportage was
deeply invested in reporting the fact of oppression as part of a cultural
project that sought to turn the postwar fiction of a patriarchal monoethnic
Japanese state into a reality.

The Proletarian Arts
Although miscegenation was certainly portrayed in works of fiction,71 the
topic loomed undeniably large in reportage. What was it about the figure
of the streetwalker that took so readily to this genre?
Historically, reportage has roots in the proletarian arts movement in
Japan. Shortly a fter writers in Europe such as Egon Erwin Kisch called for
a proletarian art based on documentary in the mid-1920s, Japanese report
literat ure (hōkoku bungaku) and documentary literature (kiroku bungaku)
emerged. According to Kurahara Korehito, one of the leading communist
literary theorists of the time, the purpose of this genre in Japan was to empower the masses to take literature into its own hands as its creators and
compare their experiences of struggle with one another. All this was to be
accomplished through the imperative to “accurately document revolutionary reality.” 72 But how was it possible to determine exactly what this
“reality” was?
Debates on literary realism w
 ere integral to the development of proletarian realism by members of the Federation of Japanese Proletarian Artists (herein referred to as “NAPF”) that formed in 1928 and dissolved in
1934. A prominent member of NAPF, Aono Suekichi, points out that the
documentation of everyday reality is nothing new to Japanese literat ure,
as it had been a characteristic of naturalism at the turn of the century.
However, whereas the “artistic objective of the theory of naturalism is the
reproduction or copying of reality” as it appears in a static moment, proletarian realism understands the temporality of reality as pregnant with
potentiality toward the f uture.73 Specifically, writers must document with
a “purposive consciousness” (mokuteki ishiki) from the standpoint of the
f uture of “proletarian class struggle.”74
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This development of a class, as opposed to individual consciousness, is
central for Kurahara as well. Determining which fragments of everyday
life to document should not be determined by individual consciousness as
stressed in naturalism, but from the standpoint of a collective class consciousness. He argues that the “human” cultivated in the arts h
 ere is not a
generalized abstraction, but a “total ‘human’ of the proletariat that only
emerges through class struggle.”75
Here we can detect the influence of Georg Lukács. He is import ant
because he illustrates how the cultivation of the “total ‘human’ of the proletariat” plays out in a distinction between reportage and realist literat ure.
Lukács calls for the formation of class consciousness of the proletariat as
the only t hing that “can point to the way that leads out of the impasse of
capitalism.”76 Specifically, he argues that the “worker can only become conscious of his existence in society when he becomes aware of himself as a
commodity.”77 Hence, for Lukács, as well as the proletarian realists, the
role of literature is to de-reify reality by revealing the driving forces
of history invisible to consciousness. On this point—of presenting the
particularity of the fact in reference to the totality of class relations—
the proletarian realists in Japan and Lukács agree that reportage can
share much with realist literat ure.
Anti-base reportage is no exception in its affinity with proletarian realism. Reports compiled from across the country work to overcome regional
difference and foster not prewar “class,” but now postwar “national” consciousness. The voices transpire as innocent and, at times, contradictory;
yet this tension is presented as the growing pains in the developmental
process of becoming, and does not undermine its overall ideological message. Finally, reportage cannot be more specific in revealing the stakes of
Japan’s biopolitical f uture, b
 ecause much of the genre is told through the
voice of children or describes the effects U.S. militarism had on their
lives. The reproduction of labor power was a national crisis to be shared
with individuals across Japan.
However, the impasse between the two genres, one based on fact and
the other fiction, is encountered in the “way that facts and their interconnections are combined, i.e., the part icular and the general, the individual
and the typical, the accidental and the necessary.”78 In “Reportage or
Portrayal?” Lukács charges that reporting the facts alone results in the
“unportrayed subjectivity of the author” who attempts to “convince by
reason alone”79 through a “(scientific) reproduction of reality.”80 In other
words, it is lacking in the “dialectical interaction” between a purportedly
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objective reality and subjective consciousness that literat ure can more effectively cultivate. The “proletarian revolutionary writer,” on the other
hand, “always has in mind the driving forces of the overall process”81 and
constantly seeks to uncover the totality of class relations. The p
 eople must
be led by ideals established by the intelligentsia.
Kurahara criticized report or documentary literat ure on similar grounds.
He wrote that writers who merely record the facts cannot adequately “serve
as educators of the masses.”82 He argues that while it is impossible to summarize ( gaikatsu) a h
 uman belonging to a different class, occupation, age,
sex, and so on, it is possible to create an “artistic type” amongst writers of
t hose various categories.83 This “type” does not simply record t hings as
they are, but in the “process of its germination.”84 In the case of both writers, reality is not something that is grasped in the moment, but something
that retroactively comes true through the process of positing its totality
in a f uture yet to come.
It is in this context that Lukács writes of a definitive difference between
the two genres with respect to the lumpenproletariat. For him, the appearance of the lumpenproletariat in reportage detracts from the ability to
grasp the totality of the social process and instead only myopically focuses
on the tragedy of state violence as a singular event.
Firstly, the exposure of the bourgeoisie’s repressive apparatus, which is
made with good revolutionary intent, is given a false emphasis
politically. It appears all-powerful and invincible. What is missing is
the struggle and resistance of the working class. The proletariat is
depicted as the impotent object of the judicial system. Indeed, in most
cases what we see are not genuine representatives of the class, but
rather characters who have already been worn down and had the life
beaten out of them, p
 eople incapable of resistance who have fallen into
the lumpenproletariat. Even where workers in struggle do become the
object of the judicial machinery (e.g. the Cheka trial in Leipzig), they
are still mere objects of the system, and their class-conscious and
combative attitude cannot find effective expression.85

Reading anti-base reportage against this passage, we can see that its characters are “depicted as the impotent object of the judicial system,” or more
specifically, the impotent object of international law as nationals belonging to a dependent state subservient to the United States. H
 ere, the state
is one that works in serv ice of capital by exhausting the “people” to the
point where they are “incapable of resistance” and fall “into the lumpen-
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proletariat.” By focusing on such “impotent objects,” reportage “gives false
emphasis politically” because its singularity is disconnected from the totality of class struggle.
Rather, Lukács implies that it is only by positing the fictional totality
of a revolutionary f uture that the worker can escape the fetish of reality
assumed by reportage and embrace a more authentic consciousness in
which he or she becomes an empowered subject—not “impotent object”—
of struggle. He points to the formation of a different kind of sovereignty
through artistic production: the ability to translate the specificity of the
fact into the fictional totality of class struggle as a condition of the formation of a working class.
When considered in this context, then, anti-base reportage suggests a
complementary combination of both elements. While Lukács was interested in g
 oing beyond exposing the “bourgeoisie’s repressive apparatus”
as “all-powerful” by pursuing revolutionary struggle with the working
class, anti-base reportage remained fixated on showing the “all-powerful”
victimization of the Japanese state to the U.S. military. It followed the JCP
two-stage program in which Japan must first overcome U.S. imperialism
that infringes upon its sovereignty in order to subsequently approach the
problem of class struggle within Japan. In this sense, the streetwalker as
lumpenproletariat subject was instrumental in staging Japan as an “impotent object.” At the same time, its all-inclusive scope of not only problematizing the lumpenproletariat, but d
 oing so through the voice of
children, allowed for a substitution of the family for the state: The dire
f uture of the Japanese family was equated to the dire f uture of the Japanese
state. H
 ere, the idealism of mythological time of what Tosaka called “restorationism” snuck in past the materialism of historical time. In other words,
by protesting the sexual predations of the U.S. military on Japanese
women, many essentialist claims about the existence of “Japanese culture”
as a transhistorical ethnic substratum emerged in the process. In this context, the sex worker as the lumpenproletariat could only exist as a threat to
the formation of a biopolitical state or object in need of rescue. The assumption of her violation by an external foreign entity produced the inner
space of “Japanese culture,” which took as its primary concern the inability to properly reproduce itself according to norms of patriarchal mono ere integral to the formation of a
ethnicity.86 These norms, in turn, w
Japanese middle class. And as was the case in interwar Japan, the formation of the middle class was not divorced from the politics of population
management in Okinawa.
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Securing Okinawa for Miscegenation
As the authors of the various anti-base reportage texts show with convincing detail, the United States is indeed guilty of compromising Japanese
sovereignty at certain historical junctures. This is not my dispute. Rather,
my point is that it is one moment in a larger historical development of
biopolitics in which Foucault traced the emergence of an overlapping but
irreducible economic register that “steals away from the juridical form
of . . . sovereignty.”87 This is a sovereignty that makes state interventions
into the population from above, but more so, it is shaped from below by
the people who have come to govern themselves internally according to
reason of the market. Although the overwhelming tendency in con
temporary Okinawan studies is to lodge Okinawa as the unfortunate
scapegoat of Japan’s subservience to the United States, a growing number
of people from the grassroots to academe have been articulating the ongoing effects of Japanese colonialism, manifest in its overwhelming concentration of U.S. military bases in Okinawa, as an everyday practice of
racism in Japan.
Two contemporary scholars of Okinawa, Gavan McCormack and
Nomura Kōya, represent aspects of these positions respectively. Mc
Cormack, who popularized the client state thesis in the context of Japa
nese studies,88 suggests that Japan has been subject to the rule of the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP), which is backed by bureaucratic elites and disconnected from the “popular, grassroots, democratic movement.”89
By contrast, Nomura argues that Japanese democracy, perfectly compatible with colonialism, is responsible for the Japanese state’s disproportionate concentration of U.S. military bases in Okinawa. He writes:
What is not so easily understood are the “progressive” or “conscientious” Japanese. They have the nerve to say, “All Japanese nationals
should be equal.” If that is the case, then s houldn’t we expect they
equally bear the burden of the U.S. military bases? I often hear voices
that declare, “I oppose U.S. military bases in Japan! I oppose the
U.S.-Japan Security Treaty!” While they have carried on repeating
this phrase, sixty years of sticking Okinawans with bases have gone by,
and even more years w ill probably go by in the f uture. How w
 ill they
take responsibility for having forced bases onto Okinawans for so
long? Do they propose to have Okinawans put up with them for the
eternal and everlasting? Moreover, do not all Japanese, whether they
support or oppose the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, enjoy the benefits
of not having to bear the burden of military bases?90
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 ere, Nomura critiques what he calls “democratic colonialism.” Over and
H
above criticism of U.S. imperialism, he draws attention to the fact that a
majority of the Japanese population not only supports the U.S.-Japan
Security Treaty, but the Japanese electorate has voted for an administration
that keeps U.S. military bases concentrated in Okinawa. This in itself is
not incongruous with McCormack’s client state thesis. The difference,
rather, is whereas McCormack emphasizes the servility of Japanese politicians and bureaucrats to the United States at the top, Nomura focuses more
on how the Japanese people engage in the democratic process from below.
Interestingly, both argue for a more faithful rendering of popular sovereignty in Japan. McCormack suggests that the international community
should respect the popular sovereignty of the Okinawan p
 eople who oppose bases.91 Nomura thinks that Japan should respect the popular sovereignty of its own people, or in other words, if the Japanese electorate has
voted to support the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty,92 then it should follow
through its own democratic process to a tee and equally distribute U.S.
military bases throughout the state of Japan instead of concentrate them
predominantly in Okinawa. In short, Nomura picked up the argument for
kengai isetsu developed by Okinawan women at the grassroots.93 “Kengai
isetsu,” literally meaning “move [bases to a location] outside the prefecture,” is an argument that calls for equal distribution of U.S. military bases
throughout the Japanese state (inclusive of Okinawa) as a separate issue
from support or opposition to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.
Needless to say, the appearance of Nomura’s book in 2005 was not well
received. His Fanonian-style language was certainly shocking to Japanese
intellectuals and activists concerned with the so-called question of
Okinawan. A
 fter all, as we s hall see in subsequent chapters, Okinawa had
become the holy grail of progressive Japanese politics by the reversion
era. Yet it was not simply his fiery tone that ruffled feathers, but the fact
that he had hit on the nature of the postcolonial problem manifest in Okinawa as Japanese fascism formed through the democratic process from
below. This is what he meant by “democratic colonialism.” Instead of
pinning Okinawa’s dream for equality on toppling an intangible beast
who rules from the bureaucratic heavens above, he affirmatively took
Okinawa’s failure to achieve the Japanese dream of equality and allowed it
to work for itself by rotting in the belly of the beast. He did not turn away
from the Japanese state in pursuit of another ideal, but he persisted in the
here and now by turning toward the state in order to allow its own contradictions to antagonize itself. That is to say, he worked to antagonize the
state from the inside instead of appeal to an ideal to criticize it from the
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outside. As a result, he unmasked Japanese liberalism with the unexpected
demand to make good on its promise.
Despite the controversial reception of Nomura’s book, what was said
could not be unsaid. Okinawa’s Pandora’s box had been opened. Although
it is unlikely he had read Nomura, Hatoyama Yukio, just four years later
in 2009, legitimized the argument for kengai isetsu in his historic bid for
prime minister from the opposing Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), where
support from the Okinawan voting district was crucial.94 It took a Japanese
prime minister to legitimize what a handful of Okinawan women from the
grassroots and a marginalized Okinawan sociologist had been saying all
along. Soon kengai isetsu had become the political platform in Okinawa, at
a time when opinion polls confirmed overwhelming disapproval of the
construction of new U.S. military facilities in northern Okinawa. In this
political climate, Okinawan journalists such as Yara Tomohiro started to
uncover the hitherto unquestioned history that led up to the disproportionate concentration of U.S. military bases in Okinawa. It is this history,
told below, that stitches together anti-base reportage, the effects of the subsequent anti-base movements that raged throughout Japan in the late
1950s, and the destination for mainland Japan’s unwanted U.S. military
bases and its accompanying miscegenation: Okinawa.
A fter the war ended, the occupying Allied powers moved into approximately 100,200 of the 741,300 acres of land formerly occupied by the Japanese
military. Then, a fter Japan gained independence in 1952, the Allied powers confiscated an additional 234,000 acres of land with the aim of expanding their operations during the Korean War.95 In opposition to t hese
additional land confiscations, and combined with the ability to freely
criticize the United States after the end of occupation, the anti-base movement quickly gained momentum.
The first spark flew from the proposed confiscation of land in the fishing village of Uchinaba (Ishikawa Prefecture) in 1952. Popular protest led
by directly impacted locals inspired other areas facing land confiscation
such as Asamayama (Nagano Prefecture) and Myōgiyama (Gunma Prefecture). Not only did Uchinaba locals succeed in having the land returned
to the people in 1957, but demonstrators in Asamayama and Myōgiyama
ended in total victory as the U.S. and Japanese governments abandoned
plans for land confiscation entirely.
In May 1954, the United States requested land confiscation for the expansion of Air Force operations in the additional five locations of Tachikawa
(Tokyo), Yokota (Tokyo), Kisarazu (Chiba Prefecture), Niigata (Niigata
Prefecture), and Itami (Osaka). Itami was later changed to Komaki (Aichi
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Prefecture). Kisarazu was returned to the Japanese Self Defense Forces in
1958, and Niigata and Komaki were returned to the people in 1958.96 The
anti-base struggle in Tachikawa made history when seven protesters w
 ere
97
prosecuted for illegally entering the base. Nonetheless, operations in
Tachikawa effectively ended in 1969, and it was returned entirely in 1977.
One of the only locations that did not end in failure for the United States
was Yokota.
The overwhelming success of the anti-base movement in preventing
new land confiscations put pressure on locations with existing military
bases. That is, “ ‘If new locations are met with protest,” then areas such as
Camp Fuji, already rife with base culture, “felt the pinch” to take on the
burden.98 Although t here was protest in base towns that had sprung up immediately after the war, Camp Fuji was plagued more intensely with division and contradiction than other areas facing new land confiscation. This
is why Shimizu Ikutarō, an editor of the aforementioned Children of the U.S.
Military Bases, stated that “Uchinaba is still a pure virgin” as compared to
areas that w
 ere already made into “sluts (abazure onna) who parasitically
live off the U.S. military.”99 On the one hand, protest was turned into spectacle when an elderly local w
 oman threw her body in front of a gun at a
100
Camp Fuji firing range. On the other hand, “places that bring in large
revenue from renting out rooms to prostitutes” around Camp Fuji were
reported to “welcome many G.I.s even while they worry about the effects
of public morals on the c hildren.”101 Approximately 10 million yen was
brought in monthly from businesses catering to G.I.s, and after they left
in 1956, the village was only able to collect 10 of 20 million yen in taxes
biannually.102
Yet even with the gulf between “resisting subjects” who reject U.S. military bases unconditionally and “petitioning subjects” (discussed in Chapter 3) who implicitly accept them given the right conditions, the anti-base
movement was still largely successful. To its advantage, it coincided with
restructuring within the U.S. military a fter an armistice was signed in 1953
to bring fighting to an end in the Korean War. Under the leadership of
Dwight D. Eisenhower, a president who went on to warn the United States
of the “military-industrial complex,” the Department of Defense was pressured to streamline its budget. It responded with a greater reliance on
nuclear weapons which allowed for troop reductions in the army, along
with pressure on its allies to prop up their own defense forces. Left b
 ehind
were the marines that would provide backup support in the event of a sudden security threat in the still volatile Korean Peninsula. But not for long.
The marines in Fuji and Gifu were transferred to Okinawa in 1956, despite
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strong protest already raging throughout the island, as w
 ill be examined in
Chapter 3.103
By this time, the United States had become increasingly wary of growing anti-military sentiment in Japan. Yoshida, the sole Japanese signatory
of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, lost power to the incoming prime minister, Hatoyama Ichirō, in 1954, who succeeded in restoring relations with
the Soviet Union and improving relations with China, much to the apprehension of the United States. Not only were leftists gaining force through
the anti-base movement, but their choice rhetorical maneuver of condemning extraterritorial miscegenation had now also become a dopted by Japa
nese ultraconservatives. For example, future prime minister Nakasone
Yasuhiro declared the following in the Diet in 1954:
Is handing over a Japan to our children and grandchildren that is
stationed with a foreign military, overtaken by hundreds of military
bases, and overrun by mixed-race children and panpan, something we
can afford to be patient about?104

The United States became increasingly concerned whether Japan could
secure “overseas markets and domestic economic policy” if the conservative base essential to the U.S.-Japan partnership crumbled.105 The further
concentration of U.S. military bases in Okinawa—t his time the marines—
provided a convenient solution to this conundrum.
Yet it is not as if the United States never considered other options besides Okinawa. Even though the United States Department of Defense was
considering moving the U.S. Army 1st Calvary Division and a marine unit
to Guam, it quickly switched to the more expedient Okinawa in 1957 by
order of President Eisenhower, who came to an agreement with Prime
Minister Kishi Nobusuke. The newly elected Kishi was u
 nder popular
pressure to eradicate U.S. military bases because of public outrage over the
murder of a Japanese woman by an American soldier that year, known as
the Girard Incident.106
The problem that the United States ran up against in postwar Japan
was that complaints of the erosion of political sovereignty, voiced forcefully
through the trope of extraterritorial miscegenation, threatened its ability
to secure Japan as a key economic partner in the Pacific essential to the
United States. Unlike the U.S. occupation of Iraq after 2003, when the
shameless lust for neoliberal capit alist pillage rendered concerns about
Iraq’s sovereignty l ittle more than a careless afterthought, the United States
was literally invested in the maintenance of Japanese democracy.
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From 1954 to 1960, the number of U.S. troops in Japan dwindled from
about 180,000 to 46,000. The area occupied by U.S. military facilities
shrank from approximately 334,100 acres in 1952 to approximately 82,800
acres in 1960, or approximately one-quarter of its original size.107 While
the U.S. military diminished its presence, the Japanese economy continued to boom. Productive capacity recovered to its prewar level by 1955.108
In 1960, Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato—the former director of the Finance
Ministry’s tax bureau mentioned earlier who approved the 100 million-yen
budget for the RAA in 1945—announced his “income-doubling plan” and
realized Japan’s economic miracle.
Japan was able to enjoy economic prosperity with a significantly reduced
burden of U.S. military bases. Japanese sovereignty largely protected the
population from the adverse effects of its postwar institutional arrangement facilitated by the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Although South Korea
initiated an adoption campaign to neutralize its mixed-race problem that
went on to flourish in the 1960s, no such campaign made headway in Japan,
with only a handful of mixed-race children being adopted out to the
United States by 1956.109 On the one hand, the United States had certainly
cultivated a white man’s burden ideology u nder the guise of humanitarianism by the 1960s that facilitated transnational adoption. But on the other
hand, in Japan, the mixed-race issue was largely contained as a social prob
lem in the late 1950s with the help of the anti-base victory and widespread
economic prosperity, thereby allowing it to continue to promote a policy
of assimilation into mainstream Japanese society, which had been recommended by Colonel Crawford Sams, the chief of the Public Health and
Welfare Section of SCAP since 1948.110 In short, Japan secured itself from
miscegenation by securing Okinawa for miscegenation.

153-75549_ch01_3P.indd 37

10/13/18 12:57 PM

Chapter 2

Okinawa, 1945–1952: Allegories
of Becoming

In contrast to the symbolic structure of Japan’s victimization depicted in
Chapter 1, this chapter positions Okinawa in terms of an allegorical structure of becoming. What this means, in advance, is that although Okinawans have historically tried to “become Japanese,” they have chronically
failed to do so. While even the “Japanese” ultimately fail in the impossible
quest for authenticity, this chapter is concerned with a more specific kind
of failure: the capability of cultivating an Okinawan middle class that internalized the need to organize labor power in serv ice to the state. Allegory, as described by Benjamin, is an antidote for symbol; it is that which
interrupts the idealism implied by the promise of sovereign power. Allegory is that which fails, and as such, this chapter reads the struggle to internalize the interests of the Japanese state in the immediate postwar
allegorically.1
This chapter starts with a brief prehistory to the biopolitics b
 ehind
Okinawa’s failure. In the prewar years, Okinawa was treated as an exception to the biopolitical order as neither a Japanese colony nor an equal
part of the Japanese state. This exceptionalism continued into the postwar years as Okinawa was again treated as neither a U.S. military colony
38
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nor an equal part of the Japanese state. Though the U.S. military, as the
machinery for a new form of empire, was certainly vested in reinserting
Okinawa into capitalist relations, its economic recovery and development
were subordinated to its utility as a U.S. military fortress that allowed for
the reemergence of mainland Japan as the regional economic leader. Yet,
while this meant that Okinawa was subject to less institutional intervention aimed at improving the economy, it also meant that it was richer in an
alegal life force concerned with survival in the here and now.
This chapter traces the establishment of the postwar sex industry amidst
t hese exceptional conditions. Different from biopolitical concerns of preserving a newly i magined monoethnic state in mainland Japan, the formation of the sex industry in postwar Okinawa was ominously informed by
the fear of continued exclusion from the biopolitical order. I read this fear
in terms of the ambivalent structure of becoming that inspired an instrumental obedience to the legal order. In other words, Okinawans danced
precariously on the razor’s edge of fear in which they could fall just as easily on the side of anarchistic insurgency as they could on the side of fascistic
collaboration.
Yet the purpose of this chapter is not to pass judgment on minority subjects who “resisted” or “collaborated.” Rather, in line with an allegorical
reading, it is to suspend the structure of judgment altogether. Allegory, as
opposed to symbol, is not grounded in the exclusionary force of the decision, but seeks to exaggerate the sovereign failure to decide and embrace
the motion of liminality. I argue that it was the alegal life force implied by
this liminality that the U.S. military aimed to contain by integrating
Okinawans into the legal order as “petitioning subjects.” That is, far from
coercing Okinawans into sexual slavery, the U.S. military imposed economic sanctions on the base towns in the form of off-limits orders if they
could not manage the spread of VD. This set them up to be subjects who
petition the U.S. military for their “right” to conduct business with the
U.S. military. What the U.S. military had to gain was not only allowing
Okinawans to assume the burden of managing the spread of VD, but more
important, the ability to manage self-determining subjects who recognized
the legal order of occupation.

A Biopolitical Prehistory
In order to understand Okinawa’s precarious position within the postwar
Japanese biopolitical state, it is necessary to go back to the prewar period. In
thinking about “a birthplace of biopolitics”2 in the larger context of Japanese
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empire, Katsuhiko Endo and Tomiyama Ichirō3 have both paid special
attention to theorizations on the “regional economic sphere” (kōiki keizaiken) that first emerged in the early 1940s in the context of the Greater East
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. As witness to the 1920 collapse in the global
sugar industry, Uno Kōzō, in particular, saw possibility in the regional
economic sphere as a way that Japanese empire could shield itself from the
unpredictability of the f ree market. This required a radically different relationship between the metropole and the colonies. In this regard he wrote,
“the colonies must also be developed as a member of the regional economic
bloc” according to the “standards of domestic relations” and “must not
be developed with the aim of producing commodities for the global market in which colonial economies are sacrificed.” 4 In short, he envisioned the
integration of the colonial economies into the national economy as a dynamic regionalism that could offset local imbalances through some sort of
overarching monitoring rationality that he had yet to identify.
For Uno, the regional economic bloc was very much a project in the making. However, as Tomiyama notes, it had an underside as it developed out of
the 1920s that Uno neglected to mention: Okinawa. Wendy Matsumura recuperates its position in Uno’s essay by showing how the “state wanted Taiwan, not Okinawa, to take the lead in making Japan self-sufficient in sugar”
because it was easier to enforce “coercive policies” in the colony where it
would have been “too burdensome” in Okinawa.5 What this means is that
the sugar industry was developed in the Japanese colony of Taiwan (and as
Tomiyama adds, the Japanese mandated territory of the South Sea Islands)6
while it was allowed to collapse in the Japanese national territory of Okinawa
Prefecture as part of a calculation for overall regional economic success.
Yet, at the same time, even though Okinawa was not “colonial” enough
to coerce into submission to state-implemented policies, it was also not “national” ( Japanese) enough to be privy to state-implemented policies that
aimed to solve the agrarian crisis domestically. As Tomiyama writes, “dif
ferent from other agrarian areas” within the Japanese state, Okinawa was
not subject to spending policies to “stave off the [formation of a] surplus
population.”7 He continues:
. . . Okinawa did not form a circuit in which its agrarian villages could
be mediated by the maintenance and organization of the surplus
population. Therefore, the agrarian surplus population was not so
much an industrial labor reserve that could be drawn from or deposited into, but it consequentially had to take on the characteristic of
being a surplus population that flowed out unidirectionally.8
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In the absence of this “circuit” or “mediation” in Okinawan agrarian villages (i.e., in the absence of institutional frameworks of a biopolitical state),
the surplus population had little staying power and flooded mainland industrial centers such as Osaka in the 1920s, where migrant workers met
widespread discrimination. T
 hese workers w
 ere seen as “ ‘unsanitary,’ ‘insane,’ ‘lazy,’ and ‘uncivilized,’ ” and their labor power was valued less on
the market. Through a “lifestyle improvement movement” (seikatsu kaizen
undō), they aimed to rid themselves of their ethnic markers in hopes of attaining a better life.9 Tomiyama writes, “everyday acts from the bodily act
of chatting in the Okinawan language, to ways of cooking and child-rearing
became surveilled as the basis for the determination of labor power.”10
Important here is that the codification of labor power was not dictated by
the state, but that it was the “prerogative of the swarming sovereigns within
the population.”11 This meant that not only mainland Japanese, but also
Okinawans themselves, surveilled other Okinawans to the point where
they often attempted to conceal their ethnicity. In this way, the alegality
of Okinawa’s labor power as a force of life that was not “mediated” by “management or organization” was translated or codified into ethnic markers
in the most intimate spheres of everyday life.
Treating Okinawa differently from colonial territories, such as Taiwan
and the South Sea Islands, and its workers differently from both farmers
and industrial workers in mainland Japan, moreover, led to a Japanese
government–implemented system of aid and relief that acted as a sort of
patch on Okinawa’s alegality floating in an ambiguous space between
both.12 The Okinawa Relief Bill that passed through the House of Representatives in 1925 was the prototype for the “Okinawan promotion and development regime” institutionalized as the Okinawa General Bureau and
housed within the Japanese government t oday, as discussed in Chapter 5.
At the time, it functioned to have a community that was excluded from
the biopolitical order—and hence fraught with the possibility of rebellion—
come before the law as “Japanese national subjects” to ask for economic
assistance in order to survive hardship that it was often blamed for
creating.13
These historical conditions informed the experience of the Battle of
Okinawa and its postwar aftermath of military occupation. The constant
fear of being excluded from the biopolitical order spurred the endeavor to
“become Japanese” not only in the workplace, but also on the battlefield.
Take, for example, the following excerpt from a letter sent by an Okinawan
soldier fighting for the Japanese Imperial Army in Papua New Guinea to
his son on his birthday.
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On the dawn of victory in the Greater East Asia War, we Okinawans
as h
 umans w
 ill be treated equal to the Japanese. Hence, if we too win
this b
 attle, we can go to Japan and live14 a peaceful life with our
families.15

It is significant that the soldier uses the same word “live” or seikatsu that
was the object of the “movement to improve life” amongst Okinawan
workers in the 1920s. His experience of discrimination within the Japanese
state presses him to victory in the hopes of attaining a better life, thereby
encapsulating what Naoki Sakai calls “imperial nationalism”16 amongst
ethnic minority subjects in empire.
In contrast to the symbolic structure of Japanism, I read this structure of
becoming Japanese allegorically. The key difference between the symbolic
structure of Japanism that asserts communion with the state and the allegorical structure of becoming Japanese that betrays the failure of such
communion is in their respective relationship to transcendence. Modern-
day allegory is commonly associated with fables in which animal characters
convey a moral to a story. Important, here, is the visual aspect of allegory
and the relative proximity (as opposed to symbolic distance) of the sign that
is substituted for the referent. A fox is a stand-in for a cunning individual
because a fox is a cunning animal. What you see is relatively close to what
you get. Benjamin himself introduced allegory through ideographs such as
hieroglyphs, but more importantly, rebuses or emblems used in baroque
Trauerspiele or tragedy plays. As he states, “the written word tends toward
the visual”17 and interrupts phonetic orthography. With the use of alphabetic writing systems, however, what you see is not what you get, but language signifies through the transcendental structure of symbol. In contrast
to the proximity between sign and referent in allegory, the distance between sign and referent in symbol is sutured by faith in an extralinguistic
(transcendental) power.18 In other words, the alphabetic script does not immediately correspond to the t hing it signifies but is predicated on our faith
in the system of signification to give it meaning. Allegory, then, is the reemergence of a potentiality of language not anchored to faith in a transcendental power that gives it meaning, but a more direct and immediate form
of signification that grounds its own meaning in what it already is (versus
what it promises to become), however imperfect that may be. In other
words, because the sign is relatively close to the referent, it constantly
thwarts the appeal toward a transcendental power to suture the gap.
In the absence of this suturing power, we are left with a multiplicity of
signs or images that say l ittle other than what they already are. This leads
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to the crisis of not being able to organize multiplicity into a unified narrative. Benjamin writes:
As t hose who lose their footing turn somersaults in their fall, so would
the allegorical intention fall from emblem to emblem into the dizziness of its bottomless depths. . . . 19

 ere, Benjamin points to t hose foreclosed from access to the heavens who
H
“turn somersaults in their fall.” The “fall from emblem to emblem” is dizzying because t here is no stable ground to bring them together in unity.
Reading the failure to become Japanese allegorically does not assume a
transcendental power that gives meaning to Okinawan life; it displaces the
seat of judgment in which Okinawans are evaluated according to their faith
in this ideal as collaborators or insurgents. Instead, as we shall see in the
next section, we can only track the dizzying movement from one subject
position to another as the “allegorical intention” to ground the meaning
of life by virtue of what it already is and not what it promises to become.
The intentionality here is not that of a self-determining subject that opposes sovereignty from a position of externality, but the intentionality of
movement that disarticulates the bordering effects of sovereign power.

The Specter of the “Comfort W
 oman”
The B
 attle of Okinawa and its aftermath is not a story of Okinawa being
violently thrown outside of sovereign power. It is a story of suspending
Okinawa in a liminal space that is ambiguously legal and extralegal at the
same time, exposing it to the lawmaking violence of sexual assault, and then
interpreting the Okinawan fear of this violence as the desire to be repatriated back into the law.
Fighting in the war itself did not polarize the friend/enemy distinction
characteristic of Schmitt’s constitution of a field of political homogeneity
that establishes the ground for conflict.20 Quite the contrary, it was not
clear whose side Okinawans were on. Okinawa was officially a part of Japan.
Yet it became the only site within the state encroached by land battle that
was designed to hold off infiltration into the mainland where the emperor
resided, thus warranting it the name “disposable castaway stone” (sute
ishi). As a result, over one-quarter of the island’s population was lost, and
approximately 90 percent of the homes and buildings w
 ere destroyed.21
Okinawans, particularly t hose indoctrinated with the ideology of imperialized education (kōminka kyōiku) that emphasized loyalty to the emperor,
were torn between the paralyzing fear of the “American beasts” they w
 ere
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told would ruthlessly rape w
 omen, and the Japanese imperial forces that
killed Okinawans as “spies” for speaking in their native tongue. This constant state of ambiguity, punctuated by the omnipresent clarity of violence,
was intensified by a mix of Korean and Taiwanese colonials mobilized into
the imperial Japanese war effort. In addition to the soldiers, t hese included
“comfort women.” Okinawa, again the exception, was the only area within
the state of Japan that housed “comfort stations” for the imperial forces.
In respect to the “comfort stations,” Okinawa was neither an “outer territory” (gaichi) of the official colonies nor an “inner territory” (naichi) of the
Japanese metropole; rather, it was a “semi-outer territory” ( jungaichi) in
between both.
As briefly mentioned in Chapter 1, the “comfort woman” system was
instituted by the Japanese imperial forces a fter the atrocities of the 1937
Nanjing Massacre. An estimated two hundred thousand w
 omen from the
corners of Japanese empire were confined to “comfort stations” in areas
where the Japanese Imperial Army engaged in combat. Approximately 130
of t hese “comfort stations” w
 ere set up during the Battle of Okinawa, purportedly to deter the rape of Okinawan women by imperial Japanese soldiers and encourage the Okinawan population to commit to the war effort
against the invading Allied forces.22 However, this confusing setup only
muddied already murky waters as many Okinawans questioned the designation of “semi-outer territory” against the historical backdrop of its
second-class status within the state of Japan.
In “Comfort Stations” as Remembered by Okinawans During World War II,
Yunshin Hong puts her finger on the pulse of liminality that ran through
the confluence of various colonial subject positions such as the “comfort
woman” and Okinawan civilians during the Battle of Okinawa. Theoretically, she traces this liminality through a genealogical reading of Foucault’s
“race war.” Particularly in his 1975–1976 Society Must Be Defended lectures
given at the Collège de France, Foucault articulated the conjunctural emergence of race and sovereignty: Race war functions to homogenize the
multiplicity within each warring state so as to reinforce the assumption of
juridico-political sovereignty supposedly common to both.23 In her reading, Hong argues that “the ‘battlefield’ for ‘excluded subjects’ who are not
included in the social contract . . . is not limited to a s imple battlefield between two states.”24 What she is referring to here is the warring that goes
on within states, even as they confront other states in conflict. In this way,
she looks past the complementary binary of t hose who lament defeat or
celebrate liberation on both sides of the battlefield and instead focuses on
those who “hesitate” (tomadō) in between. 25 In order to challenge the
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mythic narrative structure of struggle, sacrifice, and cathartic birth of a
unified national community, Hong instead dwells on a radical moment of
indecision that runs through the wart ime “comfort woman.” She writes:
What did the Korean soldiers who fought as “imperial subjects” for
imperial Japan, and the Korean “comfort w
 omen” who w
 ere designated as beings who gave “comfort” to the Japanese soldiers, witness
in the end? A
 fter confronting death on the battlefield in Okinawa,
was it the joy of a fatherland liberated [from Japanese colonial
domination]? Or was it sorrow that accompanied the fall of the
Japanese empire? . . . 26

Okinawa, for her, is a productive place to reconsider postwar characterizations of the “aggressor” versus the “victim” implicit in both Japanese-
American and Korean-Japanese histories because of its continuing liminal
position as neither a colony nor fully part of the Japanese state. Okinawa
is precisely that which does not allow for closure.
By focusing on this space of liminality, Hong makes a critical intervention into the sovereign decision that remains constant amidst regime
change from Japanese empire to U.S. military occupation. Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty as “he who decides on the exception”27 is predicated
on homogeneity on both sides of the battlefield. Under this assumption,
“comfort w
 omen” are sacrificed in order to preserve the norm, i.e., the
purity of Japanese women. The problem, of course, is that the norm
here—i.e., “Japanese women”—are r eally Okinawans who also shutt le precariously back and forth across the boundaries of the law.28 The contrast
between the exception and the norm breaks down, thereby rendering the
justification of the exception for the sake of the norm questionable.
Hong argues that it is this breakdown that both animates the constitution of the law and also renders it vulnerable. On the one hand, precisely
because Okinawans ambivalently identified with the “comfort w
 omen” as
subjects excluded by the law, they more desperately sought refuge within
the law. She suggests that it was this fear that motivated the reincarnation
of the wart ime “comfort station” in the postwar “to [secure] rest and recreation for the U.S. military as a buffer to the violence.”29 Here, the exceptional sacrifice of some Okinawan women in order to protect the rest
was predicated on the instability—and not the stability—of the norm. The
distinction h
 ere is subtle yet crucial. The exception was made not to preserve the preconstituted homogeneity of the norm amongst t hose who are
complacent, but to stabilize the radical heterogeneity of the norm amongst
t hose who w
 ere afraid.
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In his indirect challenge to Schmitt,30 Benjamin closed in on the sovereign’s vulnerability. As Samuel Weber writes in his reading of Benjamin’s
Trauerspiel, the “sovereign and exceptional decision is justifiable . . . only
insofar as it provides the conditions for the reappropriation of the exception by the norm.”31 Far from being an uncontested assertion of sovereign
authority, the exception is contingent on the norm’s ability to restore it to
a field of homogeneity. This is b
 ecause if t here were no normalcy, t here
would be no conditions for the possibility of the exception in the first
place that gives rise to sovereignty. Precisely b
 ecause of this vulnerability,
the state of exception resorts to a highly aesthetic show of power that reinforces both the charismatic authority of the sovereign as a superhuman
and the so-called normal citizen that it purportedly protects.
Certainly, the spectacle of violence invokes fear. However, Hong’s text
delivers when she disallows this fear to be articulated in terms of a stable
subject position vis-à-v is a specific state sovereignty. As witness to the
“comfort stations,” did Okinawans feel relief that Korean w
 omen w
 ere being sacrificed for Okinawan women? Or did they feel anxiety that this
could also happen to them? Did they feel pity for the Korean women abused
by the imperial Japanese soldiers, or envy that at least they w
 ere afforded
food rations as military affiliates? This line of questioning should not be
read as a replacement for the question of war responsibility of Okinawans,32
but rather as a fundamental reconsideration of the nature of the law. Hong’s
text comes alive with the movement of one conflicting emotion cascading
into another. In adumbrating this ambiguity, she does not succumb to the
authority of sovereign power that seeks to limit an articulation of fear in
terms of one’s position before a preexisting law, but instead points to the
moment in which the sovereign attempts to ground its violence through
the monopolization of liminality itself. The function of the sovereign spectacle of violence is to produce a fear irreducible to the law while simulta
neously allowing for its reappropriation by the norms—norms that
constantly attempt to contain liminality in a unified representat ion.
However, when this reappropriation is interrupted, t here is no resolution to the violence, but only a continual haunting. As a kind of allegorical
intention, haunting deploys a different mode of representat ion that interrupts the superhuman leap into transcendence as such. W hether a perfor
mance of political sovereignty that decides on exceptions to the law or an
artistic sovereignty that decides on exceptions to meaning attributed to the
sign, haunting presents a fundamental antagonism to the ability of the sovereign to make an ecstatic flight to the limits of the order for the purpose
of folding its excess back into the internal community of shared meaning.
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This is precisely what is at stake in reading the “hesitation” of “comfort
women” at the end of the Battle of Okinawa who could not decide if they
were joyous or devastated. Sovereignty loses nothing through a tragic critique of their exclusion from the law, but it reveals its vulnerability and intense paranoia the moment they fail to become intelligible through the
grammar of the law. As suggested in Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence,”
what offends the state is not the citizen’s abuse of the law, but rather the
“mere existence outside the law”33 presented by both.
The complexity of “comfort w
 omen” interrupts the idealistic leap t oward
sovereign power, leaving their excess to come pouring down with the force
of a “cataract.”34 Incapable of taking flight to the heavens, they are left no
other recourse but to haunt the land of the living in a restless liminality.
In place of the transcendental mode of symbolic representat ion (i.e., myth)
comes an allegorical presentation before another. With the dead suspended
on earth, the theatrical stage of the spectacle spills over into the audience,
where the spectator is wrested from his or her role of passive onlooker. This
is why, in pursuing her analysis of “how the space of the ‘comfort station’
changed Okinawa internally,” Hong shows that the Okinawans were always watching.
For me, the some 130 “comfort stations” do not speak to the intensity
of the “victimization,” but rather to the hypothesis that they w
 ere an
existence that profoundly affected everyday life in Okinawa. . . . This
kind of “politics of death” does not just affect the “Korean comfort
women,” but also t hose who “witnessed” her.35

Hong delineates how it was impossible to ignore the presence of “comfort
women” in Okinawa. Not only were civilians ordered to surrender their
private h
 ouses as “comfort stations,” but their operation was highly dependent on Okinawan labor.36 Simply put, they were part of everyday life.
Yet, as Hong points out, postwar accounts of the U.S. military in Okinawa
often occlude how these experiences with “comfort w
 omen” went on to
inform life in the camps a fter civilians were captured.
The function of the camps was to establish a new spatial order in Okinawa. Upon the official invasion in April 1945, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz declared that “All powers of the Government of Japanese Empire are
hereby suspended” and “final administrative responsibility are vested in me
as Fleet Admiral. . . .”37 In place of the old legal order, Nimitz established
a civilian administration that he emphasized was “a necessary part . . . of
destroying Japan’s power of aggression.”38 Part and parcel of this strategy
was to capture and confine civilians to what the U.S. military referred to
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as “refugee camps.”39 By June 1, 1945, 284,625 people w
 ere confined to
t hese camps.40 Although the space of the camp was recognized u
 nder
international law by provisions of the 1907 Hague Convention that upheld
the belligerent’s right to exercise military governmental powers, it was still
conceptually and legally ambiguous. Nimitz ordered that Okinawans
should be treated as “ordinary Japanese subjects.” This meant that they
were designated as enemy civilians in combat and not afforded the rights
and privileges of liberated p
 eoples u
 nder international law like the Koreans
and Taiwanese.41 Okinawans were both Japanese and not Japanese at the
same time.
Stories of rape in the camps are voluminous. Although t here were only
approximately twelve reported cases of rape from April 1 to June 30, 1945
(which includes reports by five male victims), oral testimony suggests that
sexual violence was a daily occurrence.42
It was in the space of the camp that Okinawans began to exercise a nascent form of government u
 nder the direction of the U.S. military. The
provisional Okinawa Advisory Council formed in August 15, 1945, with
128 representatives from the thirty-nine camps,43 and it was soon followed
by the Okinawa W
 omen’s Alliance (Okinawa fujinkai rengō) that became
gravely concerned with sexual violence. At this time, Okinawans chose
to refuse social relations with the U.S. military by asking that anti-
fraternization regulations be kept in place.
The U.S. military initially a dopted anti-f raternization regulations out
of concern for their own soldiers because it recommended that “all civilians be treated with suspicion.” 44 Fraternization was also potentially a
“matter prejudicial to the health of the soldiers” as a conduit for the spread
of VD.45 However, after they determined that, aside from an isolated incident where an Okinawan “threw a knife (fortunately with poor aim at an
American sailor),” t here was no other case of “personal violence attempted
against any member of the occupying forces,” and they argued for a repeal
of the regulations.46 It was rather Okinawans who protested its repeal, hoping to keep the G.I.s away from w
 omen. The military report states:
 here was one additional f actor of g reat importance, and that was the
T
constant preoccupation of large numbers of American soldiers abroad
with creation of opportunity for illicit sexual relations, a m
 atter
prejudicial to the health of the soldiers, to the morals of the community, and to the maintenance of dignity and order. The presence of a
high concentration of negro troops on the island and the unfortunate
fact that the negro troops were the greatest offenders against the
honor of the native w
 omen, and the further circumstance that
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civilians themselves expressed a reiterated desire to have the regulations kept in force resulted in enforcement of anti-f raternization
regulations on Okinawa when they w
 ere in force nowhere else in the
world.47

The U.S. military accounted for the Okinawan repulsion to fraternization
by pinning it onto the “high concentration of negro troops on the island.”
Yet the politics of minority sexual relations on the side of the U.S. military obfuscates another politics of minority sexual relations on the side of
imperial Japan: Okinawan w
 omen w
 ere both afraid of being made into U.S.
military “comfort w
 omen” like their Korean counterparts for the imperial
Japanese military and also afraid of being targeted as “spies for the U.S.
military” by Japanese imperial soldiers for fraternizing with the Americans.
In other words, they continued to calculate the repercussions of sexual
relations with U.S. military soldiers through an imperial Japanese gaze. In
the end, Hong succeeds in showing the difficulties of parsing this fear and
attributing it to either the American or Japanese military, and instead delineates an omnipresent fear of racialized sexual violence vis-à-v is the institution of the military itself.

Sexual Violence on the “Forgotten Island,” 1945–1947
Fighting on the island came to an end in mid-June 1945, and by the Potsdam Declaration of July 1945, it was determined that “Japanese sovereignty
should be limited to the four home islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu,
Shikoku and to such minor islands as we determine.” 48 In discussing the
future, a subcommittee of the House Naval Affairs Committee initially
recommended in 1945 that the United States “take outright” Okinawa.49
Others favored placing the Ryukyus u
 nder a trusteeship b
 ecause it would
appease the 1941 Atlantic Charter declaration in which signatories “seek
no aggrandizement, territorial or other,”50 and the 1943 Cairo Conference
in which “[t]he Three G
 reat Allies . . . covet no gain for themselves and
have no thought of territorial expansion.”51 President Harry S. Truman
presided over the issue by stating the Ryukyus would be placed u
 nder a
trusteeship u
 ntil a peace treaty could be forged with Japan at a l ater date.52
Leaving the disposition of the Ryukyu Islands without clear definition
only worsened its problems. Since the U.S. government did not know
whether it would keep the islands in the long term or return them to Japan, it did not develop its economic infrastructure and political administration as extensively as it did in the mainland. As a result, the Ryukyu
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Islands became a “dumping ground for Army misfits,” and crimes involving American soldiers were rampant.”53 The soldiers were not only incompetent and unmotivated, but miserable from boredom and the sweltering
heat.54 Heinous crime and sexual assault, in particular, became such a prob
lem that Major General Fred Wallace threatened the death penalty in a
vain attempt to curb the instance of rape.55
In addition to the “misfits” w
 ere black soldiers and the more cheaply
contracted Filipino Scouts. The U.S. military was pressed to make use of
its minority population and started to integrate African Americans into its
ranks. This was not only a response to pressure coming from within the
United States for racial equality; internationally, the United States was also
wary of the fact that “Japanese propagandists have . . . made the most of
the anti–Negro discrimination” and realized racism would only hurt
American interests abroad.56 The Tenth Army that invaded Okinawa contained a large number of black units, and the all-black 24th Infantry arrived in Okinawa from Saipan in August 1945.57
In April 1946, Lieutenant Commander James Watkins noted that “fear
of cruelty, rape, and violence replaced respect for American authority,” and
he recommended the withdrawal of blacks to “avoid further compromising the American position in the eyes of the Okinawans.”58 While the
24th Infantry left Iejima for Gifu and Osaka on January 28, 1947,59 their
departure did little to reduce sexual violence.60 In their place came 2,339
Filipino Scouts of the 44th Infantry Regiment on January 23, 1947.61 Some
suggested the Scouts were more dangerous than African Americans, as
purportedly evinced by the American director of public safety crime statistics.62 As the first postwar editor in chief of Uruma Shimpo, Ikemiyagi
Shūi, wrote, the Scouts “unleashed resentment from the atrocities experienced in the Philippines at the hands of the Japanese military onto the
Okinawan civilians.” 63 The Filipino Scouts left Okinawa in 1963.64
In this way, Okinawa quickly became a contact zone for the bottom
ranks of the U.S. military, racial minorities, and colonial subjects. On the
one hand, the hauntings of two empires, both American and Japanese, converged in a space in which sovereignty was left without clear designation.
Okinawa, as such, existed as a vacuum of sovereignty haunted by liminal subjects who struggled with ghosts that found no easy way to
transcendence.
With the potential for the confluence of t hese hauntings to disarticulate the colonial order, the U.S. military both provided the conditions for
and subsequently policed minority-to-minority sexual violence. Okinawans
were exposed to violence that continually overwhelmed the parameters of
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the law on the one hand, while it attempted to enforce the law so that sexual violence was interpreted as illegal for racial minority subjects and extralegal for majority white subjects in the military on the other. In other
words, minorities were stripped from an above-t he-law authority and repatriated back into the legal order as criminals.
As Okinawans started to return to their villages a fter October 23, 1945, to
a now U.S. military occupied Okinawa, sexual violence continued to terrorize their everyday lives. M. D. Morris, a former U.S. military affiliate, writes:
Stories of [G.I.s] sneaking into civilian dwellings and raping women
were told on a daily basis . . . For American G.I.s, occupied Okinawa
was an area of extraterritoriality. W
 omen could not go outside with
ease. Even if they stayed in their dwellings, they did not know when a
G.I. would find his way inside.65

In some villages, the threat of sexual violence was so acute irrespective of
the patrolling military police (MP) that villagers formed their own neighborhood watch ( jikeidan). If a G.I. slipped through the barbed wire to enter residential areas, the neighborhood watch would ring bells to signal
women to smear their face with charcoal and hide in their closets or u
 nder
their floorboards.66 According to the group for pre-treaty settlement of loss
and reparation, t here were seventy-six reported crimes against women
between 1945 and 1949.67 In 1946, approximately 61 percent of the attacks
came while civilians w
 ere farming or doing laundry.68
Since men of all ages—adolescent, conscription age, and elderly—were
mobilized into the war effort, a disproportionately larger female population was left behind in the postwar to care for underaged, elderly, or incapacitated dependents.69 With chronic sexual violence threatening w
 omen
on the one hand, and the responsibility to save their families from starvation on the other, many w
 ere driven to prostitution. Morris continues his
account with the development of a so-called willing submission to the soldiers as follows:
. . . t here w
 ere local girls in sufficient numbers who w
 ere willing, for a
consideration, to entertain the soldiers’ wants. Naturally any such
traffic could not be organized officially. But for the common good,
some wiser, saner heads worked out of an off-t he-record arrangement
whereby all interested girls w
 ere assembled in a single area in which
drinking, money, medical examinations, and an orderly movement of
actually thousands all w
 ere controlled closely without creating any
disturbance from the outside. A
 fter duty hours, military buses from
several areas unofficially would take and return the troops. For a while
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this appeared to be a satisfactory solution. Then some chaplains and
others had the bus serv ice prohibited from stopping at the area in
question. The buses continued to run, and slowed down to a low-gear
crawl, so that all would be able to leave and enter without mishap. . . . 70

The “willing” mentioned h
 ere were bartering sex for clothing, cigarettes,
and canned food b
 ecause Okinawa still had not returned to a currency-
based economy. Prostitution unfolded haphazardly against the backdrop
of this unorganized field of circulation.
For the U.S. military, the rise of prostitution created a VD crisis that severely hampered the productivity of its troops. It responded by passing a series of proclamations in March 1947. First was Special Proclamation No. 14,
“Prostitution Prohibited with Members of the Occupation Forces.” Special
Proclamation No. 15, “Venereal Disease Control,” called for the establishment of clinics to treat VD, isolation of infected patients, the requirement
for all health care providers to report all cases of confirmed or suspected
VD, and compulsory treatment. Special Proclamation No. 16 declared “Female Sex Slavery Prohibited” for girls under the age of eighteen. Similar to
the “prostitute hunting” that occurred in Japan, these proclamations used
the Ryukyu police to capture women who w
 ere suspected of carrying VD
and subjected them to forced treatment and hospitalization. Despite the
acute shortage of doctors on the islands, they w
 ere ordered to prioritize the
containment of VD. For example, Teruya Zensuke found it particularly
troubling that he was forced to become a VD tracer when he returned to the
Ryukyu Islands in December 1947. He writes, “Even though the demand for
physicians was so acute that I was desperate for any help I could get, I was
given the assignment to become a ‘VD Tracer’ that did not require a physician’s [qualifications] and was subsequently branded a VD doctor.”71
In this period, Okinawa is often referred to as the “Forgotten Island,”
after the well-k nown Time magazine article attesting to subhuman conditions, international apathy, and U.S. military neglect.72 The goal was to
establish the supremacy of U.S. martial law in Okinawa at a time when the
prospects for long-term occupation had not yet been determined.

Birth of the Sex Industry, 1947–1952
Relying on the might of the U.S. military to enforce the law, however, was
not a practical strategy for long-term occupation by a country claiming to
“make the world safe for democracy.” It needed to contain the field of
alegality that allowed for the interplay between liminal subjects through
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more fundamental measures: the creation of a labor force that would
come to autonomously manage sexual relations. In this way, the management of sexual relations in Okinawa took a turn as Okinawa approached
the “reverse course” of occupation and emerged as the “Keystone of the
Pacific.”
Political talks w
 ere rekindled by mounting fear of the spread of communism in 1947. Terasaki Hidenari, advisor to the emperor, relayed the
following message to SCAP, General Douglas MacArthur, in September
1947 regarding Okinawa:
The Emperor hopes that the United States w
 ill continue the military
occupation of Okinawa and other islands of the Ryukyus. In the
Emperor’s opinion, such occupation would benefit the United States
and also provide protection for Japan. The Emperor feels that such a
move would meet with wide-spread approval among the Japanese
people who fear not only the menace of Russia, but after the Occupation has ended, the growth of rightist and leftist groups which might
give rise to an “incident” which Russia could use as a basis for interfering internally in Japan.73

The emperor’s offering was quickly utilized by the United States as the
discrepant positions between its military and Department of State started
to come together in 1948. George Kennan of the Department of State released “PPS/28: Recommendations with Respect to U.S. Policy Toward
Japan” on March 25, 1948, a fter a series of meetings with General Mac
Arthur. “[A]t this point,” the report reads, the “United States Government
should make up its mind . . . t hat it intends to retain permanently the facilities at Okinawa, and the base t here should be developed accordingly.”74
This decision was a direct result of a solidified U.S. policy toward Japan in
which primary importance was placed on “the achievement of maximum
stability of Japanese society.” Specifically, this was to be obtained by “(a) A
firm U.S. security policy” that became the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty; “(b)
An intensive program of economic recovery; and (c) A relaxation in occupational control, designed to stimulate a greater sense of direct responsibility on the part of the Japanese Government.”75 Okinawa was directly
referenced in this recommendation as MacArthur suggested that “by properly developing and garrisoning Okinawa we can assure the safety of Japan
against external aggression without the need for maintaining forces on
Japanese soil.” 76 Specifically, this entailed Japanese economic recovery
without the need for U.S. bases in Japan. In this configuration, the transnational network of sovereignty and capital that made allowances for the
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exceptionalism of martial law traversed the region globally, while it simul
taneously converged through the bodies of women locally.
These developments made it clear that Okinawa’s economic recovery
was secondary to mainland Japan’s. In “Okinawa and American Imperialism,” Kokuba Kōtarō, the f uture leader of Okinawa’s underground communist party (discussed more in Chapter 3), argued that “U.S. military
economic policy in Okinawa” at this time was not “simply a ‘colonial policy’ in the classical sense” of the term.77 Rather, it was to “stabilize politi
cal rule” on the islands while preparing for the “restoration of Okinawa’s
economic u
 nion with mainland Japan alongside the restoration of Japanese
monopoly capitalism.”78 In the absence of a long-term economic policy,
Okinawa’s economy was temporarily sustained through economic aid.
Quite simply, as Kokuba notes, the U.S. military feared that without such
measures to placate the islanders, Okinawa would become susceptible to
communism.79 Similar to how the Okinawa Relief Bill acted as a patch to
Okinawa’s exclusion from the biopolitical order in the 1920s, the Government Aid and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) kept the Okinawan
economy afloat in the early postwar years. GARIOA went into effect in
late 194680 and peaked in 1950 before the economy started to temporarily
stabilize through U.S. military base construction in 1951.81 While base
construction attracted some sixty-t hree thousand base workers at its peak
in 1952 that bolstered short-term economic reconstruction,82 the boom
more fundamentally served the long-term reconstruction of Japanese industry. The U.S. military turned away from foreign construction companies to accept bids from mainland Japanese companies.83 Not only did they
earn dollars that funneled back into the Japanese economy, but of equal
importance, they acquired technological know-how on construction from
the U.S. military.84
In 1940, 74.22 percent of the working population was involved in agriculture and forestry versus 58.12 percent by 1950. This 16.1 percent difference was predominantly accounted for by the introduction of a new
category of military labor ( gunsangyō), which represented 15.05 percent of
total labor.85 This entailed a displacement of farmers from the countryside to quickly emerging U.S. military base towns. Around t hese base
towns, the U.S. military instituted a series of institutional frameworks that
first, foreclosed the possibility of economic self-subsistence that was not
linked to U.S. military base construction and operation; second, cruelly
denied this narrowly defined space of possible circulation when Okinawans
could not provide sexual serv ices to the discretionary or sanitary standards
demanded by the U.S. military; and third, created Okinawan “petitioning
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subjects” who asked for their so-called right to participate in a market
centered on the sex industry.
As described earlier, Okinawans were confined en masse to camps during the war, and then allowed to repatriate to what was left of their villages after October 1945. As many G.I.s stationed in Okinawa during this
time testify, no one thought t here were bases on a place called “Okinawa”;
they thought “Okinawa” itself was a military base. Needless to say, this total
occupation of Okinawan land distorted the economy. The poorly thought-
out American policies devoted approximately one-fifth of its arable land
to military purposes “with no regard for its economic value” by 1949.86
Additionally, the influx of Okinawan repatriates from various corners of
the Japanese empire compounded the acute food shortage.
Goyeku Village (later known as Koza City, and then Okinawa City),87
at the m
 iddle of the main Okinawan island, quickly became the center of
these contradictions. Since two-thirds of the land was occupied by the U.S.
military, farms w
 ere displaced and small businesses sprung up in their
place. Furthermore, the population increased on the remaining one-t hird
of the unoccupied land as it more than doubled from 8,481 in 1940 to
18,431 in 1950, and then nearly doubled again to 35,283 by 1955.88 Encircled by the U.S. military, it became a site of widespread sexual violence as
well as an active hotbed for prostitution.
With VD on the rise, the U.S. military responded in June 1949 by issuing the institutional framework of the notorious “one-mile limit” that prohibited native structures within one mile of any dependent housing or
military billet of a hundred or more soldiers in the Goyeku Village.89 Since
a one-mile radius around the massive U.S. military settlements encompassed most of Goyeku Village, farmers and small businesses w
 ere cut off
from their livelihood. Conflicting opinions arose amongst the leadership
on how to respond. Goyeku Village councilman Ōyama Chōjō, who would
go on to become Koza City mayor from 1958 to 1974, stood by villagers
who hoped Goyeku would eventually return to farming. However, he was
overshadowed by Goyeku Village mayor Shiroma Seizen, who represented
the interests of advocates for a base town that would serve the needs of the
U.S. military.90 In order to convince the U.S. military to remove the one-
mile limit that strangled the village, Shiroma understood that he must first
conduct a prostitution sweep, euphemistically called the “movement to reinforce sanitation and elevate morality” (eisei kyōka dōgi kōyō undō), that
took place through August and September 1949.91
The sweep, however, was said to have triggered a series of unexpected
events. In his personal history, Shiroma claimed that at least one African
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American soldier burned down a civilian h
 ouse just north of the current
Okinawa City Hall in retaliation to the sweep.92 This was near the location where the black unit took up residence. He wrote that Okinawans were
helpless to extinguish the blaze as the G.I. also exchanged gun fire with
the MP.93 Despite the shock of the military government, he suggested that
“they (karera)” were undeterred and rode into the village in a jeep as a show
of force sometime l ater. Hearing rumors that Shiroma’s own h
 ouse would
be targeted next and his daughter would be taken, he sent his wife and child
into hiding.94 In response, the U.S. military posted two MPs to guard his
residence and even gave Shiroma a pistol to carry.
The minority subject figured into the staging of a “bad” world of sexual violence, prostitution, and crime that served as a contrast to a “good”
form of international exchange. Shiroma directed t hese two parts well. He
was not just a politician, but also a skilled translator who had intimate insight
into military government culture—including its racial politics. As a former
English teacher, he was quickly mobilized by the U.S. military in 1945 to
translate newspapers and interpret for military officers.95 In his capacity as
mayor, he worked well with Major General Josef R. Sheetz, who left Korea
to take up the post of military governor in Okinawa on October 1, 1949, and
promised democratic improvements to preexisting military rule. Both
were invested in ending the anti-f raternization policy in order to encourage the infusion of U.S. dollars into the Okinawan economy. Individually, Sheetz’s agenda was to make long-term occupation more palatable
to Okinawans by representing military personnel as good neighbors
dying to spend dollars that were burning holes in their pockets.96 As for
Shiroma, he was motivated by the desire to have a central swath of land in
Goyeku, around Goya Crossing, returned from the U.S. military so as to
avoid splitting the village into two. This area, as he explained, was a
trouble spot that invited crime because it was the site of storage facilities,
parking lots, and residences of the black unit.97
Together, the two conceptualized a city plan for a “business center.”
This was a proposal to create a “recreation center” ( gorakujo) where
“Americans and Okinawans [could] engage in upright and healthy business” by exchanging U.S. dollars for goods and services in shops, restaurants, movie theaters, and so on.98 Although Shiroma was involved in its
conceptualization, the bid could have gone out to any base town throughout Okinawa. Sheetz toured the island in early December to gauge interest and also sell the idea as a model for the entire island. However, he was
not very convincing, since he was quickly accused of promoting the establishment of “prostitution districts” throughout Okinawa.99
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Shiroma backed Sheetz by insisting that his vision for a business center
would be modeled on textbook-like scenarios of international exchange. In
fact, he claimed that b
 ecause of his explicitly anti-prostitution stance,
Goyeku again faced retaliation as the number of rape incidences increased.100
Sheetz finally granted Shiroma the bid, and on December 8, 1949, Koza
was released from its off-limits designation. It “opened up as a commercial town for U.S.-Ryukyuan friendship”101 and took the name “Business
Center Street,” known today as “Park Avenue.” Sensitive to criticism,
Uruma Shimpo was compelled to start off the introduction of Business
Center Street with the defensive subheading “Let’s Do Away with Misconception.” The first few lines read:
The establishment of the Business Center is a place for light-hearted,
virtuous, and sound business as well as amusement102 between Americans and Okinawans, but naysayers of the entertainment district103
went so far as to hold a forum and espouse their misconception of the
problem as a military-appointed prostitution district. According to the
governor’s comments yesterday at the assembly, the major general told
him that “[t]he Business Center is a light-hearted place of amusement
found in any civilized country.” Nonetheless, t here is an individual104
around Naha with a misconception that it is a replica of the prewar
Okinawan pleasure quarters105 who is rousing up opposition. This is
truly unacceptable.106

The opening of Koza was followed by a lifting of the off-limits restriction
in Naha in January 1950. The Okinawa Times reported the G.I.s “look forward to meeting the young Okinawan ladies on the street.”107 A fter seeing
how off-limit areas profited from the infiltration of G.I.s into the community, northern Okinawa also petitioned to lift the Okinawan ban. According
to Ikemiyagi Shūi, village leaders justified their request to the U.S. military
by stating, “contact with Americans would promote democratization,”
“friendship with American officers would edify English-language studies,” and “friendly relations would heighten the level of trust between the
villagers and American officers.”108
However, Katō Masahiro suggests that the Business Center campaign
was a cover for the informal establishment of “comfort facilities” (ian shisetsu), more informally called “entertainment districts” (kanrakugai) or
“special drinking districts” (tokuingai), that facilitated prostitution.109 Shiroma Seizen, the aforementioned mayor of Goyeku Village, Shiroma Eiko,
vice president of the Women’s Association, and Shima Masu, the so-called
mother of social welfare who worked in the Goyeku Village a fter the war,
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met with a Major General Alvan C. Kincaid in August 1949 to discuss the
problem. Hokama Yoneko recalls:
He110 said, “It’s difficult to be concerned with the sexual problems of
the soldiers . . .” We made a case for self-discipline amongst the
soldiers and the withdrawal of special w
 omen.111 He responded, “Well
then, let’s make a special area at the fringes of town on the fields of
Yaejima. This is the best way possible.” We had no choice but to agree
with Kincaid’s opinion.112

In this way, Yaejima became established as a “special drinking district”
(tokuingai) in order to contain sexual relations with the G.I.s in a secluded
area of the village.
Goyeku was representative of similar developments unfolding throughout Okinawa. In August 1949, local municipalities w
 ere petitioning the
military government to establish “U.S. military comfort stations” (Beigun
ianshisetsu) in Koza, Naha, Maebaru, and Ishikawa.113 Their objective was
explained by the following article.
Considering the need to prevent VD that has rapidly increased in the
postwar era, the assembly has discussed the moral propriety for the
need of dance halls or other comfort amusement establishments from
every angle. In part icular, the Ōgimi public sanitation chief has
worked on a plan with this as the only way to suppress VD, and is
currently furthering talks with the police department. However, the
governor has stated that the establishment of this kind of pleasure
facilit y should be further examined as a social policy issue. All types of
documents are currently being gathered. Establishment of a special
area for amusement is almost entirely supported by men and opposed
by women.114

The police suggested that “the problems of rape, murder, assault, and arson by G.I.s are all caused by the male/female issue.”115 Here, the reference to “arson” potentially alludes to the incident in Goyeku after the
prostitution sweep.
The issue was contentiously debated at a town hall forum in Naha on
September 30, 1949, amongst the Women’s Association, the Okinawa Civilian Administration, pol itical party representatives, priests, and youth
group representatives. In particular, it was Senaga Kamejirō of the Okinawa
People’s Party (Okinawa Jinmintō, herein referred to as “OPP”)—the f uture
Naha City mayor (1956) that earned the title of “troublemaker”—who
expressed his opposition to the U.S. military through the issue.
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Senaga stated that dance hall is merely a beautiful name for a prostitution district considering it institutes a system for monitoring syphilis.
Hence, speaking from a position [that advocates] the protection of
human rights and w
 omen’s liberation, he expressed his absolute
opposition.116

As seen in mainland Japan, Marxist politicians such as Senaga who were
antagonistic toward U.S. military occupation had quickly taken up the issue of prostitution. Senaga and the OPP had covert ties to the JCP since
the former’s inception in June 1947,117 and starting in April 1949—just four
months before the town hall forum—t he OPP had become openly critical
of the U.S. military.118 The OPP was empowered to show its true colors
because of the widespread unpopularity of the military government that
had both temporarily halted the distribution of food rations and arbitrarily
raised the prices on food from late 1948 to early 1949.119 Senaga attempted
to ride this wave of discontent in order to attack the formation of a sex industry. However, he stumbled on a critical rift that would continue to run
through postwar Okinawan society. Discontent amongst farmers and base
town workers was not always congruous, as we shall see in subsequent
chapters.
Shiroma and the police chief reluctantly supported the establishment of
the entertainment districts as the lesser of two evils. The article continues:
The Goyeku Village mayor and Koza police chief both contested the
wretched conditions of the m iddle district [where Goyeku was
located], and supported the establishment of a breakwater [of the flesh]
that would preserve the social peace by gathering prostitutes in one
area as a policy for preventing the depravity of the youth and harm to
the residents.120

Quickly, the issue became polarized and set the tone for the rest of the occupation. Shima captured the essence of the dilemma.
 hese two positions w
T
 ere representative of the debate that took place
that day. Both w
 ere serious arguments. Residents living around the
bases, however, w
 ere troubled by the fact that ideals could not solve the
very real problem at hand. This debate took place in every corner of
Okinawa, and finally, everyone was resigned to accept the establishment of a special drinking district.121

Headlines for the Uruma Shimpo, directly after the town meeting, made
the exact same characterization: “The G
 reat Dilemma of the ‘Entertainment District’: A Debate between Ideals and Reality.”122
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This put Sheetz in an awkward yet desirous position. Okinawans were
poised as subjects who petition for their right to prostitute while Sheetz
was poised as the authority who bestows the privilege for Okinawans to
prostitute themselves. Yet, in light of the 1947 special proclamations, he
was at the same time compelled to publicly display his outright opposition
to prostitution. In actuality, the distinction between the “good” areas for
international exchange and “bad” areas for prostitution was rendered defunct. A fter the off-limits ban was lifted in areas throughout Okinawa,
t here were an estimated seven thousand sex workers in Okinawa by 1950,123
and the number of VD cases skyrocketed. Syphilis cases rose 583.8 percent
(111 to 759), gonorrhea cases rose 112.5 percent (711 to 1,511), and chancroid cases r ose 980 p
 ercent (10 to 108) from 1949 to 1950.124
Around this time in early 1950, off-limits orders were reinstated and
started to take on new meaning. The U.S. military prohibited its personnel from entering certain restaurants, bars, brothels, or h
 otels if they w
 ere
125
suspected of being a source of VD. Because this was tantamount to an
economic sanction, Okinawan business owners w
 ere put in a position to
petition for the removal of the order by eradicating VD and improving
sanitation in their establishments. Again, the U.S. military did not mandate
prostitution through the legal order, but rather prohibited it. Instead, the
off-limits o
 rders shifted the problem of controlling VD to the Okinawan
people by explicitly linking it to the economy.
On November 24, 1951, Deputy Military Governor Robert S. Beightler drafted a letter to Higa Tatsuo, the governor of the Okinawa Guntō,
underscoring the severity of VD with veiled threats of more off-limits
orders.126 In response, the Okinawa Guntō government established a “VD
Prevention Committee” on November 29, and VD policy committees w
 ere
established at the local level throughout Okinawa in December. They identified the gaishō, or streetwalker, as a conduit to transmission and subsequently put pressure on these women to work in the entertainment districts
where they could be monitored and directed to submit to medical exams.127
The committee worked closely with health centers that w
 ere established
throughout the island earlier that year in 1951 to promote education and regular examinations.128 In this way, the U.S. military conveniently allowed
Okinawans to do the work of controlling the spread of VD and police
streetwalkers into entertainment districts by intrinsically linking the management of sex work to the economic stability of the entire island.
As the sex industry became established as a social phenomenon in U.S.
military–occupied Okinawa, its discourse was secured by anchoring it to
conceptions of f ree w
 ill. Prostitution was e ither justified by the “local girls
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in sufficient numbers who were willing . . . to entertain the soldiers’
wants”129 on the one hand, or condemned b
 ecause they were forced to
“prostitute themselves to G.I.s as a means of ‘living’ and ‘eating’ ” on the
other.130 That is, whether or not that w ill was respected or v iolated, the
sanctity of a self-determining w ill was nonetheless posited. In this register, U.S. military strategy was to highlight Okinawan agency and downplay any instance where the political opposition could dig up evidence of
slave-like exploitation to criticize the draconian force of the U.S. military.
By freeing ourselves from the constraint of this register, however, we
can alternatively ask what is at stake with the emergence of this type of
subject. As Kokuba had analyzed, the goal of the U.S. military was to “stabilize political rule” over Okinawa in the absence of a long-term economic
policy so it could be prepared for a later reunion with Japanese monopoly
capital. In this context, the ultimate aim of U.S. military governance was
not to protect or violate the f ree w
 ill of Okinawans, but rather to allow for
the emergence of the technology of what Tomiyama calls a “petitioning
subject.”131 As “petitioning subjects,” Okinawans not only produce goods
and services, but they produce themselves as subjects before the law. In this
sense, merely exposing U.S. military rhetoric as a trick to violate the autonomy of Okinawan w
 omen does not step outside of the register of f ree
w ill, but unwittingly reproduces it. The ultimate goal here was not to negotiate for more autonomy and better protection of the inviolable human
w ill, but it was to produce subjects who negotiate within the channels of
the law. As a result, it depoliticized the field of alegality in which Okinawans
were fraught with the contradictions of a “w ill” that was simultaneously
compromised, even as it was exercised.
A petitioning subject is a precarious one who must ask for things b
 ecause
it has little to nothing. T
 hese social conditions w
 ere different from mainland
Japan, where the m
 iddle class came to internalize the need to reproduce
labor power for capital in service to the state, as discussed in Chapter 1.
Certainly, while there was similarity in that both positioned the sex industry as a deterrence to sexual violence, suggested that exposing c hildren
to the social phenomenon of prostitution was detrimental to their upbringing, and generally discriminated against the women, t here was also a con
spicuous difference. While Okinawans w
 ere well aware of the racial
dynamics of the sex industry that catered to the U.S. military, t here was
sparing to no mention of miscegenation as racial contamination of the population in need of preventative measures u ntil around 1956, when popular
sentiment shifted toward reversion to the Japanese administration amidst
the all-island struggle (discussed in Chapter 3). For Okinawans, the debate
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on the formation of the sex industry was informed by an intense fear of
sexual violence and the desire for dollars to escape destitution. Because
Okinawans were failed subjects before the state, the U.S. military, particularly a fter the arrival of Sheetz in 1949, sought to contain this field of
alegality by incorporating them into the legal order as self-determining
subjects with the temporary promise of dollars that would come with base
construction on the eve of the Korean War. And as we s hall see next, the
attempt to contain this field of alegality led to disastrous consequences for
Okinawa’s ability to embrace the birth of its mixed-race c hildren.

Impossible Descendants of the Future
The first mention of mixed-race children I was able to locate was in a handwritten Okinawa Times article dated August 13, 1948, entitled “Pleas for
Abortion Knocking on the Door of Underground Doctors.” Different from
mainland Japan immediately after the end of occupation, t hese children
were not articulated in terms of the racial contamination of the population that must be preemptively contained in order to preserve the purity
of the race. Rather, in accordance to the primary goal to “stabilize political
rule” in Okinawa by getting Okinawans to recognize the legal order, the
lives of mixed-race c hildren w
 ere superimposed onto a grid of legal intelligibility in which they did not fit and hence became existences purportedly
in need of erasure.
When a forty-nine-year-old man was arrested for suspicion of performing an illegal abortion, it became known to the authorities that it was not
an isolated case, but a growing social phenomenon amongst mostly unmarried w
 omen who could not bear the consequences of having a mixed-race
child. The article reads:
The women w
 ere outraged at the investigator’s assertion that they
exchanged their chastity for material goods from the military and
instead proclaimed they w
 ere living in pure love. They w
 ere all
unmarried and ranged from ages 20 to 25. But when they thought of
the reality of childbirth, they d
 idn’t know what e lse to do, and ultimately resorted to the crime for which they candidly apologized
before bursting into tears.132

Prostitution and “pure love” are posited at opposite ends of the same legal
continuum. The former is stigmatized as the illegal activity of women who
gave in to the temptation of “material goods” while the latter is poised as
choice that longs for formal recognition by the law.133 The w
 omen are re-
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ported as preemptively aborting because of the “reality of childbirth” in
which their children would not only be born out of wedlock, but also doubly stateless. In the first sense, Okinawa was already legally in limbo as it
was severed from the Japanese administration, and in the second sense,
Japanese nationality could only be conferred through patrilineal lines until
the large number of stateless children in Okinawa compelled Japan to reform its nationality law to include a mother’s right to confer nationality to
her child in 1985.134 These children were literally unintelligible to the state
in the most concrete sense of the law.
Another w
 oman resorted to infanticide after she realized the child whom
she birthed was not the child of her husband.
Soon a fter getting married this past June, Maemura Hiro (age 22,
pseudonym) . . . gave birth to her first child. When she realized it was
an illegitimate child with the skin of a foreign race, she was arrested
three days a fter delivery for suffocating and murdering the child in
her underarm as she breastfed it.

The corporeality of this w
 oman whose body breastfeeds her newborn is
horrifically disconnected from her conscious actions that can realize no
possibility for a racialized “illegitimate” birth other than death. Not only
is the soul torn asunder, but the bodily enclosure of the (native) mother/
(mixed)child unit that continues postpartum through breastfeeding is
severed with the razor-sharp boundary-inscribing violence of infanticide;
the mother must cut out the part of her body that is of a “foreign race,”
thereby disallowing the possibility that the baby can be an extension of
herself.
Continuing with quotes from individuals who blame the w
 omen for
their “irresponsibility,” a male researcher pointed out that “t hese women
face a crisis that cannot be handled by the old morality due to the drastic
changes in the [postwar] environment.” At the same time, he thought “they
should be blamed for the irresponsibility of taking a new life.” The Shuri
Youth Group president thought that the public was “too lenient t oward the
‘social cancer’ of the times.” A female worker from A. J. Futenma Camp
sympathizes with the women b
 ecause it is “a sad reality of the postwar era”
and at the same time admits they are a “nuisance” to “the numerous working women” who “protect their purity” b
 ecause they are categorically
“scorned” by society.135 Such excerpts from this massive article betray a
schizophrenic rhythm. The article is incapable of processing emotions that
overflow with the incommensurability between the racialized body and law
in one instance, and rigidly prescriptive normative values in another.
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The Uruma Shimpo published statistics on mixed-race c hildren in a September 23, 1949, article entitled “A Colorful Assortment of Mixed-Race
Children: Most Numerous of Caucasian Descent.” The article describes
them as “born e ither as a crystallization of international love that transcends
borders or by accidental misfortune,” encapsulating the two polarities between life legitimated by and excluded from the law. Significantly, this article appears amidst the widely contested debate on the establishment of
“entertainment districts.”136
These initial writings on miscegenation spoke of the need to blanket
Okinawa with a legal intelligibility in the immediate postwar when
Okinawa’s position in the Cold War order was still in flux. But amidst this
initial encounter, where multiple worlds collided in the space of postwar
Okinawa, what was important was the cultivation of a petitioning subject,
or a self-determining entity that recognized a sovereign power who decides. It was the form of this decision, as a power that suspends the movement of liminality, that incapacitated Okinawan women from claiming
their mixed-raced c hildren as the progeny of Okinawa.
When Ifa Fuyū (1876–1947), the so-called f ather of Okinawan studies,
wrote just one month before his death in 1947, “[t]he only choice Okinawans have is to throw themselves before the w ill of their descendants
after them,”137 it was unlikely he had mixed-race children in mind amongst
t hese “descendants.” But what is significant is that Okinawans w
 ere not
only incapable of deciding their own political f uture, but “they themselves
[were] in no position to command their descendants to be in possession of
it.”138 Ifa expressed disillusionment toward the field of represent at ion in
which the conditions for the possibility of autonomy could find articulation, but could only exist as a haunting “without a voice and without a figure.”139 Neither in death nor in life would Okinawans find transcendence
to the other world, but the dead would comingle amongst their descendants, imbuing them with the hope for a f uture that the dead themselves
could not decide. It is precisely in the inability to determine Okinawa’s
f uture that mixed-race c hildren remained the potential children in a dream
of a different kind of liberation.
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Okinawa, 1952–1958: Solidarity
under the Cover of Darkness

Chapter 2 argued that the objective of the U.S. military was, for the time
being, to establish a legal order in postwar Okinawa recognized by self-
determining subjects at a time when its position within the Cold War regime was only starting to materialize. While fear of racialized sexual
violence incited an identification with the law, it was nonetheless a tenuous one that could fall apart just as easily as it came together. The post1952 era was a testament to the need for something more than a legal order
rooted in fear amongst a war-torn p
 eople, namely, a long-term plan to care
for the population so as to maintain governance in Okinawa. GARIOA had
already peaked in 1950 and dwindled thereafter. The U.S. military
needed Okinawa to be as economically self-sufficient as possible, if not to
avoid the burden of economic aid, then to avoid communist aspirations
amongst the dissatisfied islanders. The problem, however, was that it took
over an Okinawan economy that was neglected by Japan and did not
achieve such aims on its own accord from the prewar era.
This chapter charts the position of the sex industry amidst mass social
protest as the U.S. military struggled to reintegrate the Okinawan economy
from 1952 to 1958. On the one hand, a wide range of workers speaking in
65
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different island tongues (shima kutuba) flooded into the main island around
base towns from Okinawa’s peripheries. On the other hand, the U.S.
military was compelled to confront the issue of compensation for the use
of land confiscated during the war in addition to new confiscations after
1952. Amidst this radical heterogeneity of the postwar, base construction
workers successfully carried out the first postwar workers’ strike, farmers
ignited the “all-island struggle,” and the Ryukyu Legislature was winning
seats by political radicals backed by the communist-influenced Okinawa
People’s Party (OPP). If Okinawans w
 ere to recognize the l egal order, then
they would publicly protest for reversion to the Japanese administration
through legal channels of the democratic process. Unfortunately, this was
not the political message that the U.S. military wanted to hear. It not only
responded with outright political repression, but also issued off-limits
orders to base towns centered on the sex industry that paralyzed the Okinawan economy. While the OPP opposed the formation of the sex industry, t here is l ittle evidence to suggest that they w
 ere able to infiltrate t hese
communities and mobilize them into public forms of protest as they did
construction workers and farmers. Yet t hese base town workers w
 ere not
only integral to the economy, but to the understanding of sex, race, nation, and class in Okinawa’s mass resistance. How was it possible to continue with popular resistance against the U.S. military u
 nder the banner
of an “all-island struggle” when a significant part of the island refused to
protest the very patrons that frequented their businesses?
This chapter addresses the sex worker as a subject who could not be
mobilized u nder a political platform before the state, i.e., the lumpenproletariat. I argue that the lumpenproletariat is neither inherently subversive to nor inherently complicit with U.S. military oppression. Rather, an
examination of the lumpenproletariat repositions politics as the interplay
between a radical heterogeneity (i.e., alegality) attuned to the immediate
struggle for life and political representat ion oriented toward an idealistic
goal in the f uture. The all-island struggle of this period was more than
just a struggle for land against U.S. military confiscation; it was a strug
gle to reclaim the power of resistance in an unofficial and nonpublic form
that was opened up by OPP’s underground communist party after the
U.S. military shut down other official possibilities for political expression.
It was u nder this cover of darkness that we can locate moments of solidarity between w
 omen involved with G.I.s and Okinawans resisting
U.S. military repression. Additionally, it was this solidarity that was
compromised by off-limits o
 rders that polarized Okinawan society and
drove them into political factions by making a public spectacle of “pro-
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Japanese reversion activists” who came up against “pro-A merican base town
workers.”
In the end, I argue that what divided Okinawan society was not so much
how the U.S. military pitted various interests against each other as it was
the displacement of an understanding of representat ional politics as an instrumental expression of heterogeneous interests. In this sense, OPP
played into the polarizing tactics of the U.S. military by pushing an ethno-
nationalist identification with the Japanese state. It was this “spiritualistic” (seishinshugitekina) ethno-nationalism, much like the “mysticism” or
“primitivism” described by Tosaka in Chapter 1, that fostered the biopo
litical imperative to eliminate miscegenation in the base towns for the sake
of an idealistic communion with Japan in a utopian f uture.

The Lumpenproletariat
The postwar social landscape radically changed in the 1950s as Okinawa
was transformed from a countryside filled with farmers to a handful of
larger base towns bustling with workers who built and serv iced U.S. military bases. A
 fter plans for long-term occupation solidified at the end of the
1940s, the Okinawan economy that was sustained by GARIOA shifted to
an economy sustained by “base income” that reached an all-t ime high in
1953.1 Workers came from Okinawa’s peripheral islands such as Amami,
Ishigaki, Miyako, and Yaeyama. Of t hese islands, a large number came
from Amami, which was officially part of the southernmost islands of
Kagoshima Prefecture, but was occupied (similarly to Okinawa) by the
U.S. military u
 ntil it reverted to the Japanese administration on Christmas day in 1953.2 Workers also included returnees from the corners of the
now collapsed Japanese empire. They built military bases, serv iced base
operations, and of course flooded into the base towns centered on the
sex industry.
Hayashi Yoshimi, a member of the Amami Communist Party, worked
closely with General Secretary Senaga Kamejirō of the OPP and organized
military base workers. Hayashi was the behind-the-scenes leader of the first
postwar large-scale workers’ protest known as the Nippon Road Company
(Nippon Dōrosha) strike on June 5, 1952. Most of the 143 workers came from
Amami3 and demanded a 30 percent pay increase, back pay, paid leave for
injury or sickness, and better dormitory living conditions.4 Senaga, who
was a member of the Ryukyu Legislature, brought the spirit of the strikers’
public demonstrations onto the stage of representat ional politics and won
overwhelming public support. On June 11, the legislature unanimously
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passed a resolution of support. As the Okinawa Times reported, this was an
invitation to the “100,000 Ryukyuan workers” to protest the U.S. military;
2,000 throughout the islands, in fact, participated in a rally outside of Naha
Theater on June 15.5 Soon thereafter on July 11, the Ryukyu Legislature
also passed a law that enabled workers to u
 nionize.6
The U.S. military was also facing problems with landowners. When the
1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty went into effect, the U.S. military was
compelled to legitimize its claims to the land it confiscated during the war
and its aftermath. It accomplished this with Article 3 of the treaty, which
stipulated “the United States w
 ill have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and
inhabitants of t hese islands. . . .”7 Accordingly, the U.S. military issued
Ordinance No. 91 (Authority to Contract) and agreed to retroactively pay
rent from June 1, 1950, to April 27, 1952, at a rate of 1.08 B-yen for one
tsubo. Additionally, it proposed a twenty-year contract.8 However, 1.08
B-yen at the time was about the equivalent of a pack of cigarettes, and the
lengthy contract gave cause for concern about the f uture.9 How would t hese
families eke out a life in postwar Okinawa without farmland? Because of
the confiscations, Okinawans already lost 24 percent of their arable land.10
Furthermore, they were compelled to make greater use of it because returnees from the empire had increased the population by 21 percent.11 Land
was precious, food was scarce, and the f uture was uncertain. As a result,
only about nine hundred of fifty-seven thousand families (1.6 percent) complied with the terms of the ordinance.12 If one considers that each family
had about five members—t he average at the time—t hen this means that
about half of the entire Okinawan population was at odds with the U.S.
military ordinance.13
Additionally, the U.S. military demanded more land. While t here was
little resistance in confiscating land when Okinawans were struggling to
survive the war and immediate postwar aftermath, the political climate
had changed by 1952. To legitimize the confiscations, the U.S. military
issued Ordinance No. 109 (Land Acquisition Procedure) on April 3,
1953, that provided terms for acquiring new leases, including the ability
to take private land with armed force in the case of noncompliance.14 Aja
and Mekaru of Mawashi Village were taken in April 1953, Gushi of
Oroku Village in December 1953, Maja of Ie Village in March 1955, and
Isahama of Ginowan Village in July 1955.15 T hese land confiscations
were dramatic. With “bulldozers and bayonets,” they often tricked farmers into signing documents they did not understand and burned down
their houses at gunpoint.
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In the wake of open resistance, the U.S. military resorted to outright
political repression. In 1952, the military’s governing body, the U.S. Civil
Administration of the Ryukyus (USCAR), established and surveilled the
civilian Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI) that was organized into
three branches (executive, legislative, and judicial): the chief executive who
was appointed by USCAR, the Ryukyu Legislature whose members were
elected through popular vote, and the supreme court. Okinawans were allowed to express their democratic w
 ill through its only electoral channel,
the Ryukyu Legislature.16 Senaga suggested that the new political infrastructure was tantamount to a “puppet government.”17
Yet, even with the high degree of USCAR control, Okinawans still voted
on an overwhelmingly anti-U.S. military platform led by a coalit ion between the OPP and Socialist Party (Shadaitō) in a special election to fill a
vacated seat belonging to the middle district (chūbu chiku) on April 1, 1953.
The candidate, Tengan Chōkō, won a landslide victory supporting repeal
of Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty (quoted earlier); reversion
to the Japanese administration; opposition to colonization and continued
occupation; the immediate enactment of the labor law; opposition to land
confiscations; the overthrow of the USCAR appointed chief executive of
the GRI, Higa Shūhei; and public elections for the same position.18 A fter
the opposing Democratic Party (Minshūtō) took advantage of the political
repression by presenting USCAR with evidence of a purported scandal,
the victory was rendered null and void.19 More than an incidental election
to fill a vacated seat, it became known as the “Tengan Incident” and was
emblematic of the political repression of widespread opposition to USCAR
voiced through the democratic process.
Perfectly orchestrated to fall on the eve of the April 1 election, USCAR
issued an off-limits order on establishments catering to U.S. military personnel on March 29. Different from the 1950 off-limits orders that aimed
to contain the spread of VD, Deputy Governor David A. P. Ogden of
USCAR hinted that these new orders were related to “anti-A merican
thought.”20 What this means is that the U.S. military now positioned the
businesses in the base towns as instruments of political manipulation. Concerned with the economic impact of the order, a resident from the entertainment district of the Shintsuji Town of Oroku contributed the following
article to the Ryukyu Shimpo.
If the off-limits continues for another month or two, I think t here w ill
be a number of bankruptcies in the Yaejima District of Koza and
Shintsuji Town of Oroku. Particularly in the m iddle district, I think
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90 percent of the residents live dependent on the U.S. military. People
are incited to satisfy the ambitions of a few anti-A mericanists who
 on’t understand the feelings of the
sacrifice our livelihood.21 They d
m iddle district residents. Yet the crisis is not limited only to the
m iddle district. The aftershocks are felt throughout the Ryukyus and
threaten the livelihood of all Ryukyuans with collapse. If the off-limits
are semi-permanent, then all of the Ryukyus shall be assaulted with an
economic crisis within a few months.22

Although the OPP protested the formation of the sex industry in Okinawa,
this article suggests that the so-called anti-A mericanists named here were
not able to infiltrate the base towns. The author writes of a rift between
the “ambitions of a few” who incite the masses with public protest and the
base town workers most immediately concerned with making a daily living (seikatsu). In s imple terms, this means that the immediate life of base
town workers was sacrificed on the altar of the protestors’ higher ideals.
In more complex terms, however, it pushes the theoretical problem of what
to do with t hose who fail to be politically organized, i.e., the lumpenproletariat. Despite the rich heterogeneity amongst the workers and farmers,
they w
 ere still able to find a voice through the democratic process before
the law. The workers of the base towns, however, w
 ere not.
Marx classifies the lumpenproletariat as a form of pauperism within the
relative surplus population, below the floating, latent, and stagnant populations. Even within the category of pauperism, the lumpenproletariat exists at the bottom as “vagabonds, criminals, [and] prostitutes.”23 As such,
it is a peculiar segment of the population for Marx. Ernesto Laclau points
out that the other categories of unemployment surrounding the lumpenproletariat are still “functional to capitalist accumulation because the competition of the many workers for the few jobs pushes down the level of
wages, and in that way, increases surplus-value.”24 What he means is that
the industrial reserve army is predicated on the assumption of an unemployed population that sustains competition for a few jobs, thereby pushing down wages and increasing the rate of profit. In this way, it maintains
a “functionality within the system, and as a result, t hese people are still
part of a ‘history of production.’ ”25 However, the lumpenproletariat is dif
ferent in that it is unintelligible to capital; it is not part of capital’s f uture
commodification of labor power; or as Laclau writes, it is a “heterogeneity
which cannot be subsumed u
 nder a single ‘inside’ logic.”26 This points to
a heterogeneity—t hat this book names as the alegal—t hat cannot be easily mobilized into the official “history of production,” e ither as its workers
or as its dissidents.
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Here, one may certainly be justified to argue that, contrary to Marx’s
assumption, the “prostitute” as the “actual lumpenproletariat”27 is in fact
not external to the history of capitalist accumulation, but as the author of
the article quoted earlier suggests, a driving force that has the potential to
“threaten the livelihood of all Ryukyuans with collapse.” While this gendered analysis is important, my concern h
 ere is not the “lumpenproletariat as a class or group that can be defined sociologically” as a problem of
“occupation or income level.”28 Rather, I am interested in the lumpenproletariat as a potentiality omnipresent across disparate groups. It is in this
way that Tomiyama argues that the industrial reserve army is based on a
“faith relation” (shinyō kankei) in which the unemployed are assumed to be
ready and waiting for mobilization into production. By describing it as a
“faith relation,” however, Tomiyama dislodges the facticity of the industrial reserve army and underscores the mechanism through which it comes
to be—t hat is, through the management of the lumpenproletariat as “the
limit where the potential of labor power for capital can turn into an impossibility.”29 The lumpenproletariat is the limit where the “faith relation”
breaks down and marks the constant threat of crisis; it is an interruption
in the teleological view of history. In this way, Tomiyama does not position the lumpenproletariat as an exception to the rule, but shows how the
history of production normalizes itself by categorically excluding the
lumpenproletariat. This is why he does not write about the lumpenproletariat as an absolute outside of history—as if its place has already been
decided—but instead describes it as a “place of language that searches for
a f uture.”30 Writing the history of the lumpenproletariat, as an unstable
category that can turn into a crisis for capital just as easily as it can ensure
its continued operation, is a performative process (i.e., that “place of
language”) that does not lead to a teleological end but “searches for a
f uture” in the process of its articulation.
The question of the base town worker as a lumpenproletariat subject,
then, is how to write its history without silencing it in the name of giving
it a voice, but allowing the articulation to be an open-ended and transformative process. This is crucial to representat ion before the state and the
lumpenproletariat as un-representable heterogeneity b
 ecause it opens up
the possibility for social transformation when not tethered to state recognition. This is the power of the lumpenproletariat and the alegal: It is not
in denying the existence of the state or plotting for its collapse, but in cultivating a life force that exists in its own right removed from the imperative for state recognition. This is a life force that does not have a lifetime to
wait in hopes of recognition, but embraces itself in the here and now. This
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is precisely the possibility that was opened up when Okinawans exhausted
the official channels for protest; resistance was driven out of the blinding
light of sovereignty and into the rich darkness of the underground. In the
next section, I discuss the possibilities opened up by OPP’s underground
communist party, led by Kokuba Kōtarō, which fostered social transformation through unofficial channels.

The Underground
 fter the off-limits o
A
 rders in April 1953, Okinawa’s political landscape only
became more dismal. In March 1954, USCAR announced plans for a lump-
sum payment on lands for which the lease period was projected to be over
five years. Okinawan anger was driven to a breaking point after a U.S. congressman erroneously suggested USCAR was catering to the Okinawan
desire to sell their land to the U.S. military.31 In response, the Ryukyu Legislature unanimously passed the well-k nown “Four Principles for Solving
the Military Land Problems” (herein referred to as “Four Principles”) resolution on April 30, 1954. It stated that (1) the United States should renounce the purchase of land and the lump-sum payment of rentals; (2) just
and complete compensation should be made annually for the land currently
in use; (3) indemnity should be paid promptly for all damage caused by the
United States; and (4) no further acquisition of land should be made, and
the land that was not urgently needed by the United States should be restored promptly.32 At the same time the resolution was passed, the GRI,
Ryukyu Legislature, Mayor’s Association (shichōsonchōkai), and Federation
of Landowners (tochirengōkai) formed the Council of Four Organizations
(yonsha kyōgikai). Despite their various motivations, they unified across the
political spectrum. Since Okinawa had exhausted the available channels
for political redress, the Council of Four Organizations decided it had no
choice but to trump USCAR altogether by g
 oing over its head to directly
appeal to the United States Congress. The results of this mission would
not be known u ntil 1956 (discussed later as the Price Report). Until then,
Okinawa was left with its hands tied politically.33
In the wake of the Four Principles, Ogden responded with a full-scale
Red Scare in Okinawa. In May 1954, he blamed any public opposition to
USCAR policy on communism. By October, USCAR targeted the OPP
by arresting its members, including Senaga.34 In Okinawan historiography, this period is known as the “dark ages” in which the possibility of expressing the w ill of the people through legal channels was foreclosed. The
leading historian of contemporary Okinawa, Arasaki Moriteru, argues that
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t hese “dark times of repression and plunder . . . became the fertile ground
for the p
 eople’s struggle” and “planted the seeds for the eventual explosion
that became the all-island struggle.”35
Mori Yoshio makes an important intervention to this received historiography by filling in the blanks between the “dark times”—where politi
cal speech was repressed—and its “explosion” as the all-island struggle after
the 1956 Price Report. He does not assume a natural developmental trajectory from one to the next, but instead depicts a dance between un-
representable heterogeneity (i.e., the alegal) irreducible to the state and
political representat ion before the state. To this end, he demonstrates how
Senaga intentionally and masterfully manipulated t hese two registers: the
unseen on-t he-ground work that incited the heterogenous masses and the
channeling of this energy into a political platform before the state. Specifically, he tracks the relationship between Hayashi Yoshimi (the aforementioned member of the Amami Communist Party and behind-the-scenes
leader of the Nippon Road Company strike), who pushed for the formation of an underground or “nonlegal” (higōhō) communist party36 in
Okinawa; Senaga, who capitalized on-t he-g round protest on the public
platform of the Ryukyu Legislature; and Kokuba Kōtarō, who worked as
the leader of the underground communist party in its actualized form,
from 1954 to 1957, a fter Senaga was arrested and Hayashi was deported to
Amami during the Red Scare. Whereas Senaga saw the utility in an underground communist party as it existed for representational politics,
Kokuba’s commitment to the underground enabled him to cultivate a deep
suspicion of Senaga’s spiritualistic ethno-nationalist pro-reversion politics
that would later take Okinawa by storm and engulf the base town as its
enemy.
Kokuba was a student of economics at the University of Tokyo when
he became involved in the movement for Okinawa’s reversion to mainland
Japan.37 Upon his return to Okinawa, Hayashi had already successfully
convinced Senaga to start construction of an OPP underground communist party after the success of the Nippon Road Company strike in 1952.38
Kokuba quickly learned that its role was to augment the OPP by covertly
infiltrating the pockets of society that the OPP could not reach publicly.
This shed light on the character of the OPP as a true people’s party of the
masses that was radically different from the JCP in mainland Japan.39
Kokuba turned to the farmers of Isahama in 1955, who were suffering
an “intense sense of isolation” in their struggle against land confiscations
by USCAR.40 Although they initially rejected him, he gained their trust
after working with them in the fields. He facilitated meetings between

153-75549_ch01_3P.indd 73

10/13/18 12:57 PM

74

Okinawa, 1952–1958

farmers from different villages so as to build solidarity amongst them, and
then facilitated a roundtable discussion between the farmers and politicians.41 Nishime Junji, a Socialist Party member who would later serve as
Okinawa’s governor from 1978 to 1990, was deeply moved by the women
in part icular, a contingency least likely to participate in representat ional
politics as the most outspoken in the movement. The women argued:
While the village men may have been forced to accept [a lease that]
came through coercion, they do not understand the pain of raising
children. Men probably recklessly accepted thinking they can just die,
but w
 omen a ren’t afforded the luxury.
We are driven to madness when thinking of what w
 ill happen to
the children. Even if we want to die, we c an’t when thinking of the
children.42

The women w
 ere resolute in their rejection of negotiations with USCAR
 ecause the futurity of the land was connected to the futurity of their
b
children like an umbilical cord. Death was a luxury of escape that they
could not afford; instead, they w
 ere pressed to confront the immediacy of
life.
At the same time, Iejima was also facing ruthless land confiscations by
armed force. The farmers decided to sit in before the USCAR and GRI
building in Naha after their homes were burned to the ground. At this
time in March 1955, members of the underground communist party that
Kokuba had been working with in the Ryukyu Legislature sent the farmers an anonymous letter which was to be burned after it was read.43 It
stated:
We are in the midst of a most painful b
 attle. This is b
 ecause the
opponent is an absolute power backed by the greatest military force
ever. No matter how much they appeal to military force . . . t he U.S.
military’s land seizures rob h
 umans of life and rob humans of the
freedom to live. This cannot be rationalized by anything. . . . This is
where their weakness lies. The p
 eople of Isahama and Iejima who are
risking their lives expose t hese unjust acts and weakness. Their call to
arms is not an act of strength, but rather a manifestation of their
weakness. . . .
. . . If the struggle continues to consolidate the power of all Okinawan prefectural citizens and quickly win over the support of the
people who love justice and humanity, then solidarity w
 ill deepen and
alienate the American military.44
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The beauty of this letter lies in its auto-subversion. It undermines itself,
transforms, and takes on a new life. If starving farmers from an agrarian
village receive a letter from faceless individuals associated with an underground communist party who combat a perceived U.S. military dictatorship, one might expect to find explicit instructions for some sort of call to
arms. What? When? Where? How? Yet this letter’s only instruction, “Burn
after reading!,” incites the reader to do the exact opposite: Ahagon Shōkō
is compelled to “hold it ever more closely to [his] heart.” 45 Language as a
means to a greater end, i.e., the communication model, is subverted.
Furthermore, it is not the authorship that gives it legitimacy, but rather its
anonymity that gives the farmers a sense of the infectious nature of the
agreement in which it became difficult to discern where it came from.
The power of the letter gave courage to the farmers who would go on to
take to the streets and lead a “beggar’s march” from July 1955.
Ahagon writes that “[n]o one came up with the idea” for the beggar’s
march, but it organically emerged through conversation amongst the farmers. Without thinking to make a donation box, they used only what they
had at hand—t heir hats—to collect donations as they marched across villages throughout the island.46 In this way, they did not make something
new in order to fulfill a purpose, but the materiality already surrounding them morphed into new purpose. Their march furthermore transformed the p
 eople they touched. He writes:
 omen and o
W
 thers listened to our plea as they shed tears. P
 eople who
didn’t have money with them went all the way back home to retrieve
their wallets. Police officers who thought it would be unsuitable to
make a donation entrusted w
 omen listening next to them to do it [on
their behalf]. Also, even though they d
 idn’t do it [directly] themselves,
t here w
 ere Americans who donated by slipping their honeys (lovers)
money.47

This passage is significant because it shows how women, in part icu lar,
women involved with the “Americans,” were used by the representatives
of institutional violence (i.e., police officers and most likely “American” soldiers) as mediators. They were useful precisely because they were thought
to be the farthest removed from representat ional politics. This solidarity
was only possible u nder the cover of darkness.
Mori argues that in taking on the most powerf ul military in the world,
the farmers w
 ere armed with nothing but a public display of their own vulnerability. Instead of internalizing the shame of becoming beggars, they
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revealed how the U.S. military had stripped them down to bare life. As a
result, they performed a “reversal of values” in which the “weak can overcome the strong.” 48 It was this redefinition of strength amidst conditions
of utter powerlessness that reinvigorated Okinawa’s body politic. The
people were no longer dominated by values determined by their oppressors. For Mori, this is the possibility of revolution cultivated within the
ground, out of plain view of representat ional politics, which takes the title
of his book, Revolution within the Ground.49
Mori succeeds in intervening in Arasaki’s historiography that too
quickly passes from the dark ages of pol itical repression to a new age of
popular dissent by failing to see how the work of the underground communist party prepared the soil for the people’s empowerment. However,
while farmers turned the idea of weakness into a weapon against itself, it
still left open the question of whether or not it led to what James R.
Martel calls “subversion rather than just more delusion.”50 A fter all,
Ahagon’s pacifism was very much informed by religious beliefs in Chris
tianity.51 Did the Nietzschean reversal of values simply reproduce the
delusional hope for recognition through a universal ideal—that of a
Christian-inspired nonviolence—or did it subversively dispense with
the desire for redemption through a different universal ideal altogether?
By valorizing nonviolent forms of protest as representative of the “Okinawan heart”52 that perseveres to this day, t here is a risk of reinscribing
it as a universal ideal and imparting it with “just more delusion.” Rather,
as Masaki Kinjo has shown, neither nonviolence nor violence is inherently good or bad; what makes e ither powerf ul is the part icu lar way each
is deployed in relation to the state so as to reclaim the state’s power over
life.53
As the letter written to the farmers by the underground communist
party suggests, the power of the farmers lies in the immediacy of their fight
for survival. They succeeded in exposing the idolatry of mythic violence
that does not exist to protect human life, but only exists to protect itself.
In other words, while the rest of the world may believe the U.S. military
exists to protect the weak—a mantra it continues to recite in the face of
Okinawan protest, i.e., “we are h
 ere to protect you”—t he farmers simply
revealed this fallacy with their life. They did not become something other
than what they already were in order to be recognized by the state, but by
simply being themselves, they altered their relationship to the state. Like
Benjamin’s notion of allegory, they simply performed what they already
were and, by doing so, infused nonhuman and human t hings of the world
with new purpose. Instead of replacing one universal for another, they
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formed a new community liberated from the onus of sovereign recognition. As an unintended consequence of forgoing a polity that waits to be
saved, the responsibility of the decision—however imperfect it may have
been—fell upon the individual. Kokuba describes the contagious force of
the people who made decisions unmoored from the clear guidance of an
authority figure. He writes:
. . . W hat is important is becoming unintelligible to America. In d
 oing
so, the p
 eople’s movement w ill come forth with an explosive force. Not
knowing who is behind it is the most important t hing.
That’s why after arresting Senaga, arresting the party leaders,
crushing all of the unions, incapacitating the movement for reversion,
Iejima and Isahama were nothing but a second thought for them. And
then before they knew it, the counterblow came from that direction,
and before they knew it, it spread like wildfire. Certainly, they would
try to sniff out how it was [the handiwork] of someone who did
something. But no one knows. That is the meaning of having an
underground organization. . . . If it is managed to function this way,
then I think t here is no need for something like an iron rule.54

 ere he suggests how the law, or “iron rule,” becomes superfluous. It was
H
not overcome, but disengaged. Furthermore, women involved with the
G.I.s w
 ere not alienated from this social order hidden from view of the
state, but w
 ere its active agents. When Kokuba traveled from village to village e very other night so as to not be detected by the U.S. C
 ounter Intelligence Corps (CIC) that was actively hunting him down, he says it was
t hese women who helped keep his cover.
. . . at that time, t here w
 ere p
 eople amongst the Isahama farmers called
G.I. “onlies” or “honeys,” and amongst them, some who went on to
marry them. T
 here were places where t hose p
 eople w
 ere renting
rooms. When I was around, they would sometimes come and tell me
“the CIC is coming now” or “the CIC was over t here just now.” And
you know how the American military would show up bearing arms,
right? About a day in advance, the G.I.s would tell their honeys “I
think something’s gonna go down. T
 hey’re getting ready.” And then,
through the honeys, they would tell us agents. This is how close we
got: the locals living t here and the party members.
In that way, I was assisted to some degree and was able to carry on
the entire time while avoiding the eyes of the CIC. It must have been a
surprise for the CIC b
 ecause [the all-island struggle] exploded with
55
such a bang.
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 omen involved with the G.I.s (i.e., Okinawa’s lumpenproletariat) w
W
 ere
not indifferent or hostile to the struggle, but u nder the cover of darkness,
they transformed into mediums and covert agents of solidarity. It was precisely b
 ecause they stood in the shadow of history that they w
 ere able to
help make it.56 Different from the reportage examined in Chapter 1, and
articles on Okinawa by the JCP newspaper Red Flag at the time,57 the Okinawan underground communist party newspaper For the Freedom and In
dependence of the Nation is markedly absent of depictions of women who work
the base towns.58
With the aid of the women, Kokuba was able to move in a modality “unintelligible to Americ a.” Stuck in their sovereign modes of thought,
USCAR automatically assumed Okinawa would ape its decision-making
process of mobilizing a collection of individual wills toward a common goal
decided by a charismatic figure. The unexpected “counterblow” that came
from Iejima and Isahama was the anonymity of the decision that “spread
like wildfire.” Released from the mediation of representat ional politics to
deliver their w ill, the decentralization of power had the unintended consequence of empowering the people. They did not defer to the decision of
another, but precisely b
 ecause t here was no identifiable authority figure,
they w
 ere empowered to make the decision themselves. It was this energy
that ignited the all-island struggle a year later.

Into the Blinding Light of Sovereignty
The results of the Council of Four Organizations that sent a mission directly to the United States Congress were in. A fter a six-member House
Committee on Armed Serv ices headed by Charles Melvin Price directly
visited Okinawa, they responded with the Price Report on June 9, 1956.
Although it attempted to concede with better compensation for the land,
it still maintained the intention of a lump-sum payment.59 This was the
trigger that unleashed widespread protest that took the name “all-island
struggle” as described h
 ere by Arasaki.
On June 9, when the outline of the Price Report was announced,
fifty-six of the sixty-four cities, towns, and villages throughout
Okinawa, or more than 20 percent of the total Okinawan masses,
united and held a residents’ rally60 on June 20. Then in Naha and Koza,
the people61 held a second residents’ rally of 100,000 and 50,000 each
on June 25. This was the process through which the energy of the
people had reached a boiling point and explosively sprung into action.62
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The momentum of the all-island struggle did not stop with the farmers,
but swept across many sectors of Okinawan society that had grievances
with the U.S. military. But how would this mass protest be channeled
through the political process?
As we have seen, the U.S. military government (USCAR) had said “no”
to the people. Okinawa’s civilian government (GRI) had said “yes” to the
people, but it was vetoed by USCAR and turned into a “no.” And now, the
United States Congress had said “no” to the people. Okinawa turned to
option number four and found another gate to the law left to knock on:
the Japanese administration.
Because Okinawa was boxed in on three sides, the Japanese government appeared as the only remaining gate leading to justice. On June 18,
1956, the Council of Four Organizations announced it would send four
representatives to mainland Japan to plead its case. Furthermore, the
Council of Four Organizations announced a seven-point platform on
June 16, 1956, that was oriented toward the Japanese mainland.63 It moved
to (1) form an organized body in solidarity, (2) transcend individual interests with an ethno-nationalist consciousness to protect the land and territorial sovereignty, (3) renounce all forms of violence in resistance, (4)
strug
gle against the policies of the United States and not individual
Americans whose h
 uman rights and character must be respected, (5) eradicate all forms of criminal activity, (6) exercise self-governance amongst
the people, and (7) overcome complications in strict adherence to the
Four Principles.64
Generally speaking, support for the Four Principles was framed in
terms of support for Okinawa’s reversion to the Japanese administration. Popular support for reversion to Japan was already clear by 1950
and formalized with the inauguration of the Association for the Promotion of Reversion to Japan (Nihon fukki sokushin kiseikai) in 1951,65 but
frowned upon by USCAR throughout the years of political repression.
Point two of the platform, in particu lar, explicitly drew a distinction
between “individual interests” and “ethno-nationalist consciousness.”
This suggests recognition of the heterogeneity within Okinawa that was
“transcend[ed]” by “ethno-nationalist consciousness.” The crucial point
here—particularly in light of our consideration of the position of the
base town workers as the lumpenproletariat—is the way in which this
transcendence takes place. As the leader of the underground communist
party, Kokuba was extremely sensitive to this point and how it informed
the meaning of “nationalist consciousness.” For example, in an interview,
he states:
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What we called nationalism66 was not a question of a feeling of
oneness that [comes with a sense of being] the same as all other
Japanese. That is the part that seems to be difficult for p
 eople to
understand.67

As a Marxist, Kokuba did not see the ultimate goal of revolution as the
recuperation of state power. Rather, after socialist revolution, it was assumed that the state would exhaust its utility. This is why Kokuba identifies with the state as a political platform that can only instrumentally
represent the “individual interests” of the masses. In other words, the “individual interests” are instrumentally “transcend[ed],” thereby suggesting
an awareness of the inevitable failure of transcendence toward an all-
encompassing idealist totality.
However, this instrumental identification became increasingly replaced
with a spiritualistic one as USCAR made a spectacle of public political divisions by polarizing Okinawan society with more off-limits o
 rders. Once
placed under the spotlight, Okinawans became divided as “protesting subjects,” coded as pro-Japanese who protested the U.S. military, and “petitioning subjects,” coded as pro-A merican who petitioned for their right to
participate in the base economy.
The off-limits order issued on August 8, 1956, was catastrophic. In 1955,
57 percent ($74.8 million) of Okinawa’s gross national product (GNP) came
from outside sources. Of this figure, 27 percent ($20 million) came from the
purchase of “consumption goods” by the U.S. military, or in other words,
entertainment-related expenses in the base towns.68 When students of the
University of the Ryukyus and Okinawan students in Japanese universities
planned a rally opposing the lump-sum payment in Koza, where many of
the bases were concentrated, the Okinawa Federation of Night Clubs Association (Okinawa fūzoku eigyō kumiai rengōkai, herein referred to as OFNCA) opposed the demonstration.
The next day on August 9, President Ōshiro Seiji of OFNCA issued a
petition translated into English to USCAR. I could not locate this document, but instead found a supplementary report and petition submitted
on August 13.69 OFNCA stated that they stood by the Four Principles and
pleaded to “[s]eparate clearly Off Limits from the land problem.” However,
they w
 ere not shy to demonstrate their open hostility toward the growing
leftist faction of the popular movement, in particular, the platform put forth
by the Land Protection Association at the June 18, 1956, prefectural rally.
The document:
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accused Yara Chōbyō of co-opting the Land Protection with “Anti-
American Ideology,” and suggested t hose “Okinawan f uture
leaders” and “pure-minded students” were corrupted from “being
u nder the [sic] bad leadership”;
boasted of their attempt to “stop the meetings and demonstrations”
directed by Chief Yara of the Land Protection Association;
reported their resistance to representatives of the board of directors
of the Land Protection Association;
advocated the “[e]stablishment of [sic] Pro-A merican underground
organization and Intelligence . . . u nder the cooperation of Military
Intelligence and CID” to c ounter the “people’s party and other bad
ideologists” that “have an underground organization”;
articulated a plan to “stud[y] measures against” “Mr. Senaga and
Mr. Kaneshi” as they “make an [sic] Anti-A merican Propaganda”;
stated that they would “not call our representative Democrats legislators from now if they d
 on’t make any reflection [sic].”
What is impressive about this document is that it shows how protesting
subjects came to appear as enemies to their own brethren who w
 ere constituted as petitioning subjects. In order to secure the right to participate
in the base economy, which essentially meant the right to sell sex, OFNCA was willing to go so far as to advocate the “[e]stablishment of Pro-
American underground organ
ization and Intelligence” since they
emerged as a threat to their very survival. This is far removed from the
days when Okinawan w
 omen in relationships with G.I.s tipped off underground communist party members by warning them of CIC raids just one
year prior.
Senaga understood the off-limits order to be a desperate measure taken
by USCAR that was astounded by the “breadth and depth of the resistance
that enveloped all classes and all areas” of Okinawan society.70 He paraphrased the sentiments of a speaker from the base town as follows:
I know that we have to protect the land by following through with the
Four Principles. But what about life71 today, much less tomorrow?
Shouldn’t the one protecting territorial sovereignty be the Japanese
government? Shouldn’t it be the Japanese p
 eople? They say that they
are our brethren, but have they done a single t hing for us? I support
Japanese reversion. But wait. Isn’t it the case that we d
 on’t know when
reversion w
 ill happen? How are we supposed to go on living u ntil
then? What’s wrong with relying on Mr. America to get by?72
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The speaker repeatedly points to the here and now, “life today, much
less tomorrow,” and getting by in the base town instead of looking beyond to the Japanese government and Japanese people to do what both
neglect to do. The statement is allegorical in structure because it interrupts the idealism of the reversion movement that makes promises t oward
the f uture and points to the failure of total unification by revealing that the
“all-island struggle” really did not encompass “all” of the island to begin
with. Senaga is at a loss as to what to do with t hese “bastards (otoshigo) of
military colonial rule,” or as he calls them, “Okinawa’s ‘lumpenproletariat,’ ”
and asks when they w
 ill be “washed away.”73 By use of this verb “washed
away,” or “kiyomeuru,” language commonly used for religious purification,
he suggests an ethnic cleansing from contamination of a social or moral
evil. He is interested in Okinawa’s underground only to the extent that it
can be brought up to the light of representat ional politics and therefore
locks the lumpenproletariat in a position outside of history. This is why
for him, “[t]he most horrifying thing in the world is military colonial
domination . . . whereupon shameless exploitation by capital comes to
bear upon those thrown outside of production and allowed to fall into
prostitution.”74 In this sense, Senaga performs the sovereign power of exclusion of sex workers from a political enclosure—ironically couched in
his plea for reincorporation into the Japanese administration—much like
anti-base activists appealed to the elimination of the occupation baby in
mainland Japan during the 1950s.
Yet, with this quotation, Senaga’s ambivalence is apparent since he also
demonstrates an understanding of how the base town workers instrumentally deployed a pro-A merican stance out of the immediate concern for
making a living. The problem, however, is when an instrumental identification becomes confused with what Kokuba calls a “spiritualistic” (seishinshugitekina) one. In other instances, Senaga increasingly evoked a
spiritualistic ethno-nationalism as he rallied against “rule by a foreign race”
(iminzoku shihai) toward Japan in which Okinawans were “connected by
blood to the fatherland.”75 Kokuba faults Senaga for crossing this line by
stating that his “appeals to ‘ethno-nationalism’ rooted in spiritualism in
1958 lacked the power to move the Okinawan masses” t oward revolution
and only delivered them to the door of Japanese monopoly capital.76 I w ill
return to this point at 1958 in terms of the development of capitalist relations in Okinawa shortly, but first, what is significant here is how this
spiritualism complicated the mixed-race issue.
Whereas Senaga only made gestures to this h
 ere, the prominent
Okinawan historian, Higashionna Kanjun, lodged a public attack on the
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base towns framed in an explicitly spiritualistic ethno-nationalism amidst
the all-island struggle. In a 1957 newspaper article entitled “Mixed-R ace
Children,” he identified the problem specifically as the type of miscegenation that occurs as a result of extraterritoriality, and not “international
marriage.”77
The mixed-race children that creep out of the present red-light
districts are nothing but scars of war damage that have inherited the
inferior genes of both parents. Of course, t hese children are not guilty
of sin or blame. However, regarding their birth, they are nothing but
the crystallization of disgrace that was not planned for nor hoped for.
They w
 ill eternally be an enormous liability to society. Letting such a
liability go—or worse yet, letting [the population grow] larger in
numbers—w ill condemn our communal life to darkness. We probably
have no choice but to look a fter t hose already born. But it is to our
greatest dissatisfaction that in t hese times where a limitation on the
number of births in the healthy sector of society is recommended,
t here is no check on t hese unhealthy births.78

And:
When the representative petitioners traveled to Tokyo last year to
advocate the Four Principles, the occupying U.S. military ordered the
soldier’s red light district off-limits on the grounds that it would
reduce friction with the locals. Accordingly, the district’s business
owners fell onto hard times. When I heard them complaining that this
was the revenge tactic of economic pressure, I thought as p
 eople who
purport to protect the land and protect their everyday life,79 their
argument was suicidal. Rather, we became livid and felt that t hese
types of unhealthy businesses should be completely eliminated.
Nonetheless, they countered that ideals and reality are different.
These kinds of businesses are proof that they have come to think it is a
natural given that mixed-race children are growing in numbers every
year primarily out of t hese kinds of districts.80

In these passages, Higashionna’s writing is spiritualistic b
 ecause the merely
instrumental identification of heterogeneous “individual interests” with
ethno-nationalism is replaced by the imperative for all individuals to
identify with the f uture of an idealistic “communal life.” The allegorical
structure of an instrumental nationalism that is reminded of the ultimate
failure of identification is replaced with a symbolic structure of ethno-
nationalism in which the integrity of the f amily unit is substituted for the
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integrity of the community and, by extension, state. In other words, similar
to protest against extraterritorial miscegenation in Japan, Higashionna does
not take issue with racial mixing per se, but with the racial mixing that
occurs as a result of extraterritoriality. These are the “unhealthy births”
that occur outside of the state’s ability to manage the population. Furthermore, Higashionna’s spiritualism, similar to what Tosaka Jun described
as “mysticism” or “primitivism,” beckons forth a biopol itical mechanism
of social defense: It becomes the imperative of so-called good Japanese to
eliminate these “unhealthy births” for the sake of the entire Japanese
community. This is why Higashionna expressed his “greatest dissatisfaction that . . . t here is no check on t hese unhealthy births” and disapproved
of the thought in which “it is a natural given that mixed-race c hildren”
grow in numbers e very year.
For Kokuba, however, this kind of spiritualistic ethno-nationalism was
not only ineffect ive, but in fact played directly into the hands of the global
political economy after 1958. While the United States became the world’s
strongest economic power a fter World War II, the relative strength of the
dollar propelled by military expenditures during the Korean War was losing ground. The U.S. balance of payments resulted in debt in the late
1950s.81 Europe and Japan, which had focused on reconstructing the
war-torn infrastructure of their economies, were now transitioning into
export economies.82 As a result, Eisenhower opened a new chapter in
the story of American empire in which the U.S. military and global
economic policy became even more intimately intertwined. This new economic policy aimed to first, integrate the economies of the United States
and its allies through f ree trade, and second, promote burden-sharing of
military security.83
In Okinawa, the political unrest from the all-island struggle combined
with the overall global trend of defense spending cuts and liberalization of
the markets of the free world resulted in a decisive policy change in the
political economy. USCAR announced the abandonment of the lump-sum
payment proposal, agreement for payment on a yearly basis, reassessment
of lands e very five years, and agreement for payment of more than six times
for rent than was originally agreed upon in the Price Report.84 This created a military base land lessor class that became immune to the spiritualistic ethno-nationalism of the all-island struggle. Kokuba argued that this
led financiers and entrepreneurs hungry for capital into believing the
trickle down of rental income could be used to fund growth in industry.
Cultivating this sector of the political economy could further neutralize
discontent in the base towns. Kokuba writes:

153-75549_ch01_3P.indd 84

10/13/18 12:57 PM

Solidarity u
 nder the Cover of Darkness

85

At the height of the “all-island struggle,” the U.S. military implemented off-limits measures in which G.I.s w
 ere prohibited from
entering the entertainment districts in Okinawa’s m
 iddle district
around U.S. military bases. This started to put economic pressure on
the residents who were directly dependent on base income for their
livelihood. . . . I n other words, they w
 ere opposed to the Price
Report. . . . but the Okinawan economic structure replete with a social
stratum85 considered lacking in f uture prospects a fter the loss of base
income became conspicuous as a weak point when moving forward
with an ethno-nationalist resistance movement.
In suturing this gap, some finance industries or various business
managers scraped together the residents’ military land rent. Thinking
that they could exploit the capital for the establishment or expansion
of new industries, enthusiastic supporters of the lump sum payment
for military use of the land started to come forward.86

The “entertainment district” exemplified the “weak point” of the “ethno-
nationalist resistance movement” b
 ecause the everyday life of its workers
could not sustain on spiritualism alone. In addition to the economic sanctions, the introduction of the A-sign system in 1956 also shifted the cost
of managing the spread of VD to base town establishments. Even though
the U.S. military made prostitution illegal, t here were no corresponding
laws effective enough to enable the local Ryukyu police to punish offenses.87 Hence, VD was controlled through a combination of off-limits
orders and regulations that imposed expensive standards to be “Approved,”
thereby warranting it an “A-sign” establishment. This meant that the
establishments required more startup and running capital, and drove
struggling establishments into bankruptcy.88
At the same time, even though the original dream for reversion to mainland Japan was rooted in a dream to return to Japan as part of a global
proletariat and not a bourgeoisie state,89 Kokuba detected that the larger
aim of the resolution to the all-island struggle was to further the reintegration of Okinawa into the Japanese political economy. Money would not
go into supporting the growth of Okinawan industry, but it would flow
into Japan. Much of this infrastructure had already been laid by the 1952
Japan-Ryukyu Trade Memorandum that allowed Okinawa’s main industries in sugar and pineapple to be subject to special treatment on exports
to Japan.90 In other words, t hese industries were treated as domestic, not
foreign, from the perspective of Japan. This enabled Japanese businesses
to take advantage of the government protection of Okinawan industries
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by importing sugar and pineapple at a low price. At the same time, Okinawan
imports vastly exceeded exports, resulting in a balance of payments deficit. Furthermore, 70 to 80 percent of the imports w
 ere consumption
goods, and not materials for the promotion of industry. The gap was
offset by base income; base income, as Kokuba argued, centered on the
entertainment industry.91 In this way, Kokuba formulated what would become known as a “colander economy” (zaru keizai).92 Dollars that flowed
in from the U.S. military bases passed through the hands of Okinawans
and into the coffers of Japan as Okinawans used the dollars to purchase
consumption items from the mainland. Takazato Suzuyo added a feminist
analysis to this tripartite arrangement: “Japan came to the end of the war
by using its ‘Okinawan’ daughter as a breakwater of flesh and then sub
sequently sold her body to gain economic prosperity.”93
In order to further win over the industrial sector, USCAR implemented
a series of ordinances to open Okinawa up to the global economy in
September 1958. Ordinance No. 11 encouraged foreign investments in the
Ryukyus,94 Ordinance No. 12 encouraged foreign trade,95 and Ordinance
No. 14 regulated the conversion of the B-yen military notes to U.S. dollars.96 While the aim of the 1958 ordinances was to encourage investments
in Okinawan industries, Kokuba understood as early as 1962 its limitations.97 Without production subsidies from Japan, he saw little hope for
their development.98 Indeed, as he predicted, imports continued to far surpass exports,99 leaving the difference to be offset by the base economy.100
As o
 thers have noted, tertiary industries (tourism, restaurants, transportation, retail, and the serv ice industries) came to dominate the structure
of the Ryukyuan economy with renewed vigor.101 Although the Ryukyus
were technically open to foreign investments globally, imports and exports
were largely to and from Japan.102
In place of substantial economic development, the United States instead
created yet another type of petitioning subject. The United States Congress directly passed Public Law 86–629, “An Act to Provide for Promotion of Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands,” that
provided a legal basis for “improving the welfare” of the Ryukyu people
through economic aid.103 This was reinforced by the Ikeda-Nixon Joint
Statement of 1961 in which the United States agreed to increase funding
of the Ryukyus and also accept funding from the Japanese government in
preparation for the eventual reversion to the Japanese administration.104
In 1962, GRI received significantly increased aid from the United States
and newly introduced aid from the Japanese government.105 This aid concentrated primarily in funding educational facilities and public works.106
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By 1971, a year before the reversion, aid from the Japanese government was
more than double the aid from the United States.
The spiritualistic ethno-nationalism, which Senaga (and the JCP before him) hoped would resist capitalism, ironically went on to become the
voice that petitioned for Okinawa’s reintegration into the Japanese economy. Even though the workers and farmers were pitted against the base
towns—giving the illusion of a binary between pro-Japanese protestors and
pro-A merican petitioners—Kokuba understood that this dialectic could
be readily sublated. In order to “break through this ‘imperialist’ ideology generated by Japanese monopoly capital and the ‘utilitarianism’ of
Okinawa’s local capitalists,” Kokuba argued for an “organization of workers and farmers based on class into a revolutionary movement.”107 The
possibilities and limitations of this new class-based movement through
New Left activism, along with its implications for the base towns, is the
topic for the next chapter.
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Okinawa, 1958–1972: The Subaltern Speaks

In Chapter 3, I showed how the simple pro-Japanese versus pro-A merican
national binary was complicated by fundamental shifts in the global economy. The economic policy changes of 1958 triggered a second, more substantial exodus from Okinawa’s peripheries to U.S. military base towns in
pursuit of dollars. This era also marked the emergence of the New Left,
both globally and in Japan, and the development of its thought in Okinawa
as a critique of the Old Left’s ethno-nationalism.
While class solidarity seemed like a progressive step beyond the trappings of Marxian ethno-nationalism, a number of Marxist activists started
to question New Left assumptions of a “single-state imperialism” against
which the “Japanese proletariat” was to resist. Taking into account the differing Leninist internationalist model of imperialism, critical Marxian
activists such as Kawata Yō and Matsushima Chōgi questioned the
middle-class assumptions about a “Japanese proletariat” and drew connections between the regionalism of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere and a renewed trans-Pacific regionalism that emerged in the postwar period. Paying attention to Okinawa’s historical exclusion from the
biopolitical order, Matsushima particularly defined the “Okinawan prole88
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tariat” as a social stratum that constantly failed to be represented by the
state.
Instead of assuming that the failure of class represent at ion is an impediment to resist ance, this chapter repositions it as a valuable clue. It
reads portrayals of base town w
 omen in reportage and documentary
film in order to show the possibilities of their failed representat ion. It
also shows the real-l ife possibilities of an allegorical reading of the world
through a remarkable moment of insurgency amongst base town workers during the 1970 Koza Riot. Those very subjects who had hitherto
shied away from public protest were able to celebrate a moment of open
anti-m ilitary violence precisely b
 ecause of the absence of any sort of po
litical mobilization. Hence, I ultimately show how the failure of repre
sentation does not necessarily lead to the weakening of politics, but
instead points to the possibility of a different relationship to the politi
cal itself.

Koza, a Trans-Pacific Borderland
During the reversion era, from 1958 to 1972, Okinawa became a borderland between the United States and the Asia Pacific. It was the hub of the
Vietnam War through which multiple worlds, each engaged in their own
internal struggles, passed. It was the turf on which white supremacy and
Black Power clashed, the launching pad for the Vietnam War and anti-war
protest amidst reconceptualizations of Pan-A sian solidarity, and the ground
upon which debates on global capitalism w
 ere rehashed. Base towns such
as Koza City (formerly Goyeku Village) quickly became a central nodal
point that facilitated a proliferation of t hese rhizomatic entanglements.
Hence, Koza’s formation is the story of a borderland. H
 ere, we w ill examine the kaleidoscopic overlapping of differences as t hese multiple worlds
of the United States, Japan, and Okinawa converged through the expansion of the base towns.
Farmers throughout the prefecture flooded into Koza in search of the
dollars brought in by the 1958 economic reforms and entered the labor
force of the U.S. military base economy. Okinawa’s internal ethno-
linguistic multiplicity was collapsed into the base towns whereupon it
writhed restlessly u nder the new heading of a working class enslaved to
the American dollar. Often t hese migrant workers could not immediately
identify as “Okinawan” much less as “Japanese.” They came to establish
and/or work for dry cleaners, pawn shops, general stores, and of course,
the entertainment industry. Interviewees of a Koza oral history project
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paint a picture of this exodus whereupon migrant island p
 eoples flocked
to Koza in pursuit of the American dream in Okinawa.
 eople from all areas of Okinawa gathered around Koza’s Business
P
Center Street. These were not just p
 eople from Koza, but they also
came from Naha, Itoman, Kadena, northern Okinawa, and peripheral
islands like Miyako and Amami. They settled down on this land with
dreams of success and continue to live here as pioneers from that time.
The economic promise of Koza drew in the impoverished Uchinānchu1
of the day. The entertainment industry that serv iced U.S. military
personnel and its affiliates, bars, and such emanated with a gaudy
charm and drew people in. Americans jostled together in this gathering from all corners of Okinawa and created a champurū2 culture.3

Amidst this social transformation, workers flooded into base towns such as
Koza that sprung up around the sex industry, referred to h
 ere as “fūzoku
eigyō.” As workers filled into t hese spaces in search of work, they w
 ere met
with American-style racial segregation; the internal diversity of one group
collided with the internal diversity of another. B
 ecause fights immediately
erupted as soon as whites rubbed elbows with blacks in Yaejima bars, Yaejima
and the Business Center Street became designated as white neighborhoods
while the nearby Teruya became designated as a black neighborhood.4
Many African Americans claimed the space themselves by calling it the
“Bush” or the “Four Corners.”5 According to one estimate, by 1969 t here
were approximately ten thousand black G.I.s in Okinawa; six thousand of
them were ardent supporters of the Black Power movement and two thousand were members of the Black Panther Party.6
Okinawan bar bouncers, known as “Boys,” became implicated in the
maintenance of t hese boundaries, as they understood its economic implications. Higa Sadanobu narrates the following in an oral history.
 here were black versus white brawls. If a white person came to the
T
black neighborhood by chance, he would get jumped by black p
 eople.
It’s the same if a black person came to the white neighborhood.
Moreover, when the Boys got involved in black versus white altercations, the Boys from the black neighborhood would join forces with
the blacks and the Boys from the white neighborhood would join
forces with the whites.7

In recognition of the place of the base town in maintaining racial segregation, U.S. military soldiers attempted to desegregate by threatening offending bars with off-limits orders. One Koza resident recalls the following:
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Since brawls would immediately ensue if [blacks and whites] came
face-to-face with each other, we A-sign business p
 eople w
 ere deeply
troubled and hence put up “no blacks” signs. The reality is that fights
ensue when black p
 eople are let into an establishment frequented by
white p
 eople. We put the signs up b
 ecause our establishments would
get trashed. [Our actions] were interpreted as discriminatory
because it was right before reversion when discrimination against
blacks was facing scrutiny in the U.S. We were subject to off-limits
orders. If we put up a “no blacks” sign, then our A-sign designation
would be taken away.8

Above concerns with the larger implications of racial discrimination,
the speaker focuses on how blacks challenged racial bounda ries to the
detriment of good business by intentionally sitting in white-designated
bars for prolonged periods of time with only one beer on their tab so
that “whites would stop coming and [the bar] would get hijacked by
blacks.” 9
The racial politics amongst p
 eople of the base towns was also complicated by gender and national difference. In 1972, Okinawa’s f uture governor, Ōta Masahide (1990–1998), foregrounded the problem of Okinawa’s sex
industry in terms of the deteriorating position of women after the indigenous Ryukyu Kingdom became absorbed into the modernizing Japanese
state. Drawing from Ifa Fuyū and Majikina Ankō’s Okinawan Women’s
History (Okinawa joseishi) and Sakima Kōei’s Meditations on Female Politics
( Josei seijikō), he contrasted the modern form of Japanese state sovereignty with a dual structure of male/female sovereignty u
 nder the Ryukyu
Kingdom in which sovereignty of the female court (onnagimi) took prece
dence over the male court (otokogimi). This soon changed, however, with
the demise of the Ryukyu Kingdom. Patriarchal social relations w
 ere inscribed within the process of Okinawa’s assimilation into the Japanese
state.10 Women commonly fled catastrophic domestic situations into the
arms of pimps who took on their monetary debts in exchange for bondage into a form of indentured sexual slavery.11 Debts grew as the women
were charged interest; penalized for taking days off; and charged for supplies such as toiletries, clothing, and bedding, in addition to room and
board. If they attempted to escape, they risked being caught by watchmen
at the airport or harbors who brought them back with additional debt
tacked onto their account.12 Hence, as is the case with colonialism in general, gender inequality amongst Okinawan men and w
 omen was part and
parcel of the unequal relationship between mainland Japan and Okinawa
before the war.
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Despite the gendered implication of Okinawa’s precarious relationship
to Japanese sovereignty, anti-prostitution campaigns were couched in pro-
reversion rhetoric of equal protection u nder the Japanese constitution.
While Japan had just passed anti-prostitution legislation in 1956 that was
implemented in 1957, petitions for similar anti-prostitution legislation by
the Okinawan Women’s Association (Okinawa fujin rengōkai) in 1958 were
not well received. Initially, anti-prostitution campaigns were designed to
eliminate a social evil that plagued Okinawa’s youth with bad influence.13
But after feminist politicians and activists from mainland Japan, such as
the suffrage leader Ichikawa Fusae,14 visited Okinawa, it was recast as a
human rights issue.15 Under this rubric, w
 omen’s groups addressed the conditions and rights of prostitutes as well as the movement to revise Japa
nese nationality laws in order to accommodate stateless mixed-race children
born to Okinawan mothers and U.S. military fathers.16 Director of the
Women’s Congress of Japan (Nihon fujin kaigi) and f uture House of Councillors politician Shimizu Sumiko addressed the issue as follows.
. . . t he problems women in Okinawa have come to face u
 nder the U.S.
administration is a structure of oppression that is two or three times
worse than what w
 omen in the mainland face. . . .
Albeit incomplete, in the postwar mainland, t here was a period
where the administration encouraged w
 omen’s liberation, and in some
way or another, managed to inculcate the spirit of h
 uman rights into
the constitution.
However, for Okinawa, which is deprived of such t hings, w
 omen are
sacrificed. Accustomed to an obedient way of life, their h
 uman rights
are trampled on through prostitution and their slave-like bodies are
confined; they are resigned to the idea that debt upon contract [with
their pimps] is unavoidable.17

Shimizu views the women as “slave-like” and links the recuperation of their
autonomy to protection under the constitutional democracy of the Japanese
state. Yet this is a state sovereignty that Japan recuperated at the expense
of allowing Okinawa to become a U.S. military fortress.
The inability to account for Okinawa’s precarious position vis-à-v is
Japanese state sovereignty in the anti-prostitution campaign was compounded by the absence of an analysis of the political economy. Although
prostitution was opposed by most sectors of Okinawan society, conservatives representing the Ryukyu Legislature argued that it would be impossible to outlaw because Okinawa “has bases.”18 What this meant more
explicitly was that it was integral to the Okinawan economy. Shimabukuro
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Hiroshi argued that sex work was Okinawa’s largest off-base industry by
1970. He estimated that it generated $50.4 million per year compared to
the largest official off-base industries in Okinawa: sugar ($43 million) and
pineapple ($17 million).19 Joined by four other organizations active in the
reversion movement, the anti-prostitution lobby at least succeeded in
prompting the Ryukyu Legislature to instigate a series of studies in 1964.
As of 1969, the police department reported approximately 7,385 suspected
prostitutes in Okinawa.20 This pointed to about one in forty to fifty women
ages ten to sixty.21 Furthermore, anti-prostitution legislation was put into
place on July 10, 1970, although it was essentially useless b
 ecause t here was
no social welfare infrastructure to assist the w
 omen and their c hildren u
 ntil
after Okinawa was incorporated into the Japanese administration in 1972.22
In showing how the various categories of race, gender, and nation—each
fraught with internal contradictions within—collided in Koza’s base town,
my aim here is to show how its workers became a highly contested site precisely b
 ecause of their ambiguity. The more they pushed the boundaries
of each category, the more t here was a compulsion to determine their position before the law. Furthermore, the more t hese issues became politicized, the more they retreated into the shadows. The attempt to forge class
unity clashed with the base town workers. Not only is this New Left archive still somewhat taboo within Okinawan studies,23 but no one has been
able to directly engage it with the question of sexual l abor. Yet, as the Okinawan activist Matsushima Chōgi acknowledges,24 base town workers
were so central to debates during this time that it was impossible to work
around them. In the next section, I show how the New Left’s assumption
of class solidarity failed to breach the foundational problem of alegality that
the base town workers embodied.

Class Struggle
As early as 1962, Kokuba Kōtarō’s writings marked a deep cleft in the reversion movement. He challenged his readers to reposition an ethno-
nationalist struggle against American imperialism as a class struggle in
which Japanese monopoly capitalism collaborates with American imperialism. Yet Kokuba was not part of a social movement or mainstream intellectual current. He was ousted by the OPP in 1959, fled to mainland
Japan, and had little connection to the arrival of New Left thought in
Okinawa. Although remarkably close in trajectory, the Ryūdai Marukusu
shugi kenkyūkai (University of the Ryukyus Marx Research Group, herein
referred to as “Maruken”) came together in 1961 and became one of the
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first social formations that integrated New Left thought and activism into
Okinawa. The group’s leader, Yamazato Akira, wrote of the emergence of
Maruken as a result of the disillusionment with Senaga’s OPP politics. Even
though both the JCP and Senaga had identified Japanese capitalism as complicit with American imperialism, their adherence to the two-stage thesis
prevented them from apprehending it theoretically. Both insisted upon a
national unification of Okinawa and Japan first; the messy matter of capitalism would be dealt with later.
Kokuba, Maruken, and others who would come to be aligned with the
New Left, however, criticized the primacy of national struggle as a sort of
political opportunism that gained force in the blind spot of theorizing a
new form of militarism wedded to transnational capit alist exploitation.
Yamazato charged that Senaga’s “vassal state policy” “failed to capture
the sense of crisis imbued in the people.” This is why, he argues, Senaga’s
campaign “fell apart without allowing for the spontaneous formation of
 ere not becoming
an organization and consciousness.”25 Okinawans w
complicit with the U.S. military b
 ecause of a lack of ethno-nationalist sentiment; it was because resistance toward economic hardship was transforming Okinawans into a new type of “petitioning subject”: Okinawans who
petition the Japanese government for “industrial subsidies”26 to protect
Okinawan industries within the Japanese national economy. Far from Okinawans becoming pro-A merican and anti-Japanese, they were being aligned
by the United States to “request for a return to the Japanese administration”
through economic interest.27
Hence, many progressive activists who had originally supported the
OPP as the premier anti-base party in Okinawa w
 ere overcome by a sense
of alienation. They drifted away without a concrete idea of how to form
another party that could represent the interests of the workers. This cloudy
disillusionment, however, was struck by a “lightning bolt”28 instance of
clarity when students of the University of the Ryukyus set their sights on
the sweeping student movements of Zengakuren (detailed next) as they surrounded and infiltrated the Japanese Diet with tens of thousands of workers in protest of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty (herein referred to as
“Anpo.”)
Demonstrations to oppose the 1960 revision of Anpo are canonized
as the most significant moment of mass protest in the history of postwar
Japanese pol itical activism. College students emerged as a driving force
in the protests. Zengakuren (or the zennichi gakusei jichikai sōrengō) formed
a network of student governances in public and private universities
across Japan.29 It was originally established in 1948 within the JCP, but
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a fter years of factionalism from within, Zengakuren was taken over by
Bund (kyōsanshugidōmei) leadership in 1958. Bund was composed of
younger students who clashed with the old guard of the JCP. While the
JCP carried out a strongly anti-A merican platform after 1950 that protested the U.S. military presence in Japan, Bund differentiated itself
from the JCP by shifting to a critique of the resurgence of Japanese imperialism. It attacked the Stalinism of the JCP30 as a rigid, narrow-m inded,
and insular ethno-nationalism that failed to envision world revolution.
In this way, the Japanese New Left was born out of Bund’s ideological
commitments to anti-
Stalinism, internationalism, and anti-
Japanese
imperialism.31
Bund splintered into a number of sects a fter the fanfare of the 1960
Anpo protest settled down. Maruken started to interact with Kakukyōdō
(Nihon kakumeiteki kyōsanshugisha dōmei). In 1963, Kakukyōdō branched
off into Kakumaruha32 and Chūkakuha.33 Kakumaruha, in part icular, became prominent as many members from Maruken, including its leader,
Yamazato, joined its sect.34 These New Left activists persistently inserted a class analysis into the reversion movement while also emphasizing the revolutionary practice of strug
gle ( jitsuryoku tōsō) as they
35
routinely took to the streets in protest. For example, Nakaya Kōkichi,
who was active in Kakumaruha, reversed OPP’s emphasis on national
struggle manifest in its anti-A merican rhetoric with an international
class analysis. I quote at length h
 ere a 1965 article Nakaya published in
the University of the Ryukyus Student Newspaper that captures the sentiment of Kakumaruha.
. . . as seen in the frequent appearance of tear gas G.I.s throw at
civilians, the fights between G.I.s in the bars, their reckless cars, and
their bombings of neighborhood shops sensationalized in the daily
newspaper, they intentionally commit crimes to get thrown into
military prison. T
 hese are the G.I.s raging about, who attempt to
escape deployment to the battleground (i.e., Vietnam) by intentionally
committing crimes in order to get sent to military prison; t hese are
the G.I.s with ghastly and downtrodden expressions as they are taken
to Naha military port to be sent off to die in Vietnam. They are an
oppressed class used as an instrument of the U.S. imperial war of
aggression. Instead of reaching out to t hese G.I.s to “oppose U.S.
imperial war policies and rise up to an anti-war struggle,” is it r eally
acceptable to simply yell, “Fucking Americans go home!” or “Yankee
go home!,” fan hatred t oward a foreign race, or [push for] the liberation of the Okinawan people through racial hatred? Is it possible for
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this “anti-A merican racial thought,”36 which is completely cut off from
internationalism, to realize the liberation of humans (i.e., alienated
workers or the p
 eople)? I w ill answer [this question] very clearly: No.
The reason is that the most fundamental basis of the poverty of the
workers is in the “usurpation of profit by Okinawan capit alists in
the workplace.” This “essential contradiction between capitalists and
workers” in the eyes of the class struggle cannot achieve class liberation by asserting “America is the enemy” and subordinating itself to
the national activism of “first expel America and then return to
Japan.”37

Nakaya directly opposes the anti-A merican Japanese ethno-nationalism
that informs the reversion movement. Specifically, he attacks the primacy
of national over class struggle by criticizing the OPP two-step program to
“first expel America and then return to Japan.” Instead, he takes the most
“sensationalized” fodder for anti-A merican ideologues—U.S. military
crime—and rereads it as a desperate plea for international class liberation.
While it is clear that he opposes one kind of internationalism (i.e., the international system of nation-states), his proposal for a different kind of
internationalism (i.e., international proletarian revolution) poses some of
the same theoretical questions that troubled his ethno-nationalist counter
parts. If national unity is a problem for Okinawa, then how about class
unity? Or alternatively posited, if Okinawa cannot be represented as a nation, then how can it be represented as a class?
One of the largest complications of a class-based analysis occurred with
the conflict between the on-base labor u nion Zengunrō and the off-base
workers in the base towns. This l abor union, specifically for on-base workers, was originally established in 1961 (
u nder the name Zengunrōren,
which changed to Zengunrō in 1963) and fought for the right to organize
without USCAR interference, better wages, better benefits, and better working conditions.38 Although Zengunrō ultimately joined the reversion
movement, it was ambivalent on the anti-base issue. By 1968, Zengunrō
boasted of 20,400 members, making it one of the largest unions in Okinawa
with significant political force.39 Zengunrō was able to win concessions
from the U.S. military u
 ntil the 1969 Sato-Nixon Joint Communique in
which both states agreed that Okinawa would revert to the Japanese administration.40 At this point, the United States sought to transfer the economic burden of its military presence in Okinawa to Japan. The process
started to unfold in 1969 as the U.S. military trimmed its on-base labor
force with 2,826 layoffs.41 Zengunrō responded with two strikes ranging
from forty-eight hours to five days in duration. It was during the second
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strike in particular that friction between Zengunrō and the base town workers reached new heights.
With a tightening of the flow of U.S. dollars, the base town workers—
particularly the debt-stricken w
 omen—were the first to feel the devastation of the change in economic tides. The severity of the situation was
compounded as the U.S. military responded to total paralysis brought on
by the Zengunrō strike with its go-to solution: more off-limits orders.
A-sign businesses w
 ere forced to close their doors and took to the streets.
Business o
 wners joined forces with the conservative Okinawa Liberal
Democratic Party (Okinawa Jimintō, herein referred to as the “Okinawa
LDP”), right-w ing organizations, and Okinawan yakuza to launch an
attack on the Zengunrō protesters with physical violence, stoning, and arson. Koza was so torn by the conflict that its so-called progressive mayor,
Ōyama Chōjō, was compelled to petition for the strike’s cessation.42 The
following oral history illustrates how the Zengunrō strike affected the rest
of Koza.
. . . A s soon as Zengunrō engaged in their activism, the neighborhood
became subject to off-limits orders. B
 ecause this foreclosed the ability
for the Boys of Business Center Street to make a living, they got angry
and started d
 oing t hings like punch Zengunrō activists. . . .
When we broke through the picket lines of the Zengunrō protesters, the Boys on our street laid in on the union. . . . The Business
Center Street youth were the right-w ingers at the time. They surrounded Zengunrō and created havoc. That time the riot police w
 ere
deployed to protect Zengunrō. Usually it is the [riot] police that
Zengunrō fights with, but this time, they w
 ere deployed to protect and
pull them out.43

The speaker remembers the incident in terms of an emotional and violent
response to the organ ized activism of Zengunrō picketers who “created
havoc” on the Business Center Street way of life. The “right wingers” are
described h
 ere as young and raw. Okinawan New Left activists, however,
characterize the same incident in terms of the organization of a conservative right-w ing political force “that parasites” off of the U.S. military.
“A-sign businesses” are a social stratum44 that embodies the real
parasites of the base-dependent Okinawan economy, i.e., existences
that parasite off the G.I.s. A situation has been created in which
right-w ing forces such as the Okinawa LDP, the anti-reversion
“Association of Okinawans to Create Okinawa,” 45 and the “Federation
for Victory over Communism” 46 graft their ideology directly onto the
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business o
 wners’ concerns for their economic interest and allow
groups of organized violence to forerun attacks on the picketers and
their headquarters. Of course, lingering in the background of such
developments is the U.S. military plot to have “Okinawans fight
amongst themselves.” 47

The business owners here are articulated in terms of a bottom-line “economic interest” that can be harnessed by right-w ing political forces. They
are blamed for succumbing to the temptation of economic interest and belittled as “parasites” who are not able to realize their potential because
they unproductively depend on the bases for sustenance. The U.S. military is the agent that takes advantage of the situation by orchestrating
right-w ing versus left-w ing opposition.
Interestingly in this account, it is through the dialectic of force and
counterforce within Okinawa that pushes the po
l iti
cally ambivalent
Zengunrō over to explicitly oppose the U.S. military presence in Okinawa
altogether.
Through a confrontation with right-w ing violence that “opposed
reversion to the mainland and elimination of bases,”48 Zengunrō
workers were able to practically49 realize their struggle as a struggle
for the “reversion to the mainland and the elimination of bases, i.e.,
Okinawa’s recapture.”50 The self-protection style of [sporting] helmets
and gewalt51 batons became popular and some even started preparing
Molotov cocktails.52

The jargon of the times h
 ere requires explication. The “elimination of
bases” (kichi tekkyō) referred to in the passage was a divisive issue within
Zengunrō. In short, by supporting the elimination of bases, t hese on-base
workers would be effectively advocating the elimination of their employer.
The Okinawa Prefecture Council for Reversion to the Fatherland (Okinawaken sokoku fukki kyōgikai) had keenly monitored t hese deliberations
within Zengunrō, as it was e ager to gain its endorsement as the largest l abor
u nion in Okinawa. In order to come to a m iddle ground, members of
Zengunrō split hairs between being “anti-base” (kichi hantai) (i.e., in opposition to problems stemming from Okinawa’s bases, such as crimes committed by the G.I.s) and being for the “elimination of bases” (i.e., the
eradication of all U.S. military bases from Okinawa).53 Here, the visceral
confrontation between right-w ing Okinawans is what pushed Zengunrō
over to the side of supporting the “elimination of bases.” This was further
conflated with the New Left slogan “Okinawa’s recapture” (Okinawa dakkan),
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which was a criticism of the bourgeois version of Okinawa’s reversion
uncritical of the U.S. military and Japanese capitalism. Other Okinawan
New Left activists, such as Hateruma Takeshi, similarly described this
as a pivotal moment where not only Zengunrō, but all involved in the Okinawan struggle (Okinawa tōsō) were able to “resolutely fight back” against
the “A-sign business owners who attack as an anti-revolutionary group”
against the “Okinawan proletariat.”54
Although New Left thought certainly opened up productive critiques
of JCP and OPP ethno-nationalism, Okinawa’s on-t he-ground historical
complexity would soon exhaust the limits of this class-based analysis. As
important as it was to question how ethno-nationalism overshadowed class,
a small handful of activists, scholars, and poets started to question how a
class-based analysis also overlooked its implicit nationalist assumptions.
Critics such as Kawata Yō and Matsushima Chōgi problematized the New
Left assumption of a “single-state imperialism” and instead linked the regionalism of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere to a renewed
postwar regionalism centered on the United States and Japan in the Asia
Pacific.
Kawata was a mainland Japanese Marxian activist deeply involved in
Okinawan movements of the 1960s and 1970s. In a 1971 essay entitled
“Border, State, and the Third Ryukyu Disposition,” he argued that the
“Japanese proletariat” did not emerge endogenously by overcoming feudal
remnants within Japan, but through discrimination t oward migrant workers
on mainland Japan’s workforce. He faulted such assumptions on Eurocentric readings of Marxism. Different from the traditional Leninist model
of imperialism defined as the international competition to export finance
capital to the colonies, Kawata’s understanding was in line with Uno
Kōzō’s identification of the limitations of single states vis-à-v is the global
economy that needed to be overcome by a market-rational regionalism. His
contribution to this thread is linking it to what he calls the “transborder
domination of labor power.”55 This is the historical context given in the Introduction in which discrimination toward surplus populations from areas
such as Korea or Okinawa on the mainland Japanese labor market produced
notions of Japaneseness. Kawata called this population the “non-Japan,”
which is another term for the “world of the industrial reserve army of Japa
nese capitalism.” Class unity could only obtain by “limiting it to a world”
constituted as a “Japan within Japan” in which the “existence of a ‘non-Japan
within Japan’ is once again abandoned outside of the concept of ‘class.’”56
Simply put, he inscribed the historicity of Japanese colonialism within the
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concept of “class.” B
 ecause Kawata did not see the border as a geopolitical
category but as a biopolitical one, he became highly suspicious of the call
for international class solidarity framed as a “transborder revolution.”
Hence, he did not frame imperialism in terms of the logic of invasion and
subsequent pillage of a territory, but in terms of a process of discrimination
in which the non-Japan within Japan were rendered “outsiders” or “foreigners” to the internal enclosure of “Japan.”
Kawata’s analyses are complemented by Matsushima’s essays published
in the years before reversion. Matsushima entered Chuo University to
study law in 1966 when he became involved in Okinawan activism on the
Japanese mainland before he became active in the New Left movements
in Koza.57 He complements Kawata’s critique of single-state imperialism
with an analysis of a regional U.S.-Japan imperialism. He writes:
It must be said that the philosophy of the New Left that preaches
reversion to the mainland is very much a single-state theory for
revolution. While they carry on about struggle that transcends
borders, they are in actuality very much [engaged in] a single-state
struggle. Rather, it does l ittle more than play the part of forming the
Japanese nation and actualizing power of the Japanese state. . . .
. . . The problem is that Okinawa’s contradictions do not exist as the
contradictions of a single-state Japanese imperialism, but as the
contradictions of a U.S.-Japan imperialism.58

Matsushima argues that the New Left’s transnationalism problematically assumes national unity prior to crossing borders to unite the proletariat. For him, this not only effaces the discrimination toward Korean
and Okinawan workers that he witnessed in Tokyo, but it also ignores
the heterogeneity of the mig rant workforce internal to Okinawa. To the
Japanese New Left, Zengunrō workers appeared as the proletariat compared to the so-
called bourgeois Ryukyu police or A-
sign business
owners who beat them down.59 So as to challenge this logic, Matsushima
rescues the ethno-
l inguistic diversity stemming from a “peripheral
island–main island–Satsuma domain” geog raphical triad that preceded
the postwar Okinawa-Japan–United States triad.60 In other words, he
points out that the mig rant workers carry with them a historical sensibility whereupon the Satsuma domain of the Edo period in present-day
Kagoshima Prefecture oppressed the main Okinawan island, which in turn,
oppressed the peripheral islands. It is with this historical sensibility that
the workers come into contact with the postwar geopolitical triad of the
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United States, Japan, and Okinawa. He thereby makes a theoretical intervention by insisting on the inability to sublate the prewar configuration into the postwar.
Instead of positing class as a sublation of difference, Matsushima defines
the “Okinawan proletariat” in terms of the inability to decide the constitution of a class. He states:
For example, in the case of the Zengunrō struggle, t here is a structure
in which [some] confront the U.S. military as Miyako islanders or as
Yaeyama islanders. It is a question of how to engage that structure and
the ability to organize in order to confront power. I think this can
only be done by consolidating them into an Okinawan proletariat. In
other words, in a structure in which [Okinawans] confront both
Japanese state power and also U.S. military power as the Japanese
proletariat, [we] lose sight of the internal axis of unification. . . . W hat
Okinawa is confused about right now is that even though Okinawans
carry on as if they are Japanese, t here exists this [non-Japanese] part
that gets dissolved.61

 ere, the consolidation of an “Okinawan proletariat” is not the unificaH
tion of a class at the expense of eliminating its internal diversity. Quite the
opposite, it embraces the “structure in which [some] confront the U.S. military as Miyako islanders or as Yaeyama islanders,” or in other words, the
failure to unify as “Okinawans” or “Japanese.” Hence, the “Okinawan proletariat” is consolidated not as an identity based on ethnicity, language, or
even geography, but as an identity based on a fraught relationship with the
exclusionary power of sovereignty that unifies heterogeneity. This is what
he means by putting “into conversation that” heterogeneous “structure and
the ability to organize in order to confront power.” What Matsushima proposes is not the end of identity altogether, but rather an identity that
forges a different relationship to transcendence implicit in sovereign power.
We w ill recall from the Introduction that Schmitt’s sovereign is a type
of God on earth. It is both of the law and above the law b
 ecause it has the
power to make exceptions to the law in the name of protecting it. In this
sense, the sovereign transcends the realm of the law-abiding citizen and
justifies his ability to make exceptions to the law by appealing to a holier-
than-t hou power. It goes without saying that I have been showing over and
over throughout the pages of this book that Okinawa is that which is perpetually excepted (excluded) by sovereign power. But here, Matsushima
speaks more specifically of a certain type of alegal Okinawan subject—
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uprooted migrant laborers, or ryūmin, who fail to be constituted as a class.
For Matsushima, it misses the point to simply criticize Japan for excepting
(excluding) these Okinawans from sovereign power in the constitution of a
class because it fails to take hold of the fundamental problem of the relationship to transcendence itself. By reaffirming the act of the exception—
even in the guise of criticizing sovereign power for making an unfair or
wrong exception—we have done nothing to change our relationship with
transcendence. By contrast, Matsushima proposes an Okinawan proletariat
that forms through critical vigilance of the “internal axis of unification”
whereupon this heterogeneous “element” within Okinawa “gets dissolved.”
Here, the relationship with transcendence is one in which our eyes are constantly opened up to the act of the exception so as not to be blinded by the
phantasmagoria of unity it claims to offer. “[T]his element” is precisely the
allegorical rhythm of Okinawa that sovereign power attempts to “dissolve”
through transcendence. It is the inability to decide vis-à-vis this sovereign
power that defines Okinawa, or as he puts it, Okinawa as an “endless melody” (mugen senritsu) of what I have been describing as allegory.62 Hence,
class contradictions for Matsushima, as seen with the clash between
Zengunrō and the base town workers, are not embarrassments to be glossed
over for the sake of power in unity, but a testament to how the colonial condition in Okinawa offers a different method of reading sovereign power.

Can the Subaltern Speak?
Thus far, we have traced the limits of the discourse of national versus class
struggle through the lumpenproletariat in the base towns. The former assumes primacy of the state in rectifying class contradictions and the latter
fails to see how the biopolitical state is complicit in the constitution of class.
Hence, the base town worker fails to be represented by the state and by
class. In turning to representat ions of t hese women, we may now ask, following the postcolonial feminist scholar Gayatri C. Spivak: Can the subaltern speak?
Spivak famously breaks down the problem of speaking to two forms of
representat ion: Vertretung and Darstellung. The former is “representat ion
within the state and political economy,”63 or “proxy,”64 and the other is “the
philosophical concept of representat ion as staging,”65 or “portrait.”66 She
criticizes Deleuze and Foucault for conflating t hese two “irreducibly discontinuous”67 registers of representat ion. Both make the subaltern speak
by assuming her “desire” corresponds to “interest” through a “representa
tionalist realism”68 that appeals to “what actually happens”69 on the ground

153-75549_ch01_3P.indd 102

10/13/18 12:57 PM

The Subaltern Speaks

103

of capitalist exploitation. Spivak instead returns to the well-k nown passage
by Marx in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte to uncover a more
complicated reading of representat ion.
[The small peasant proprietors] cannot represent themselves; they
must be represented. Their representative must appear simultaneously
as their master, as an authority over them, as unrestricted governmental power that protects them from the other classes and sends them
rain and sunshine from above.70

In his discussion of ryūmin (the uprooted migrant worker), Tomiyama reads
Spivak’s evocation of this passage by Marx in terms of the state of exception. This is the “unrestricted governmental power” (Marx) that, in Tomiyama’s words, “represents the externality ( gaibu) excluded by the linguistic
order in one stroke.”71 Although he uses the term “externality,” or gaibu,
here, it is clear that he is talking about the sphere of alegality that is produced as an externality as an effect of the exception. In other words, the
sphere of alegality is represented as an externality by virtue of an extralinguistic power (i.e., a governmental power “external to the symbolic order”72) that is another name for the state of exception. In sum, Tomiyama
reads Spivak as attempting to identify a stratum of existence that constantly
fails to be represented by the state. The problem for Spivak is when the
“event of representat ion as Vertretung (in the constellation of rhetoric-as-
persuasion) behaves like a Darstellung (or rhetoric-as-trope), taking its place
in the gap between the formation of a (descriptive) class and the nonformation of a (transformative) class.” The former, or “rhetoric-as-persuasion,”
must convince us of the ambition of the state’s ability to represent, which
all too easily becomes equated with “rhetoric-as-t rope,” or the symbolic
representat ion of the p
 eople in language. For Spivak, “this complicity is
precisely what Marxists must expose.”73
I read Spivak as demanding that the intellectual recognize how she can
reproduce the violence of the exception by conflating t hese two registers
of representat ion, even as she claims to have a progressive ear open to the
subaltern’s speech. For purposes here, however, I would like to pose the
question “Can the subaltern speak?” in the following way. In place of asking how Okinawa, as hermeneutic object, can be translated into a preexisting legal discourse, I reframe the question to ask how it is possible to
read the sphere of alegality irreducible to the law. My answer is: Read it
allegorically. In this section, I would like to push for an allegorical reading of the base town worker through a reportage text and documentary
film from the Japanese New Left.74
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Ishida Yukio was a Japanese reportage writer who grew critical of the
JCP through anti-base activism on the mainland before he departed to
Okinawa. Through his interaction with activists and poets, he started to
develop a nuanced understanding of Okinawa’s class struggle. He published
a number of volumes of reportage, including Okinawa: Indigeneity and Liberation, in which he describes a tense collision between Zengunrō and an
A-sign madam. I quote at length here because the scene lends itself to a
nuanced account of the various problems of representat ions of sexual l abor.
An A-sign madam emerged alone amongst the picketers in the
demonstration. She started to shoot off at the mouth in dialect. T
 here
was a young Zentōrō75 activist who rushed in from a sugar factory up
north and stood in scrummage formation with me to my right. I asked
him to interpret.
“I came h
 ere ten years ago escaping the landslides of the mountainous Kunigami (a valley in the north part of the main Okinawa island).
I’ve worked hard to make a life h
 ere in a corner of Koza, serving G.I.s.
Few can understand how I’ve been tormented by the U.S. military.
They order renovations whenever the c ounter isn’t high enough or the
stainless sink is starting to rust, and put me in debt. If an Okinawan
client comes in, they threaten to shut the place down. Just as I have
started to see the light at the end of the tunnel of debt, the United
States loses to Vietnam in the war, and the value of the dollar plummets. Then, the Yamato government that killed my parents and older
brother in that war talk about the prospects of Okinawa’s return. W
 ill
someone tell me which is more important: prospects for returning my
debt or prospects for returning Okinawa (although I d
 on’t know what
Okinawa will be returned to)? When it comes to the anti-war [movement], I’m second to none. I see and hear t hings about the demonstrations, and I root for them in my heart. T
 here have been times where I
put my hands together to tōtōtōtōganashi (word for prayer to the native
god) for them. However, t here is nothing as inhumane and lawless as
t hese picketers. . . . The act of blocking the public street is a transgression against the highway to heaven.” A picketer retaliated to her tirade.
“You’re the handiwork of the Association to Protect Life.76 I’ll yank out
your tongue for g
 oing off as you please.”
The woman, flushed with anger, pressed on. “What the hell is wrong
with being the handiwork of the Association to Protect Life? You guys
collide with the U.S. military and my business dries up. I have a life,
too, you asshole (this is my translation). Yeah, the bigwigs of the Association to Protect Life tried to organize the bar neighborhood residents
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into a counter-demonstration to break up the picketers. I don’t join
those t hings. And so, the grand scheme of the bigwigs didn’t work.
Damn losers. Even I feel like sticking my tongue out at them. I w
 on’t
come b
 ecause the bigwigs order me to come, but I got so pissed off that
I came out spontaneously on my own to teach you guys a lesson.”
One picketer came forward and attacked her by saying “If you keep
on with your yapping, I’ll rape you.” Turning to the man, the woman
said, “Come on! Go ahead and try!” and sticking out her crotch, came
up against the picketers alone. “I’ll take all of you on! My genitals are
so strong that they won’t flinch even if I take on all of you guys. Guys
like you are no big deal. Come on. Hey, rape me. Hey, hey, hey.” A
 fter
all became overwhelmed by her roaring laughter, [the scene] returned
to silence. While they were distracted by what was going on, a few
cars had rushed into the base. One picketer, half seriously whispered,
“She’s probably an e nemy spy. She’s a female ninja who uses e nemy
tactics to break up the picketers by drawing attention to herself.” The
picketers broke up and then formed a wide circle around her. A
middle-aged, tall Zengunrō man resolutely walked away from the
picketers, pushed aside the human circle and stood right in front of her.
Perhaps it was b
 ecause she thought the person in charge had come out,
she raised her voice even more and said:
“Immediately dissolve this inhuman and lawless picketing. If you
don’t, then rape me. If you d
 on’t follow my order, then I’ll twist your
necks off between my legs you obstinate pigs. . . .”
Her scream broke off sharply. I flew off to the side. The tall
Zengunrō man held his hands together behind his back and tilted his
head forward. He closed his lips right onto the lips of the w
 oman who,
pushing into him with her face up, had just gone off on the rant. He
very softly suppressed her speech. It was commendable—t he one and
only way to shut her up.77

Upon my first reading of this passage, my initial thought was: Did this actually happen? Is this what she actually said? Suspicious of yet another
Japanese male stepping in to speak on behalf of an Okinawan w
 oman,
I succumbed to the seduction of wanting to know the “truth.” However,
after recognizing this seduction, I returned to examine what Ishida’s text
is actually doing (form) as a temporarily separate issue of what it is saying
(content).
From the beginning, Ishida tries to be transparent about the function
of translation in his text. He sees an A-sign madam emerge from the crowd
of picketers when she starts to “shoot off at the mouth in dialect.” The
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subaltern is speaking, but he literally fails to understand what she is saying.
He documents this failure by introducing the use of an interpreter from a
“sugar factory up north.” Again, we are given clues to the failure of communication as we think about the ethno-linguistic diversity within Okinawa in this scene. It takes a translator from “up north,” the same region as
Kunigami where the madam originates, and not just any other Okinawan,
to perform the translation. We are left wondering how well the madam is
communicating to Zengunrō while at the same time we are left wondering
what kind of translation the man from “up north” is giving Ishida. Multiple translations abound. Ishida’s account is, by no means, definitive; he
exposes fissures and fractures of a sovereign translation that attempts to
monopolize meaning and instead opens the text up to be claimed by o
 thers
who come into contact with it.
Not only does the form attempt to undermine sovereign representat ion,
but the content attempts the same. He shows how the ethno-linguistic
diversity within Okinawa in the constitution of a class is complicated by
gender. According to this passage, the madam resolutely refuses to be or
ganized. She rejects institutional power that hides b
 ehind the constitution of class and instead aligns herself with “life” (seikatsu). This is seen as
she not only clashes with Zengunrō on the left, but also as she ridicules the
“Association to Protect Life” that attempts to organize the base town
workers on the right. Most of the picketers cannot identify her irreducibility to institutional power and instead read her as a “female ninja who
uses enemy tactics.” The alegality that she embodies is met, yet once
again, with gendered violence as a picketer attempts to silence her with
threats of rape. This conjures up the not-so-distant memory of state sexual violence committed by the Japanese Imperial Army during the war as
well as the U.S. military during the war and postwar. This is a border-
inscribing violence that inaugurates sovereignty through the bodies of
women at the scene of rape. Yet the madam fires back, “I’ll take all of you
on!” Ishida suggests, through the reproduction of this scene, that the
madam neutralizes the threat of rape integral to sovereign power by purportedly cultivating resilience to sexual transgressions through her experiences in Koza.
At this point in the text the threat of extralinguistic sovereign violence
in the form of rape is countered by another extralinguistic act performed
by the “tall Zengunrō man” who calmly walks over to kiss her. Here, the
“tall Zengunrō man” has one foot in the movement while at the same time
does not forget that he is also more than just a Zengunrō member of a class.
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It is only through engagement on this level of alegality that he is able to
“shut her up.” In other words, the subaltern “shoots off at the mouth” precisely at the point where she insists on the impossibility of total represen
tat ion by institutional power. She is not speaking, but screaming rather
confrontationally. Yet no one can hear her in this modality; they instead
insist on translating her into a different mode of representat ion in which
all of her actions are channeled into the teleology of state power. It is only
when the “tall Zengunrō man” recognizes this failure of totalization in
representat ion that he forges the possibility of a different kind of communality with the madam, or what Matsushima might call the “Okinawan
proletariat.” H
 ere, the subaltern is not s ilent; she is a loudmouth who is
told to shut up. While this is an interesting turn in the text, it also poses
limitations. She is shut up by a man so Zengunrō can carry on with business as usual. However, the point of an allegorical practice of reading is
not to reach a place beyond representation—a place where language is no
longer needed—but to keep failing through speech.
While the madam is told to shut up in Ishida’s text, we are able to get a
glimpse of another w
 oman speaking in the documentary Motoshinkakarannū:
1969–1971, A Long Okinawan Documentary Film—An Insider Story of Okinawan Eros.78 This documentary provides one of the most intimate visual
records of sex workers in Okinawa during this time. It was produced by
NDU (Nihon Dokyumentarisuto Yunion, or Japan Documentarist Union), a
Bund-influenced group who departed to Okinawa in 1969.
Producer Nunokawa Tetsurō situates the documentary within the
larger picture of New Left movements in Japan. Why 1969? Why Okinawa? NDU members w
 ere part of the student movement generation of
the late 1960s who participated in Zenkyōtō. This was a militant nonsectarian movement centered on the university. It increasingly appealed to
spectacular displays of violence by sporting Gewalt batons ( gebabō) or
stoning the police.79 The appeal to violence was part of a larger trend of
intra-and intergroup Gewalt (violence), or uchigeba, that raged throughout
the New Left during this time, climaxing in murders. The “practice of
struggle” ( jisturyoku tōsō) was reduced to radical showmanship; t hose who
failed to pick up Gewalt batons or boycott classes w
 ere attacked as traitors.
Participants in the occupation of the University of Tokyo, in part icular,
engaged in “self-refutation” ( jiko hitei) in order to correct their class privilege.80 However, far from succeeding in the actualization of revolution,
the intra-and intergroup Gewalt catalyzed its decline. This moment in
1969 marked the beginning of the end of the New Left in mainland Japan.
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Nunokawa theorizes the impasse through the language of the French
philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre in order to foreground his approach to the
documentary art form as a practice of decolonization.
The foray into documentary is for one part of a preexisting social
stratification to make a clean break from self-perpetuation (being
in-itself ), or in other words, the “myth of totality”. . . .
The process of filming and producing a documentary is quite
naturally to live a process in which the imagination of the object is
betrayed and retaliated against before it enters into an actual relationship. This is to, in reverse, move down on the upward ascending
process of existence → content → meaning → value → symbol. Further,
it is the dissolution of “limited facticity,” the bankruptcy of the
“practico-inert,” and the first encounter that comes a fter
“self-refutation.”81

From this passage, we get a sense of how intimately Sartre was received by
the Japanese New Left. But what was an inside conversation in that circle
begs for some unpacking here. In Critique of Dialectical Reason, Vol. 1, Sartre writes of the emergence of the group in capitalist society whereupon
each individual interiorizes the gaze of an external third. In this process,
each individual becomes a third for all the others. Hence, in this triadic
structure, t here is no longer s imple reciprocity between the self and the
other, but now a dialectical relationship between the self as an individual
vis-à-v is the group and the self that exists as a mediating third for all the
others in the group. This had a significant impact on the core tenant of
Sartre’s existential philosophy—t hat of the freedom of praxis as it is put in
a contradictory relationship with the institution. No longer is freedom
the negation of the being in-itself in order to achieve being for-itself, but
now the common “pledged inertia” of all individuals to commit to the
group. In other words, one can practice his or her freedom only to the
extent that it preserves the inertia of the group. What results is the heavy
machinery of the “practico-inert” that defines the institution. The institution mediates everyone, and everyone mediates the institution. T
 here is
no escape.
It is precisely from within this circularity that Nunokawa positions “self-
refutation” as symptomatic of the futile attempt to escape. A refutation of
the self does nothing b
 ecause the self is already mediated by the third. This
is why he conflates “self-perpetuation (being in-itself )” with the “myth of
totality.” Hence, the attempt to refute “self-perpetuation (being in-itself ),”
as seen in the throes of Zenkyōtō activism, becomes a refutation of the
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group itself. H
 ere we can see why intra-and inter-Gewalt do not lurk far
behind self-refutation and why this is the place where Sartre situates
“fraternity-terror,” or terrorism, among brothers. It incites a “deep fear of
a dissolution of unity” that plagues the group and is displaced onto an
imagined “traitor as absolute evil.”82
It is at this point of arriving at the impasse of the practico-inert that
Sartre’s theory of language becomes deeply shaken. H
 ere, Nunokawa pulls
him close to develop his own approach to the documentary art form. Sartre’s interaction with the colonies constantly informed his approach to language. In What Is Literature?, first published in 1947, Sartre argues that
literat ure should be “committed,” meaning that it should be used as the
means to clearly communicate ideas to the p
 eople.83 But as he starts to
develop the idea of the practico-inert in Critique of Dialectical Reason, Vol.
1, in 1960, communication becomes complicated. Man’s ability to freely
communicate to another man is problematically mediated by the institution. One cannot speak without speaking the institution. This is why Nunokawa devotes much of his essay to a dismissal of New Left journals such
as Asahi Journal (Asahi Jānaru) or Modern Eye (Gendai no Me) as inviting
narcissistic performances of radical politics through the rote act of reading
and paying for one’s monthly subscription. No one can communicate
anything to get out of the circularity of bourgeois society. Quite the
contrary, the act of communicating itself only serves to reinforce it.
So where can one possibly go? Like Sartre, behind the poetry of Léopold Sédar Senghor and Aimé Césaire, Nunokawa follows Okinawa b
 ehind
the lens of a camera; both embark on a flight that attempts to break the
institutional sound barrier of the metropole and voyage into a colonial
space they envision as lying beyond. This takes us back to a reworking of
Sartre’s original philosophy of language. Sartre returns to the opposite of
“committed” literature that uses language as a tool to communicate thought:
poetry. For Sartre writing What Is Literature? in 1947, poetry was overshadowed by prose because the latter could clearly communicate information to incite social change. In contrast to the “language-instrument”84
of prose, Sartre argued that the poet treats the word like a material object,
much like an artist’s relation to paint. That is, communicative language
can only describe a house through signification, but a material object resembling a h
 ouse is able to emerge through an artist’s use of paint on a canvas. Poetry, for Sartre, was akin to art in that the word conjures up images
like a material “phrase-object.”85 However, when he writes Black Orpheus in
1948, these views undergo a dramatic transformation. For him, “[t]he
words of Césaire do not describe negritude” like words signify meaning
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in prose, and “they do not copy it from outside as a painter does a model”
like his previous view of poetry, but “they make it.”86 What he means is
that “black poetry” already contains within it dialectical movement in
which the “Negro,” who “is exiled in the midst of the cold buildings of the
white culture,”87 retaliates against and destroys it and, by doing so, is able
to “return to the native land” of the “black soul.”88 This, of course, is the
“dialectic law of successive transformations”89 that is merely the “means”
that leads the “ultimate goal”90 of the “black contribution in the evolution
of Humanity.”91
Perhaps b
 ecause Nunokawa is a producer of documentary films, and not
a literary critic, his views are somewhat modified. He retains the visual aspect of Sartre’s previous views on poetry by focusing on the materiality of
the “image” instead of the “language-instrument” of prose, yet he merges
it with Sartre’s “dialectic law of successive transformations” b
 ecause the
image of the other is able to retaliate against and destroy the colonizer. In
other words, Nunokawa attempts to bypass communication by g
 oing directly to the image of the colonial other. But this isn’t just any image. He
takes the image to an extreme form of materiality; he goes straight to the
“flesh” of the colonial other.
Nunokawa quotes the theater critic Kisei Ei to assert that communicative language “homogenizes and reifies the flesh”92 and seeks to document
the “flesh” as something that has an inherent “desire to roam” f ree from
“social constraints.”93 The “flesh” here is precisely that which is antagonistic to the practico-inert, or in his words, that which w
 ill lead to its
“bankruptcy.” B
 ecause the “flesh” of the colonial other is supposedly external to both Japanese social relations and language, it has the power to
productively betray and retaliate against the symbolic order. In other
words, if existence is in a dialectical relationship mediated by the state that
is symbolized by the “myth of totality,” then he looks for a symbol outside
of the semiotic order (i.e., the “flesh” of the colonial other) to forge another possibility for existence. Of course, we know that the roaming flesh
he speaks of here is the flesh of the sex worker that belongs to what he calls
the “fluid bottom” of the “modern social order”94 —an existence that is,
for him, “closest to revolution.”95
So, what exactly happens in Motoshinkakarannū promising revolution
through the “flesh” of the sex worker? The entire script of the documentary, after its immediate release, is published in Film Critique.96 In the original cut, it consists of twenty-three chapters. It haphazardly unfolds by
patching each chapter together with interviews of sex workers, an interview
with a hand-tattooed elderly w
 oman, a scene depicting w
 omen who sell dol-
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lars for yen to Japanese tourists on the streets of Naha, interviews with
Japanese tourists in Okinawa about their views on prostitution, an interview with members of the Black Panther Party, a scene with Okinawa’s
yakuza, scenes of the Zengunrō strike, scenes of native Okinawan festival
dancing and tug-of-war, and scenes from the 1970 Koza Riot. The black
and white film is grainy and images fly by with dizzying speed. Integral to
the visual and audio effects of the film is the use of a technique called “insert cut” (insāto katto). The voice recording is cut and rearranged by the
producer. Visual images are then inserted between cuts of the voice recording. This is purportedly to compensate for the interruption of flow between
the voice and image. However, in the case of this film, it is often exaggerated to convey an intense suspicion toward the sign in its ability to convey
the “truth,” which is seen in the interplay between the visual and vocal text.
This tension is most convincing in the chapter on fresh-off-t he-boat
leftist mainland Japanese l abor u
 nion members from the General Council
of Trade Unions of Japan (Sōhyō). A fter opening with a group of men
chanting “return Okinawa,” it follows with a series of interviews with men
and women on the topic of prostitution in Okinawa. The interviewer is
direct and to the point.
Interviewer: Have you ever met a prostitute before?
Man 5: I have. Yesterday, no, the day before yesterday, I met one.
Interviewer: Did you buy her?
Man 5: . . . W hat the. . . .
Man 6: He asked whether or not you bought her?
Man 5: I bought her.
Interviewer: How much did she cost?
Man 5: . . . This is too difficult. I can’t make conversation like this.”97

The voice is superimposed onto celebratory images of hundreds of Japanese
tourists gathering in the streets of Naha to rally for Okinawa’s reversion.
The infectious feeling of Japanese ethno-nationalism emanating from the
fanfare of the mass gathering in the visual text is disturbed by the uncomfortably intimate interview between the men in the vocal text. The documentary shows that this is not merely a case of sexism within the Japanese
New Left, but sexism with an added colonial dimension. To the question
“Was she a good girl?,” we are given an image of men sporting bandanas
that say “recapture Okinawa” (Okinawa dakkan), suggesting the hypocrisy
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of the Japanese New Left’s desire to recapture Okinawa from the United
States as if she were an object. Man 5 continues with his fantasy of the
Okinawan sex worker.
Man 5: She was a good girl. . . .
Man 5: Okinawan women are sort of caring.98 In that sense, I find them
charming. They are nice to anything. And not only that, if you talk to
them about anything they can converse in a most carefree manner as if
you had been living together for an entire lifetime.99

Superimposed onto this statement is the image of a human ocean of hundreds of mainland Japanese demonstrators at an Okinawa Prefecture Council for Reversion to the Fatherland rally. Each respective group within the
totality props up a flag representing their originating prefecture. We get a
glimpse of the geographical diversity within Japan, only to be reminded that
it is a totality separate from Okinawa. The vocal text again does the work of
driving home the dissonance between mainland Japan and Okinawa.
Interviewer: So in other words, your relationship with the w
 oman was
a monetary one?
Man 7: No, that’s not the case.
Man 8: Yeah, we’re from Osaka, and with prostitutes in Osaka, it’s
completely a monetary relationship. P
 eople around h
 ere aren’t concerned with such t hings. . . . 100

In Man 8’s fantasy world, Okinawan sex workers are not concerned with
money like “prostitutes in Osaka.” The vocal text is again juxtaposed with
actual images of sex workers walking the streets of Koza with G.I.s, lurking in the shadows, and the commodification of the female body seen in
shots of mannequins showcasing skimpy lingerie. His fantasy continues by
professing firsthand knowledge of the opinions of the sex worker, which
mirror his own.
Man 8: Also, we went to have fun in one of t hose places. As a . . . 
u nion . . . official. So, we also went in order to learn. It wasn’t of course
just to fool around. It was to talk mainly about topics such as Okinawa’s return. . . .
Man 8: Yeah, those p
 eople said they want to return [to the mainland
Japanese administration]. It’s not like we’re saying they’re at the bottom, but we had an interest in directly asking the prostitutes. Listening
to them, they had the same opinions as us.101
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The hypocrisy of this encounter is ended by the visual images of legions
of tourists, picking up their u
 nion bags embossed with the words “Abolish
the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty,” and climbing on board an enormous
cruise ship flowing with an entanglement of streamers that the tourists
wave as they depart from Okinawa.
In this chapter, the film succeeds in showing the contradictions between
Japan and Okinawa by using the sex worker as representative of the “fluid
bottom” of the colonial world. However, the documentary meets its limitations when actually turning to the vocal text of the sex worker herself.
Certainly, her text presents an example of how “the imagination of the object is betrayed and retaliated against,” as hoped for by Nunokawa. But
her text betrays expectations in a different way. Far from providing the
“flesh” that undermines the symbolic order from the outside, she works
clearly within the symbolic order and dismantles Nunokawa’s assumptions
of transcendence implicit in his theory of the institution and language.
The film opens with an explication of the title by a seventeen-year-old
sex worker named Akemi.
Akemi: “Motoshinkakarannū, hōremiyachubate? (You mean someone who
lets you do pussy?)102

The title of the film “motoshinkakarannū” means a business that can be
launched without start-up capital in the Okinawan language. Here Akemi
understands that NDU is referring to sex work and intuits that the “flesh”
Nunokawa has in mind is “pussy.” The body part is alienated from its person who “lets” others “do” it. Although the documentary makes this native
phrase the title in order to exoticize Okinawa, we learn immediately that
this is not a word Akemi uses herself. Rather, she is quick to identify it as
language appropriated by mainland Japanese men for their own purposes.
She follows:
Akemi: You guys, when you came from Japan, you went to Yoshiwara
huh. Oh my God, you perverts. . . . 103

Akemi associates the objectification of the motoshinkakarannū by the film
crew with the commodification of Okinawan bodies in the sex industry.
Although it is not evident from the documentary itself, we learn elsewhere
that the film crew indeed paid for sex with the women as they interviewed
them.104
In this scene, Akemi is acutely aware of the various power dynamics in
the room. She is surrounded by the NDU film crew and two yakuza named
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Asa and Aba in addition to the camera and microphone, although we can
hardly see anything but Akemi. The atmosphere is convivial, and they
converse in a tone akin to friends reminiscing over drinks. However, the
content of the conversation that follows is anything but festive. The tension between form and content h
 ere is not given so much with visual over
vocal text, but within the visual and vocal text coming from Akemi
herself.
Akemi: I got my cherry popped when I was on my period. So, I don’t
know if blood came out or not. I was on my period.
Akemi: Nebā hapun105 to a person.
Akemi: I told you. Just now, I told you it hurt!
(Everyone laughs.)
Akemi: Why do you laugh? Stupid assholes.
Akemi: . . . . . .
Aba: . . . . . .
Akemi: Atarimaeshichi, murumāyamuga! (Of course, I said it all hurts
down t here!)
(Aba laughs)
—A kemi, it was like that, wasn’t it? You thought of giving yourself,
didn’t you?
Akemi: No! Rape. It was an outright rape. It was so scary. A
 fter it was
over, I kept pushing my stomach. Didn’t want to get pregnant . . . I was
just a warabā (child). A seventh grader! Fakkuyū shārappu!106

The scene comes and goes so quickly that the viewer is left somewhat
dumbstruck. Akemi describes a gang rape by the yakuza committed when
she was in seventh grade. Thereafter, one yakuza becomes her pimp. Akemi
then takes on the pimp’s debt and is forced to pay it back through sex
work. The pimp is obligated to protect her in the violent world of the sex
industry but at the same time poses a threat to Akemi.107 NDU thereby
uncovers the unofficial world of organ ized violence that parallels the official world of organized state violence.
Although Nunokawa searches for “flesh” outside the linguistic order,
in listening to this scene closely we can see that Akemi nonetheless speaks
within it. There is not only tension between the joking form and serious
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content of her speech, but her speech is also linguistically hybrid as she
fluidly mixes native Okinawan, Japanese, and English at once to create her
own language. Akemi does not just say it like it is, but there is a fundamental tension between what is said and how, or in what language, it is said. It is
in this instability, where meaning is never allowed to land on stable ground,
that her text opens up to the allegorical. Yet, at the same time, there is
something more specific than allegory at play h
 ere, namely irony. Allegory,
as we w
 ill recall, is experienced as the swaying, swinging motion between
images without ever being able to fully fixate on one. In this way, we can see
that allegory is characterized by a drawn-
out temporality of moving
through space.108 Irony, by contrast, collapses temporality into a moment
and condenses multiplicity in a single space.109 As a result, she can only say
what she means by showing that she d
 oesn’t mean it. She can take possession of the word “outright rape” by laughing it off. Laughter protects her
from the gravity of the situation while it also suggests to the men physically
surrounding her that she w
 ill not challenge them.110 Her ambivalent relationship to power and language is then captured by the “Fakkuyū Shārappu!”
(Fuck you, shut up!) that she undoubtedly learned from the only oppressors
not present in the room—the men of the U.S. military.
The irony in Akemi’s speech suggests a different ontology from
Nunokawa’s. Whereas Nunokawa searches for something outside of the
linguistic order to ground the formation of a new subject, Akemi instead
demonstrates a different relationship between the empirical self and language. Her speech exposes language’s constant failure to represent the empirical self. It is in this sense that irony is allegory’s cousin. In contrast to
Nunokawa, who sought to escape representat ion in language by filming
the “flesh” of the colonies, Akemi’s life is an existence that is constantly
barred from transcendence. She is not far off from Fanon’s critique of Sartre here when he writes, “I am overdetermined from without”; “I am
locked into the infernal circle”; “I was walled in.”111 Whereas the white man
exercises his agency through confrontation with an external object that
causes the subject to change through a new dialectical relationship with
the object, Fanon’s point is that the colonized are afforded no such luxury.
The ability to self-determine is already foreclosed by the colonizer who
determines colonial existence. Akemi responds to this situation not by appealing to an outside that she is constantly denied, but by attempting to
forge a different relationship with transcendence itself.
We get a feeling of being “walled in” when Akemi catches the anger
emanating from her own body as it threatens to strike the object and redirects it inward in language.
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Akemi: (Speaking in dialect.) They say t hey’re g
 oing to film
motoshinkakarannū right away. Does that mean t hey’re g
 oing to
film me?112

At this moment, she realizes that she is being captured both in language
and image by the Japanese film crew. She considers what this means.
Akemi: (Akemi’s speech returns to standard language.) No one knows
what it means, but they say t hey’re g
 oing to make the title
motoshinkakarannū. They come to Okinawa, and go all out like, like
this to Yoshiwara. They came thinking t hey’re g
 oing to film
motoshinkakarannū, motoshinkakarannū in that kind of a place. How
embarrassing.113

At this point, Akemi makes an assessment of the power dynamics in terms
of geopolitics that frames the anger welling up in her soul.
Akemi: If Okinawa reverts to the mainland, only people in the
government w ill get rich. This is the first time that I’ve spoken to
Japanese p
 eople like this. Even if I argue with you, ah, I mean it’s
not an argument. No matter what kind of dirty words you use, I c an’t
get ma . . . ma . . . mad. So, that’s why it’s worth talking and talking.
You get it?114

Akemi suddenly becomes conscious of her anger but realizes that it w ill
have no release in communicative language: She cannot directly tell them
“I am mad” and mean it. Instead, her text is again ironic. As if tripping at
this sudden point of transition, she stutters on the word “ma . . . ma . . . 
mad” and can only say what she means by saying that she doesn’t mean it:
“Even if I argue with you, ah, I mean it’s not an argument.” Although she
is disgusted with “the dirty words” they use, she nonetheless states that
this is “why it’s worth talking.”
Akemi: They say people from the inner territories115 are nice like this.
But guys from the inner territories are nice, huh. Just like foreigners.
—“Are foreigners nice?”
Akemi: Really nice. . . .
Akemi: If I’m g
 oing to get mad and speak my mind, then I’ll tell a lie.
My boobs are nambā wan.116 You wanna see? I get compliments from
everyone.117

She gives the camera crew a backhanded compliment by stating that the
“guys from the inner territories are nice . . . [j]ust like foreigners.” “Inner
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territory” or naichi is a term still commonly used in Okinawa to describe
mainlanders. It is a relic from imperial Japan as the Japanese termed it the
“inner territories” in contrast to the “outer territories” ( gaichi) of the colonies. Although Okinawa was not an official colony, and was hence technically
naichi from the perspective of the official gaichi of Taiwan or K
 orea, it
nonetheless referred to mainland Japanese as naichi people, thereby reflecting consciousness as a colonized p
 eople. In her anger t oward the colonial
violence of the film crew, she could not be more explicit about her irony.
“If I’m g
 oing to get mad and speak my mind, then I’ll tell a lie.” She
switches from her thoughts to her body, from native Okinawan language
to a mixture of Japanese and English. Nambā wan (number one) is an En
glish borrow word commonly used in Japanese, but in this context, it conjures up another numerical phrase used by blacks in Okinawa to describe
the United States: “number ten.” If her “boobs” are the best at number one,
then it is because the United States and its mainland Japanese counterpart
are the worst at number ten.
The NDU production team was not uniform in thought. Another
member, Murase Haruki, published a reportage-style book based on the
documentary in 1970 entitled Does Anyone Know Okinawa? Unlike Nunokawa, Murase did not emerge from the experience of the documentary
immersed in Sartrean existentialism. Rather, he was left “speechless” and
turned toward problematizing Japanese society’s assumptions about sexuality.118 Much of his thinking was channeled through his experiences with
the Black Panther Party in Okinawa. Three chapters of the original film
are dedicated to introducing Black Power in Okinawa. In his book, Murase
analyzes the Black Power movement in terms of class. He describes uchigeba,
or in-fighting, between “cultural nationalists” who rejected white alliances and the Black Panther Party that cultivated a class-based analysis.119
He spoke with Black Panther Party members critical of Nixon’s “black
capitalism policy” that sought to “foster a group of puppet nationalist cap
italist” in order to integrate African Americans into capitalist society and
turn rich African American capitalists against their poorer brethren.120
He described how members of the Black Panthers in Okinawa lamented
how some of their brothers collaborated with “white imperialists” by
serving as Green Berets and/or acted as spies for the CIA and CID by
sporting ethnic African dress as they infiltrated the communities.121 Interestingly, however, Murase is pushed outside of his Japanese New Left
framework and comes face-to-face with something irreducible to its vocabulary. As if to echo Fanon in Black Skin, White Masks—a book he surely
read in Japanese translation, as it came out in late 1968—he recognizes a
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fundamental difference between the position of blacks and himself. He
writes:
They have no other choice but the absolute choice of “being black” in
America or Africa where they are ruled by whites. They cannot escape
from being “black. . . .”
We “Japanese” who are ruled in “Tokyo” by rulers of the same skin
color can make various choices.
We can carefully escape from being “non-nationals,”122 “rioters,”
“criminals,” and “insane.” We can innocently escape from being
“aggressors,” “oppressors,” “discriminating,” or even “executioners.”123

Unlike Nunokawa, who attempts to exercise the freedom of praxis through
a confrontation with the colonized for the purpose of a dialectical synthesis that results in a renewed humanism, Murase understands that the same
“choice” is not available to blacks. While the colonizer produces the colonized through an exclusionary decision—a practice where the colonized
is captured as an externality that exists before the colonizer and for the
purposes of the colonizer—Murase points to the absence of symmetry in
the sovereign decision or “choice.” The colonized is not a negation of the
colonizer and the colonized is not in possession of reciprocity; the colonized is produced by the colonizer through an exclusionary decision.
Hence, having been determined by the colonizer, the colonized cannot
simply exercise the “choice” of self-determination as a full realization of
his or her humanity. This is b
 ecause “choice” for the colonized has already
been chosen by the colonizer.
Indeed, Sartre’s celebration of Fanon’s writings on anti-colonial violence
articulated in the preface of The Wretched of the Earth has been widely criticized as self-congratulatory. Murase himself lived the tension between
t hese two authors in Okinawa in real time. Not long a fter NDU’s arrival
in 1969, Murase picked up the hot-off-the-press Japanese translation of this
book, which came out in November that year, and read Sartre’s preface,
quoted h
 ere, in the overlapping space of two colonial worlds that existed
as the black neighborhood in Okinawa.
Walking Honmachi Street, I, of course, couldn’t discern who was an
imperialist and who was a revolutionary amongst the brothers, but all
the guys roaming Honmachi Street had an ineffable ghostlike power
about them. They perhaps w
 ere not into “consciousness124 [raising]” or
125
“class-based [analysis],” but they had some sort of fundamental
dreadfulness about them that was not commensurable with “logic,”
could not be mediated by “language,” and not incapable of rejecting
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the formation of “language.” Moreover, like Roy and Tom, they w
 ere
mixed in with experienced veterans who had actually “dirtied their
hands” in the Vietnam War and were different from the backup
reserves who had graduated from college. Just as Sartre wrote, “no
gentleness can efface the marks of violence; only violence itself can
destroy them,” what “whites” including Sartre feared the most was
perhaps the true revolutionary power of “blacks.”126

The “blacks” that he describes h
 ere cannot be constituted as imperialist
or revolutionary b
 ecause they are irreducible to both. Blackness is a fundamental antagonism (i.e., “dreadfulness”) that cannot be organized into
a “logic,” “language,” or political party. This is not the “flesh” existing outside of the semiotic order as conceived by Nunokawa, but an “ineffable
ghostlike power” irreducible to it as it roams the borderland of Honmachi
Street. In the following section, I w
 ill turn to a moment where base town
workers and African American soldiers come together in a scene of vio
lence irreducible to the state.

The Koza Riot
On December 20, 1970, something remarkable happened. Workers who
had just been fraternizing with their clients emerged from Koza’s A-sign
establishments and took to the streets. They filled up pop bottles with gasoline and started pitching them at U.S. military vehicles. They joined an
amorphous crowd of over a thousand Okinawans who pulled G.I.s out of
their cars, flipped them over, and set them on fire. The uprising was spontaneous and the word on the street was infectious: Don’t touch the black
soldiers.
This is the Koza Riot. The historical details that triggered the event
itself are rather uneventful. A drunk U.S. soldier hit an Okinawan as he
was crossing the street at about 1:00 a.m. As a small crowd gathered around
the crash site, they became agitated when the Ryukyu police attempted to
turn the car over to the MP. Okinawans knew the routine. Just five weeks
earlier a U.S. soldier had hit and killed an Okinawan woman in an Itoman
car accident. A fter the car was turned over to the MP, the soldier was found
not guilty. As the fresh memory of this incident cascaded over a continuous flow of memories of countless other rapes and murders committed with
impunity by U.S. military soldiers over the years, someone shouted “Try
them at a people’s court.”127 By 2:00 a.m. the crowd grew to a thousand.
Instead of serving the soldiers cocktails in the bars, they w
 ere now serving
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them Molotov cocktails in the street. They identified U.S. military cars by
their yellow or F-number license plates, pulled them into the m
 iddle of the
street, turned them over, and burned them. Approximately five hundred
Okinawans penetrated nearly two hundred yards of Kadena Air Base and
set fire to the buildings.128 The MP fired shots into the air. A
 fter six hours
of violence, no one was killed. Special assistant to the president for Okinawan Affairs attempted to categorize the incident in a report to the president of the United States.
The Koza riot was not a riot in the usual sense. No damage was done
to stores or buildings, no one was killed. When an American ser
viceman’s car was attacked the occupants w
 ere pulled from the car
before it was set on fire. (Eighty-t hree cars were destroyed, so I am
told.)129

The Koza Riot was not an indiscriminate expression of violence. The crowd
refrained from killing serv icemen, damaging Okinawan property, and as
noted elsewhere, they refrained from touching black soldiers or their
property.
Yet, at the same time, it was not premeditated e ither. The report follows, “It seems to have broken out spontaneously.”130 The United States
was not gifted with a terrorist group that had planned the violence in
advance, nor could they identify a group in the making toward the f uture.
In a confidential Department of Defense Intelligence Information Report, the USAF commander writes: “No information has been developed
to date to indicate any group or individual is planning a recurrence of
violence. . . . It is impossible to identify when and where it could since the
circumstances creating a potential for violence would have to develop
first.”131 The mass media as well was denied an object to villainize b
 ecause
of the anonymity of the violence. Although Okinawan politicians paid
lip serv ice to the U.S. military by stating the incident was regrettable,
they nonetheless sided with the civilians by stating that they understood
their actions. Because the Koza Riot belonged to no one, it belonged to
everyone.
This odd mixture of organized spontaneous violence deeply troubled
the United States. More than simply the cost of property damaged, they
sensed a small tear in sovereign power with potentially catastrophic consequences: “The riot, the first to occur on Okinawa, was so serious that it
is bound to have import ant effects upon the relationship between Okinawans and Americans, governmentally, economically, and socially.”132 I
read the Koza Riot as a moment of divine, as contrasted to mythic, vio
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lence that is inimical to sovereign power. In “Critique of Violence,” Benjamin famously uncovered the design of state violence as a teleology in
which subjects use violence as a means to a greater end. T
 here he showed
how the state allows labor u
 nions the violent means of a strike in order to
achieve the end of better working conditions. Although it appears that
the state is making concessions to the strikers, what is important is that the
strikers remain within the means-end relationship. So long as violence is
used as a means to the greater end of challenging the state, the state maintains a monopoly on power. However, real crisis ensues when the means-
end relationship is altered.
The significance of the participation of the base town workers in the
Koza Riot is that they did so in the absence of mediation by politics or economics. Violence was not used as a means to ask for concessions from
sovereign power. They were neither petitioning subjects who worked
within the state for better concessions nor w
 ere they protesting subjects
who came up against the state with the aim of opposing it. This is why
base town workers were able to play a central role in the incident despite
being labeled as “pro-A merican.” Just as they cannot be reduced to being
for the state in their serv ice to the U.S. military, their violence cannot be
reduced to being against the state in unleashing their rage toward the
U.S. military. More than a terrorist group that plots the downfall of the U.S.
military, this violence irreducible to state power posed its greatest threat.
A-sign business owner Arakawa Sachio plainly separates doing business
from rioting as he recalls the incident.
During the Koza Riot I was d
 oing business as usual on Business
Center Street. Like everyone else, I went to go check out what was
going on. That’s when I saw that all of the foreigners’ cars were set on
fire. Poor guys. W
 oman, child, it d
 idn’t matter: Everyone got in on the
action of dragging t hose guys out of their foreign cars from opened
doors.
. . . W hen I witnessed the Koza Riot, I thought it was only natural
that the foreigners got what they deserved. . . . Rape someone? Not
guilty. Run over and kill someone in a car accident? Not guilty. The
civilians were tired of hearing about such incidents as they accumulated year a fter year. That’s why their feelings about “t hese assholes”
suddenly exploded into the riot.
Of course, I was doing business with foreigners during t hese times
when they got off scot-f ree a fter committing crime a fter crime. But
business was business and the incident was the incident. T
 hey’re
separate issues. Since I was profiting from their business, I was to a
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certain degree appreciative t oward the foreigners. But I was also
bullied by them a fter losing the war.133

Arakawa categorically separates profit from emotion, business from vio
lence. He has no trouble expressing sympathy for the “poor guys” while
saying that they “got what they deserved” in the same breath. It was precisely in this separation, in the absence of a telos through which to channel their anger, that the base town workers were able to take pleasure in
the means.
In this moment, roles in Okinawan society w
 ere reversed. The base
town workers who were thought to be useless in terms of their ability to
protest U.S. military bases attacked the reversion activists who had prided
themselves in their anti-base politics. Matsushima writes:
Anyone and everyone who took part in that riot shouted out the word
Uchinānchu. Anyone and everyone agitated the situation with the
Uchinānchu slogan right before they broke into the base. Even the
A-sign business p
 eople who were labeled right-w ingers shouted out to
the civil servant educators,134 “You guys go on about reversion,
reversion, but you c an’t even kill the U.S. military? Quit fucking
around. Can you still call yourself Uchinānchu!!” In that whirlpool [of
energy], the gawkers could no longer be gawkers, and even the
educators joined in the fight as Uchinānchu. In other words, the
fundamental characteristic of that riot is that Uchinānchu w
 ere able to
express their hatred to the U.S. military as one body.135

In this passage, Matsushima defines Uchinānchu, or Okinawan identity, as
that which is unintelligible to state power. This is what they chanted before they broke into the base. Liberated from the onus of political goals, it
was this identity that empowered the p
 eople thought to be lacking in po
litical life.
When the boundary-inscribing violence of the state started to lose
ground, African American soldiers located the potential to come together
to form a different kind of community. We w
 ill recall friction between
African Americans and Okinawans surrounding the economics of the
base town and politics of race managed by state power. Yet there was a
moment of mutual recognition at this point where both gave up on state-
mediated communication that subtends the dream of internationalism. A
bilingual letter written by African American soldiers in Kadena Air Base
starts off with a recognition of communicative failure: “There is a communication barrier between Okinawans and the Black G.I.” It continues
by pointing out the in-between position of both groups:
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Black p
 eople have fought in wars which they r eally had nothing to do
with. Okinawans fought in wars that they had nothing to do with . . .
. . . This is because Black peopl [sic] have been discriminated against
for over 400 years, and it hasn’t stopped yet. The same with Okinawans; they’ve been discriminated against also.136

The letter speaks of a parallel minority position that is both used as an instrument of state violence and alienated from it. It was such movements
that pushed activists who lived in Koza, such as Matsushima, to formulate
the Okinawan proletariat in a trans-Pacific context. He writes:
The relationship between blacks and whites, and the relationship
between blacks and state power: I think the problem for blacks is that
they must constantly sublate t hese two relationships . . . I think that
question of blackness137 finds a most similar situation in Okinawa.138

Matsushima articulates a moment of connection between subjects who
struggle in their failure to be represented by the state during the tumultuous years of the reversion era. I w
 ill return to how it informed his vision
of a global proletariat in the next chapter. But in terms of this moment of
African American–Okinawan solidarity, it was largely unable to grow into
a larger movement.139 Apprehensive about the Koza Riot and the type of
connections it engendered, the United States became more eager than ever
to transfer Okinawa to the Japanese administration in 1972. The replacement of American dollars with Japanese yen in combination with the execution of the Japanese anti-prostitution law meant the formal demise of
the sex industry. The racial politics implied therein faded against yet another attempt to become Japanese as Okinawa was formally integrated into
the Japanese political economy. The following chapter w
 ill return to this
moment of failed representation before state power after Okinawa becomes
disillusioned with redemption by the Japanese state and once again
looks beyond in the post-reversion era.
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Chapter 5

Okinawa, 1972–1995: Life That Matters

Chapters 3 and 4 showed the respective limitations of national and class
unity in resisting U.S. military bases in Okinawa alongside the Old and
New Japanese Left. Both assumed a single-state logic of imperialism and
failed to position Okinawa in terms of a regional form of governance between the United States and Japan. In the post-reversion era, however, the
complicit relationship between U.S. militarism and the Japanese political
economy became undisguisable, causing much sobering reflection on the
past and new ways of thinking about Okinawa’s ability to assert its autonomy in a global world where it is not held back by the unfulfilled promises
of the Japanese state.
In the effort to think beyond Okinawa’s vexed position before Japanese
state sovereignty, this chapter reconsiders the logic of bordering based on
the philosophical notion of self-determination.1 In place of the imperative
for a unified self and unified nation as the precondition for entry into selfhood and nationhood (i.e., the capacity for “self-determination”), it considers the theoretical implications of Okinawa as a borderland of the Pacific,
where bodies and objects circulate. It appeals to Tosaka’s critique of static
matter wedged in a two-dimensional planar space and his attempt to as124
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sign a different kind of agency to morphing matter. In this way, it attempts
to think about how Okinawan life, as life that fails to unify before the state,
can matter or be significant in the quality of its mutability.
This chapter reads the Okinawa failure to achieve self-determination
as the potential for developing a different kind of autonomy grounded in
the agency of morphing matter through Tanaka Midori’s mixed-race memoir My Distant Specter of a Father. In it, she fails to become American; she
fails to become Japanese. She comes to realize that t here is no transcendental power to give meaning to her life. Instead, she grounds the “endeavor to live on” in the uncertainty of her ever-changing self. While she
is left bereft of any transcendental truths by which to live, her act, as an
unintended consequence, recuperates her life force from the state to ground
her ability to continue to live on. For the first time, her life is finally allowed to m
 atter.

The Monotony of the Same
On May 15, 1972, the long-awaited moment had finally arrived: Okinawa
fully reverted to the Japanese administration. As the hopes and dreams for
a new f uture w
 ere ushered in at the threshold of the Japanese state, a very
cold post-reversion morning dawned on the horizon. The threads of the
Okinawan dream for liberation had been woven into a different web. Quite
cruelly, the more Okinawans resisted, the more they became entangled.
Complaints about the U.S. military? Lodge them with your own
government—the government of Japan that not only welcomes U.S.
military bases, but enthusiastically funds them with the might of the yen.
A fter reversion, the proportion of U.S. military bases on the island increased while it decreased in mainland Japan.2 This was not because Japan
was forced to buckle u nder the unilateral pressures of the United States;
Japan actively opposed a U.S. Department of Defense proposal for withdrawal. As the Vietnam War started to come to a close, the United States
was becoming wary of the explosive resentment toward U.S. military bases,
as seen in the 1970 Koza Riot. But perhaps more importantly, it could no
longer sustain funneling U.S. dollars into military expenditures a fter an
unpopular war. It was in this political climate that Department of Defense
analysts concluded it would be “considerably cheaper and probably more
effective” to withdraw all marines throughout the Pacific, including
Okinawa and Hawai‘i, and bring them to Camp Pendleton in San Diego,
California.3 Instead of seeing this as an opportunity for base reduction,
Kubo Takaya, head of the Japanese Defense Agency, stated that “Given
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the need for a mobile force in Asia, the U.S. Marines should be retained.” 4
Yara Tomohiro argued that “[h]ad Japan not stopped the process of their
withdrawal to the mainland United States it seems most unlikely that the
Okinawan base problem would have become such a big political issue.”5
In 1972, the United States happily turned over its financial responsibilities in Okinawa to Japan. Japan was crowned with the title of the world’s
second-largest industrial power,6 and by the reversion year, it was ready to
reintegrate Okinawa as its periphery. The government enacted the Special Act on the Promotion and Development of Okinawa (Okinawa shinkō
kaihatsu tokubetsu sochi hō) ostensibly to close the economic gap with the
mainland. This established what Shimabukuro Jun refers to as an “Okinawan promotion and development regime” that operated first through the
Okinawa Development Agency u ntil 2011 and now through the Okinawa
General Bureau. This means that t here is a separate agency within the
Cabinet Office of the government of Japan dedicated to collapsing the convoluted political issue of U.S. military bases in Okinawa into the narrow
channel of economics. Shimabukuro calls this setup a “dispute canceling
device” (hisōtenka shisutemu) in which bureaucrats from the Agency for
Public Works, Ministry of Finance, or Ministry of Home Affairs occupy
the Okinawa General Bureau while t hose from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Ministry of Defense are conspicuously absent.7 Because
Okinawan politics are carried out through the Okinawa General Bureau, it
is cut off from the rest of political life in Tokyo and incapable of influencing the ministries where the real politicking happens for the rest of Japan.8 Moreover, when Okinawa addresses a po
l iti
cal issue, it is
rechanneled through the Okinawa General Bureau and reconfigured into
an economic issue in which the Japanese government doles out money for
“promotion and development.” The two-way street of negotiation that
constitutes political agency for the rest of Japan dissolves into the one-way
street of beggary for Okinawa. At first, the “promotion and development
regime” was sold to the Okinawan people as a way to close the gap in the
standard of living incurred through its painful years of U.S. occupation.
However, in the late 1990s, it came to explicitly link reparation with the
acceptance of new U.S. military base construction. The quasi-governmental
1996 Shimada Colloquium (Shimada kondankai) brazenly mapped out
such a carrot and stick approach.9 Acceptance of new base construction
led directly to specific business incentives. Rejection of base construction
led to t hese incentives being taken away. Many later pointed out that the
so-called incentives w
 ere not as lucrative as what other municipalities in
Japan received simply through normal politicking. Nonetheless, since the
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Shimada Colloquium, protest against U.S. military bases in Okinawa has
been dismissed simply as a way for Okinawans to squeeze more money out
of the central government. This is why Kevin Maher, a State Department official in charge of the Japanese affairs office, stated that Okinawans are “masters of manipulation and extortion” when dealing with
the central government.10 It seems that Okinawans had graduated from
being petty beggars only to become masterful extortionists.
Yen is not the only problem. Contrary to common belief, dollars flowing out of bases no longer do much for the Okinawan economy. More and
more, business leaders in Okinawa are starting to view the bases as unwanted baggage crowding large swaths of the island that could otherw ise
be used for farming or industry. Military base revenue in 2009 only accounted for 5.2 percent of Okinawa’s gross domestic income of nearly
$4 billion, down from 15.5 percent in 1972.11 Tomochi Masaki estimates
that the Okinawan gross income would be 1.25 percent greater after the
elimination of all U.S. and Japanese Self-Defense Force bases and their
accompanying subsidies from the Japanese government.12
Finances between the United States and Japan have changed dramatically as well. Japan gives unprecedented financial support to the U.S. military. Per the 1960 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), embedded as a
subset of articles to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, Japan has historically
been obligated to provide the land and maintenance costs for the bases f ree
to the United States while the United States pays for the operation of military forces on the bases. However, in 1978, Japan Defense Cabinet Secretary
Kanemaru Shin volunteered to go above and beyond this obligation and
provide an omoiyari yosan (sympathy budget) commonly referred to as
“host nation support” that also pays for salaries of Japanese nationals working on the bases and the cost of facility construction.13 As a result, by
2002, Japan covered 74.5 percent of the operating costs for U.S. military
bases t here.14 This means that it is less expensive to maintain forces in
Japan than it is in the United States. In the last published figures by the
U.S. Department of Defense in 2003, Japan contributed $4.41 billion to
U.S. military bases within its borders. This was the largest amongst all U.S.
allies: nearly three times Germany’s contribution of $1.56 billion and over
five times South Korea’s $842 million.15
Economics came to a head with politics in 1995 whereupon the movement against the U.S. military bases in Okinawa underwent cataclysmic
change. This, of course, was the year of the rape of a twelve-year-old Okinawan by three U.S. military personnel. But it was also around the time
when the U.S. military started to express a desire to close the dilapidated
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Futenma Air Station and build a new U.S. military installation in northern Okinawa. In the space of some thirty years a fter the reversion era, Okinawans faced the monotony of the same. Instead of scrambling for
American dollars that were soaked up by the Japanese economy during the
reversion era, they now scramble for Japanese yen that is soaked up by the
Japanese economy t oday. In any case, honing a middle-class Okinawan
work ethic did not correspond to an ability to have their voices heard
through the democratic processes of popular sovereignty. Nor did it afford them equal protection u
 nder the Japanese constitution. Their efforts
only led to a reinforced presence of U.S. military bases and marginalization within the Japanese economy. Okinawa, hence, continues to be excepted (excluded) from Japanese sovereignty.
Given that Okinawa Prefecture is officially part of the Japanese state,
yet still robbed of decision-making power regarding U.S. military bases
and the economy, what possible recourse does it have for political expression? Understandably, Okinawan scholars of the political economy have
been most conspicuous in arguing for Okinawan autonomy vis-à-v is the
Japanese state. Their proposals have been presented in various forms, including autonomous regional power in place of the centralized Japanese
government, autonomous state within a federalized system, and all-out in
dependence.16 Furthermore, these proposals are not esoteric discussions
limited to the academic elite; recent opinion polls point to growing popu
lar support. Compared to 61.8 percent in 2011, only 46.1 percent—less than
half—of all respondents in 2016 reported satisfaction with the status quo
of Okinawa as a prefecture within the Japa
nese state. By contrast,
34.5 percent reported they favored some form of increased local autonomy
with choices ranging from variations of a federal system (with authority
in administrative, economic, and/or diplomatic matters) to all-out inde
pendence. This was a marked increase from just 20 percent in 2011.17 Without belaboring the finer differences of these debates, they indicate a
strong desire for more autonomy within the established system of international law. While I am aligned with the spirit of such debates, my concern here, as it is for this entire book, is to theorize a form of autonomy
irreducible to the law. In the next section, I focus on self-determination
not as a political concept, but as philosophical one, specifically as it relates
to biopolitics and miscegenation. A gap needs to be addressed between the
language of the political economy that expresses the right to “determine
itself ” as a unified entity on the stage of international politics and Okinawa’s
visceral experience at the crossroads of the Pacific, where bodies and
t hings (i.e., m
 atter) are in constant motion. Because the Okinawan dream
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for autonomy has gotten nowhere by moving forward on the same planar
space through time, it is time to consider the analytics of space where
Okinawan lives can finally start to matter.

Matter in Motion
Acutely aware of the spatial dynamics in his formulation of biopolitics, Foucault articulated them in terms of circulation in his 1977–1978 lectures at
the Collège de France, Security, Territory, Population. More than just a discussion on the circulation of bodies and objects, his broader aim was to
insert a metaphysics of m
 atter in motion into geopolitics as part of his effort to develop a notion of biopolitics. He writes:
I mean . . . circulation in the very broad sense of movement, exchange,
and contact, as form of dispersion, and also as form of distribution, the
problem being: How should t hings circulate or not circulate? Now it
seems to me that . . . we see the emergence of a completely different
problem that is no longer that of fixing and demarcating the territory,
but of allowing circulations to take place, of controlling them, sifting
the good and the bad, ensuring that t hings are always in movement,
constantly moving around, continually g
 oing from one point to
another, but in such a way that the inherent dangers of this circulation
are canceled out.18

Foucault points to a shift away from sovereignty defined in terms of the
territory and the sovereign’s ability to “fix” its borders, to a new form of
governmentality concerned with “ensuring that things are always in
movement” for the population. Things must move. And the new art of
government is contingent on the ability to regulate this imperative for
movement.
Matsushima Chōgi paints a vivid picture of what governmentality as the
regulation of circulation looked like in U.S. military–occupied Okinawa.
If you want to see how t hese [military] roads developed, all you need to
do is pick up two Coca-Cola ads. One is from the 1950s and one is
from the 1960s. On them you w
 ill find Okinawa’s roads and bases
printed out with Coca-Cola vendors indicated by arrows. On the new
map, you can see the expanded bases along with new roads to serv ice
them that extend beyond what you see on the first map. If bases are
expanded, then roads are elongated. So, if one base was destroyed by
something like an explosion, it is designed so that the remaining 99 go
unharmed. In this way, the roads that connect independent bases
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together are like a nervous system for the entire body called the
“Okinawan base.”19

Matsushima does not understand sovereign power to be controlled by a
head that commands other parts to move, but as a system that can counteract crisis through its ability to maintain circulation. In this way, he
attempts to give new meaning to the rally to “take to the streets” and
comments how a simple sit-in for ten hours on Highway 1 in 1965 para
lyzed base operations for a week at the cost of thirty thousand dollars for
the military.20 Furthermore, he speaks of the significance of the death of
a Ryukyuan police officer on the same Highway 1 some six years later. The
police officer was used as an instrument of institutional power to maintain circulation that was threatened by a general strike. From the perspective of the U.S. military, his life mattered only to the extent that he could
maintain circulation; from the perspective of the Japanese Left, his life
mattered only to the extent that he could stop it and rally against the bases.
In other words, his life did not really matter for either side outside of its
utility for both. His Okinawan life falls off of a two-dimensional grid of
intelligibility. In this sense, Okinawans did not care if he was for or against
the bases, Matsushima writes, for his life simply mattered as Okinawan.
Matsushima points to a different spatial dimension in which a seemingly
contradictory Okinawan life—as simultaneously instrumental to the U.S.
military and victim to it—refuses to be flattened into mutually exclusive
opposites.21 This is why he writes, “I want to dwell (kodawaritai) upon the
fact of his death just as much as the place where he died.”22
For both Matsushima and Foucault, circulation is integral to the formation of a spatial order that regulates the intelligibility of life itself. Foucault picks up this thread again in his lectures of the following year, The
Birth of Biopolitics, in a more concrete geopolitical configuration through a
discussion of Kant’s Perpetual Peace. In his reading of this essay, Foucault
notes that states mutually expose themselves to the “unlimited nature of
the external market”23 (i.e., circulation with the unknown) in order to collapse its infinite expanse into a two-dimensional spatial order. This occurs
when first, the disunity within states is canceled out vis-à-vis economic enrichment of the “unlimited nature of the external market,” and second,
the ability to determine a unified “self ” is achieved systematically with
“other” states. In other words, states mutually self-determine vis-à-v is a
potentially self-d issolving encounter and reemerge as a constellation of
states that confront an unknown. The self/other distinction is secured
through the enabling limitation of globalization that reinforces a federa-
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tion of f ree states in pursuit of perpetual peace. Just as the “self ” must unify
internally in order to express a self-determining w ill onto the external
world, states must unify internally in order to express its ability to self-
determine as a state in a system of other nation-states.24 The irony is that
even though the nation-state system is predicated on the synergy of exchange, it is an exchange that does not break down borders, but reinforces
them with increasing tenacity. This is a metaphysics of movement in
which the agency of its matter in motion is surrendered to the sovereignty
of a transcendental power that organizes its intelligibility in terms of a
two-dimensional planar space, divided internally between an inside and
outside, that is inserted into chronological time. It spatially freezes—or
renders static and originary—matter in atomic units as the precondition for
its continued systematic movement. A non-idealist conception of movement, however, understands that “matter is in motion” and surrenders its
agency to this motion.25
Chapter 4 attempted to capture the agency of this matter in motion
through Matsushima Chōgi’s writings on the movement of migrant workers in which he conceptualized the “Okinawan proletariat.” This is a class
that does not unify internally and therefore fails to self-determine. Matsushima theorized the Okinawan proletariat because he came face-to-face
with the contradiction of Okinawans unifying as a Japanese proletariat
when they could not even unify as a class of Okinawans. Furthermore, he
paralleled this contradiction with the Black Power movement he came into
contact with in Koza in which he saw the contradictions of African American soldiers who fight for a state that discriminates against them.
Hence, through his contact with the Black Power movement, he was
able to see that “Okinawa is not the contradiction of a single state,” but
that it is the contradiction of something larger that similarly affects others
around the world—t hat is, “the contradiction of capitalism” itself.26 What
he means is that capitalism flattens the world. Okinawa is a contradiction
of capitalism insofar as it is wedged as a static entity within a two-
dimensional planar space, in which it is supposed to find its place within
the inner space of “Japan” so it can gain entry into the outer world of nation-
states. His description of Okinawa’s “contradiction” resonates with the
contradiction of a static materiality within a two-dimensional planar space
described by Tosaka. He writes:
A characteristic of what is called formal logic is that it mediates t hings
that fall on two identical planes. T
 hings that move and act within
t hese planes are fundamentally contradictory. For example, on one
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plane, “A” is α and, at the same time, it is not something e lse like
β. However, on the other plane, “A” could very well be β. (But if so, it
is already not α.) And so in the vertical relationship between t hese two
planes, the law of contradiction is not played out. On the first plane,
the object “A” is α, but if “A” has a concrete mutability, on the second
plane it is of course not α. (It is β or something e lse, for example.)
Rather than displaying “A’s” contradictory nature, this situation
demonstrates “A’s” materiality. Thus, this so-called formal logic is
merely a kind of three-dimensional logic of different planes.27

What liberates “A’s” contradictory nature from a two-dimensional planar
space is its materiality described as “concrete mutability.” It is this mutability that demands a third dimension of m
 atter in motion, and not an “internal axis of unification”28 as critiqued by Matsushima. The autonomy of
this materiality, furthermore, is not surrendered to a sovereign who exists
at the limits of a two-dimensional planar space—a demi-god who sutures
the space of the inside from the outside through an exceptional decision,
but it is retained as motion itself.29
When Matsushima argued that the Okinawan proletariat must remain
vigilant to the “internal axis of unification,” he spoke of a vigilance of sovereign power that unifies according to this two-dimensional plane that
has no space for Okinawa’s experience of mixing. Hence, different from the
mixing of bodies that emerges with configuring nation-states, Matsushima
suggests a metaphysics of m
 atter in motion that neutralizes the synergy of
the nation-state system.
More contemporary scholars have noted that while mixing has been imposed upon Okinawa, this mixing at the same time does not occur in a
way in which Okinawa gains entry into the global world. That is, mixes it
does, but self-determines, it does not. For example, Shimabukuro Jun
writes:
. . . it was precisely b
 ecause assimilation into Japan and exchange with
mainland Japan had considerably advanced that Okinawa . . . was able
to take notice of the particularity of a self that cannot easily assimilate. . . . 
The postwar Okinawan population included no less than 100,000
members of the U.S. military armed forces and civilian components,
and also Indian and Filipino foreign nationals who work in business
that serv ice them. . . . This is a condition of being at the crossroads of
a plural ethnic mixing. . . . 30

Shimabukuro points to the experience of mixing, and not a multicultural
society subsumed into a globalized Japan whereupon the latter simply needs
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to learn how to become more tolerant of difference. His writing is markedly different, for example, from that of the multicultural advocate Noiri
Naomi. Frustrated with the overt racism that mixed-race children encounter, she views Okinawa’s champurū (mixed) culture as hypocritical and instead argues that Okinawans should realize Okinawan AmerAsians
receiving a “double” or bilingual education “can be beneficial for all
children in our time of globalization.”31 Certainly, Okinawans who discriminate against mixed-race c hildren in Okinawa are hypocritical, but
the violence is not so much because of lack of a w ill to embrace the benefits of globalization as it is Okinawa’s being barred from entry into the
global world, as suggested by Shimabukuro. For Okinawa, mixes it does, but
self-determines it does not. If this is the case, then what use does Okinawa
have for all of t hose mixed-race children having a run of the islands?
Okinawa’s experience of mixing does not lead to a determination of the
self as a singular “one” whereupon the mixed-race subject can emerge in
either a fraction form of “half ” or a multiple form of “double.” Such equations are predicated on the stability of a two-dimensional self. T
 here can
only be a collapse of a unified self altogether. If the only path to global citizenry is to self-determine, then this failure of unification seems to drive
Okinawa into a dead end. In the next section, I examine how this failure
can be turned into an opportunity for a different sense of autonomy through
a close reading of a mixed-race memoir, My Distant Specter of a F
 ather.

The Failure of Mixed Race
By the time the reversion year came around in 1972, the first cohort of
mixed-raced individuals born in 1946 had turned twenty-six. No longer
were they spoken for, but they started to express themselves as embodiments of Okinawa’s condition of mixing. Koza burst forth with mixed-race
rock artists such as Kyan Marie, who sang in Japanese, Okinawan, and En
glish.32 Suzuki Teruko, a survivor of the 1959 Miyamori Elementary
School plane crash by a supersonic fighter jet, published a fictional account
of her life entitled Come Out Kijimuna in 1990.33 In 1998, a group of mothers
established the AmerAsian School in Okinawa to provide a bilingual education for their children who were susceptible to bullying in public
schools.34 This gave rise to a short-l ived spin-off called the C
 hildren of
Peace Network in 1999 that was led autonomously by a mixed-race adult,
Higa Malia, for the same. As described in the Preface, she helped numerous individuals find their long-lost fathers and also problematized their extreme alienation from the anti-base movement.35
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From this experience came widely visible figures such as Fija Byron.
He started out as a skilled Okinawan sanshin (banjo) musician who released an independent a lbum and soon grew into a leader of the revitalization of endangered Ryukyuan languages. Fija’s story resonated with
many mixed-race individuals who grew up in Okinawa u nder Japanese
assimilation. Even though he was raised in an Okinawan home and educated in Japanese public schools, his mixed-race identity was met with a
“Japanese versus American” binary that sought to pigeonhole him as an
English speaker on a daily basis. If he was not interpellated by the obligatory “Hāfu desuka?,” or “Are you half?”—a question tantamount to asking an Asian in the United States “Where are you really from?”—t hen he
was greeted with a “Harō!” (the attempt to pronounce “hello” in Japa
nese), to which he answered “Haisai!” (the Okinawan word for the same).
He used the Okinawan language as a weapon against racism to show
the world that although he may look “American,” he is in fact a living
embodiment of the unintelligibility of Okinawa itself. This is an unintelligibility so acute that Okinawans can no longer even recognize
one of their own (Fija), much less comprehend one speaking their own
language.36
The extreme alienation that renders mixed-race individuals foreigners
in their native islands has driven many to claim an indigenous Okinawan
identity irreducible to the U.S.-Japan binary itself as they self-identify as
“American-Okinawans.”37 The “American” modifier before the hyphenated
“Okinawan” has less to do with their affiliation with the United States than
it is a marker of how they have been treated differently in an Okinawan
society tenaciously influenced by the myth of Japanese monoethnicity.
They came together in 2012 to form an “American-Okinawan Association”
and argued for the right to an Okinawan identity in which they can live
without the daily harassment of being asked to speak English or answer
personal questions about their parentage.38
What mixed-race subjects such as Fija demand is not that the true Okinawans accept their racially diluted half-offspring with the arrogance of
tolerance disguised as multiculturalism, but that Japanese-assimilated Okinawans realize that their unintelligible offspring are the real Okinawans.
What this points to is a different relationship with transcendence in which
mixing does not present the self with an opportunity to reinforce its own
borders of enclosure; but embracing, instead of excluding, the failure of
transcendence as such is the first step in exercising a different kind of autonomy. If the game of international politics is rigged so Okinawans are
always destined to lose, then one recourse to autonomy is to embrace this
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failure—and by extension, o
 thers who fail in a similar way and make it work
to their advantage.
Next, I would like to turn to the only published American-Okinawan
mixed-race memoir, My Distant Specter of a Father, written by Tanaka
Midori, to think about the possibility of failure. Tanaka is a half-Okinawan,
half-white w
 oman, born in Okinawa in 1954, and raised by her m
 other
alongside a non-mixed younger brother and sister. The book is written in
first-person narration as a search that she reflects back on, from the endpoint of her discovery. Structurally, it unfolds like a detective story: Tanaka
is presented with evidence of miscegenation in the form of her own body.
This compels her to search for the missing agent of the crime, her “specter of a father,” as suggested by the title. She writes:
I made a new friend in m
 iddle school. One day, I went to her h
 ouse.
She lived near the part of town where all the bars were concentrated—
so-called A-sign bars. G.I.s abounded. I saw big men up close drunk
and shouting rambunctiously for the first time in my life. . . .
The men all looked like big red g
 iants. The women w
 ere dirty,
vulgar, and always laughing in a lascivious tone.
It didn’t take me long to put two and two together. This social
landscape overlapped with the face of someone with a “foreign male
father and Japanese female m
 other.”
I thought to myself, “Men make women their playthings and fool
around with them . . . I wonder if I was also born out of a relationship
between such a woman and man.”
As a fatherless “hāfu,” a cloud of doubt always hovered about me:
“Was I born to a knocked-up w
 oman?” However, the image was never
quite as lucid as what I saw in the bar district. I realized it was t hose
feelings that had prevented me from asking my m
 other about my
father the entire time. This also explains the twisted feelings that are
conjured up each time I was called “Amirikā!”39

In this passage, Tanaka depicts the American-occupied Okinawan milieu.
Japan, one party in the triangular trans-Pacific relationship, comes into
relief not as a physically present entity, but as the internalized gaze of an
assimilated Okinawan whereupon Tanaka contrasts a “Japanese female
mother” (not Okinawan) with a “foreign male father.” It is at this point,
where bodies racialized and gendered along the lines of state sovereignty
circulate, that Tanaka makes a causal connection, putting “two and two
together,” and asks: “Was I born to a knocked-up woman?” With her
American father as the agent, and her m
 other the victimized medium,
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Tanaka is the result of the crime. She is hailed, in native Okinawan pronunciation, “Amirikā!” (not the Japanese “Amerikajin”), whereupon it becomes clear that the effect (mixed-race child) is substituted for the cause
(American father). Tanaka emerges as her f ather’s creation. Hence, in order to come to terms with her identity, she feels compelled to return to
her purported origins and find her “distant specter of a f ather.”
The smooth surface of the narrative, however, is quickly interrupted by
a split identification. While she feels compelled to recuperate her paternal
lineage, she simultaneously registers her “father’s country” as offensive and
alien.
I thought in the depths of my child-like heart, “What in the world
is Americ a up to? My f ather’s country that I longed for became
sullied. . . . The “A” in A-sign bar means the U.S. military sanitation
office deems it “suitable for entry.” Is t here anything as insulting to
the Japanese as this? The arrogance of white people who think that
they are the only ones who are h
 uman is appalling.40

And:
My adverse reaction increased in strength at the sight of G.I.s who
walk around like they own the place, flaunting the enormous strength
of the dollar, and the America that brought the crisis of war to
Okinawa.41

How is it possible for Tanaka to be bullied as the evidence of a crime and
feel victimized by the U.S. military like her Okinawan counterparts at the
same time?
Herein lies one of the most vexing moments of mixed-race identity. As
the embodiment of what she perceives is a sexual transgression, Tanaka is
infused with an immense sense of alienation from her own body: “To think
that I was ‘a child born to a knocked-up [woman], a child of a disgusting
sin’ always caused me sadness and impotent anger.” 42 She is disgusted with
both the G.I.s and herself as the product of a “disgusting sin” precisely
because she is also Okinawan. Unable to work out this contradiction, she
is left only with “sadness and impotent anger.”
A common response to Tanaka’s dilemma is to turn the tragic crime
into a celebrated partnership to rescue mixed individuals from their identity crisis. For example, Takara Kurayoshi, who spearheaded the well-
known Okinawan Initiative in 2000, incorporated mixed-race individuals
and their mothers into a full-scale attack on Okinawa’s history of victimization. Instead of the dead-end “victimized view of history” disseminated
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by Okinawan intellectuals, Takara asserted that Okinawa should actively
draw on its historical heritage not as unfortunate baggage, but as the
springboard from which it redefines itself as a cultural leader in Asia. In
this way, the military bases are not the festering wounds of colonialism,
but “the fermenting agent of postwar Okinawa” 43 worthy of praise that
“serves as the fundamental significance linking the U.S.-Japan Alliance together.” 44 As an example of the positive products of this fermenting agent,
he copiously quoted statements by Okinawan women and their mixed-race
children.
“I got married and bore two kids, but when my G.I. husband said one
day he had a drill, I never saw him again,” says a woman as if she w
 ere
talking about someone else. “Before payday, G.I.s are so broke, I d
 on’t
know how many times I was taken for a f ree r ide,” laughs off a former
prostitute. One hāfu rock musician states, “When I’m on stage, right
away I can tell which soldiers are g
 oing to Vietnam the next day.
When I see guys like that, I get all worked up in my performance and
want to send them off to war.” 45

As more mixed individuals such as Tanaka come out with stories of how
they w
 ere bullied as c hildren by Okinawans imbued with victim consciousness, a theoretical vacuum in Okinawa’s politics of resistance is created. It
testifies to the ironic consequence that the very individuals used in anti-
base protest—and indeed, the very individuals who may bear the most direct consequences of the U.S. military presence—are alienated from the
movement. Takara exploited this vulnerability as the opportunity to use
mixed Okinawans as a living bridge across cultures so as to seal off this
silent gap. The problem, however, is not with determining whether mixed
individuals are victims or agents, but rather with determining the relationship between mixed identity and a philosophical notion of causality
hinged on the assumption that a “doer” can enact a “deed” in the world by
virtue of his or her sheer f ree w
 ill.46
If she is the effect, then Tanaka is determined to know the cause: the
doer b
 ehind the deed, or her specter of a father. She starts by asking her
mother about her paternity and is shocked by the ease and glibness with
which she speaks. She learns that her father was the branch manager of
American Express Bank on Camp Zukeran. Her m
 other worked as his maid
in a mansion for foreigners where the two became romantically involved.
When her m
 other became pregnant, she quit her job and gave birth to the
baby alone. Her father repeatedly asked her mother for her hand in marriage and pleaded with her to join him in America. He even followed her
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in a “sparkling foreign car” from which she resolutely walked away without ever looking back.47
The journey progresses as Tanaka leaves for the United States, with the
help of a church friend, to search for her father. She finds his name in a
phone book from Florida and agrees to meet him over the Christmas holiday. The reunion is cinematic—literally, as a popular media outlet from
Japan covers the entire event by camera. She dives into her father’s arms
and weeps like a child. A
 fter the reunion, she learns that he never had any
other children and attempted to look for her in Okinawa, only to be refused multiple times by her mother. At first, when Tanaka’s intense desire
to know her origins is satisfied through the discovery of her f ather, she feels
complete.
. . . New blood started to flow through my veins. The black “blood”
that I i magined stagnating through my veins turned into fresh blood
and started pulsing vivaciously. . . . I decided to live my life very, very
preciously. This decision filled my body to the point where I became
feverish. In this way, . . . I searched and found the “evidence of my
blood” that had always hovered fearfully in my spirit. In this way,
I have now “resolved” everyt hing. There is nothing to be afraid of
anymore.48

However, even though her m
 other encourages her beforehand to take U.S.
citizenship and undergo adoption procedures by her f ather, Tanaka hesitates when the prospect materializes into a reality. Instead, she decides she
is neither Japanese nor American, but in a state of exile.
 here was another article that caught my attention and shook me to
T
the depths of my heart. The article was to the effect of an Okinawan
woman who married a G.I., lived in America, got a divorce a fter
four-and-a-half years, and returned to Okinawa. Her young daughter
was ridiculed for being a “Jap” in preschool.
Mixed-race children are discriminated as “Amirikā” in Okinawa, and
despised as “Jap” when they cross over to America. No matter where
mixed-race children go, they w
 ill always have to live as a “people in
exile.” This article overlapped with the issue of me becoming an
adoptive daughter to my f ather, and taking on U.S. citizenship.49

When the prospect of fulfilling her dream comes within arm’s reach,
Tanaka does not simply switch over, but takes a step back. Instead of fulfilling her destiny, dictated by the causal chain by becoming the American
father’s d
 aughter she often fantasized about in the midst of intense suffering,
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she problematizes it altogether. Here, Tanaka resists clinging to either
polar opposite, and the mythic rhythm of her text starts to dabble in the
divine.
The very force that attempts to galvanize mixed Okinawans into oppositional categories mythologizes their origins in terms of a pure singularity and gains inertia by neutralizing their excess. They are neither the
evidence of Okinawa’s victimization nor the promise of the U.S.-Japan relationship. The compulsion to lock them into one extreme says less about
what they really are, and more about how their rich ambiguity is secured
as a site of mythic violence that seeks to submit everyt hing to the logic of
the law. It is through this myt hology that we again and again locate the
mixed-race subject as a tragedy of bilateral state violence that is redeemed
through a rebirth into a biological bridge across cultures.
What is crucial in experiencing Tanaka’s memoir is not adjudicating
whether her decisions are right or wrong, whether she is American or Japa
nese. Rather, it is crucial to take stock of the various decisions she made in
her journey so as to undermine the field of representation that constantly
seeks to exclude her contradictions, inconsistencies, and ambiguities. By
laying bare the rich ambiguity of Tanaka’s journey, the goal h
 ere is not to
delineate a victim or agent, but to reveal a constant thirst to search for
meaning in life. This laying bare inherently antagonizes the field of repre
sentation that both produces mixed people and simultaneously erases them.
Yet, at the same time, to merely suggest that the alegal is precisely that
which is in excess of the law and representat ion only gestures to the existence of a truth beyond human grasp that we can never know. Upon coming up against the crisis of indecision—of not being able to decide on the
meaning of her life—Tanaka certainly appeals to the power of God to fill
this void in meaning.
. . . t hen one day, I began to pray.
On that day, I became liberated from the utter hopelessness, and
my heart became peaceful. Sadness and hatred vanished, and I began
to firmly believe that my birth was “desired by God who endowed me
with life on this earth.”50

Although her faith in God, in certain instances, answers her prayers (such
as saving her sister from death in the hospital), I would like to focus on a
different moment in her faith. God delivers her to the cold reality of meaninglessness whereupon she is empowered to survive as an individual who
embodies Okinawa’s condition of uncertainty. This is not self-determination
that emerges triumphantly from a space completely lacking in sovereignty.
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Rather, just as Benjamin answers Schmitt’s trap of sovereignty with allegory defined as “the non-existence of what it presents,”51 it is that unnameable t hing which is not outside of sovereignty, but what must be assumed as
a fixity in order for sovereignty to establish itself; it is the value x in an
equation that defines a system of sovereignty. But it is precisely the ambivalence, liminality, and inconsistency of the un-namable that undermines
this assumption and becomes a nullifying force that denies the sovereign’s
ecstatic flight to transcendence; that is to say, in this case, it refuses to wait
for salvation from a superhuman force that we can never know. It is this
great ambivalence of constantly living as a member of a “people in exile”
that leaves her with the resolution to write in classical Japanese, “I must
nevertheless endeavor to live on (iza ikimeyamo).” Here, the text does not
present us with the truth that the truth is inaccessible to humans and only
lies beyond, in the transcendental realm of God. Rather, the text appeals to a God who says very l ittle and only imparts an endeavor to live
on; it turns not away from represent at ion as a failed means to deliver
the truth, but rather toward this failure as a different means—pure
means—to a different end. That is, by embracing this failure, it can
now be that which disarms the fantasy of accessing truth in the dialectical rhythm of myth. This is precisely what Benjamin suggested with
divine violence.
The failure of the memoir lies in the ambivalent first-person narration
itself. At first, Tanaka’s text seems to offer what Okinawa, in its seventy
years of American-Okinawan miscegenation, has not been able to achieve
because of the plethora of media representat ions on mixed individuals: a
full-length memoir published by a mixed Okinawan herself. All ears are
open to hear the subaltern speak. Yet, upon closer inspection, it becomes
clear that it is precisely this media that not only invited the manuscript,
but aided Tanaka in her journey to find her father with documentation at
every step. She writes:
One day, by way of an introduction from a cameraman who had been
following Okinawa’s mixed-race children, I met Nakamura Sumiko
from the Woman52 magazine. Even though Ms. Nakamura wanted to
meet me outside of work, simply hearing Woman evoked an adverse
reaction [within me]. Even if she said it was outside of work, I had the
uneasy feeling that it would ultimately be turned into an article.
Furthermore, at the risk of sounding rude, I had the feeling that it
would be an article that caters to the sensational curiosities of its
readership.

153-75549_ch01_3P.indd 140

10/13/18 12:57 PM

Life That Matters

141

By that point, I had already been covered in a series of articles in
Yomiuri Shimbun, Asahi Shimbun, and the Ryukyu Shimpo, and I was
accustomed to being interviewed. Nonetheless, I had a fear of this
weekly women’s magazine.
However, a fter meeting Ms. Nakamura a number of times, my fears
seemed to fade away. Actually, she started to come across as a maternal
figure.53

What is missing from the deliberate documentation of the role the media
played in forming her memoir is the degree to which Nakamura had shepherded or perhaps even wrote part of it herself. Yet it is precisely this
failure to deliver a memoir written without mediation from the Japanese
media that makes it a success.

The Decision to “Nevertheless Endeavor to Live On”
Although it may be difficult to identify who wrote which part, it is clear
that Tanaka at least has attempted to write the memoir herself. This, in
itself, shows that her relationship to representat ion, particularly in its written form, is markedly different from her m
 other’s. Tanaka learned the
details of her parents’ romance narrated by her m
 other for the first time
in a weekly magazine. She is alarmed that her mother divulged such intimate information to the media, yet left her own daughter starving for clues
to her identity growing up as a child. “If only my m
 other would have rehearsed to me—[a child] who was in despair about my birth—t he details
of that story over and over again like a lullaby. . . .” When her m
 other tells
her that her father was an important person for her, Tanaka casually responds, “That kind of story is too much for the written text.” Her m
 other
then responds, “Midori, not at all. A person’s life and death cannot be expressed in the written text. It was more than that.”54 Tanaka’s mother, from
the beginning, only tells the media what it wants to hear while always
knowing that it constantly fails to capture her experience.55 By d
 oing so,
she points to something ineffable, beyond representat ion.
Tanaka, by contrast, does not give up on representat ion, but rather dives
into it, not as a means to access the truth, but to ironically undermine its
own promise to deliver the truth. Hence, she does not look to the sovereign
or to God to rescue her from the crisis of meaning. Rather, it is the perpetual state of exile that deflates hope of deliverance from such a crisis in the
first place. In this way, she turns away from the symbolic that promises
access to transcendence and turns toward allegory that comes crashing
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down to the living with the force of a “cataract.”56 Her appeal to God gives
her hope not to defer the decision to attribute meaning to her life to a higher
power, but to decide to “nevertheless endeavor to live on.” In desolation,
her life starts to matter. She reclaims her own life force from the biopoliti
cal state that attempts to monopolize it. Instead of looking to the promise
of transcendental power to deliver her from her troubles, she dives into the
morass of failures, contradictions, and inconsistencies, where the responsibility to decide falls upon herself. This is precisely why Benjamin contrasted “the modern concept of sovereignty” that “amounts to a supreme
executive power on the part of the prince” with “the baroque concept . . . 
of the state of emergency” in which “the most important function of the
prince [is] to avert this.”57 This inability to decide is not a curse, but hope
for a different sense of autonomy that refuses to surrender to the translating force of the sovereign authority. It struggles, it contradicts, it fails.
But for the first time, the failure is finally one’s own.
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 oday the Okinawa prefectural government is engaged in an all-out po
T
litical battle with the Japanese government’s determination to build a new
base in Henoko, despite overwhelming opposition. The “right versus left”
bipartisanship of political life in Okinawa that undergirds the ideology of
a democratic state has largely melted away. “Conservative” business leaders
have joined hands with “radical” anti-base activists where now 76 percent of
the people and all elected leaders oppose construction of this new military base.1 Riot police are recruited from mainland Japan to reinforce the
local Okinawan police force thought to be “too soft” on protecting the construction sites from its own p
 eople. Although the Japanese government
technically needs local compliance for base construction, it continues to
make exceptions to the law in order to push through with brute force.
Okinawa, with exponentially accumulating force, is being propelled into
a space where the seduction of sovereignty is quickly losing its charm. Public opinion is edging for more autonomy in various forms, and an all-out
independence movement is on the horizon. In my discussion on self-
determination in Chapter 5, I reframed the problem of determining a
single “self ” by capturing the motion of in-betweenness of multiple “selves”
143
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embodied by mixed-race subjects. This is the motion of multiple character changes within the same actor and actress on the stage of Chinen’s “The
Human Pavilion”2 that captivates the audience more than it would if the
stage were simply populated with multiple actors and actresses who represent singular characters.3 To self-determine is to excise the motion of in-
betweeness and instead set into motion a constellation of enclosed unities
that self-determine. By contrast, I argue for a form of mixing that attempts
to generate a different kind of inertia by disengaging sovereignty with the
failure to determine a unified self. In place of a constellation set into motion by the magnetic force of unities against an externality beyond its limits, I propose developing a different relationship with the alegal as not an
externality, but as a rhythm felt immanently throughout. The self does not
enclose with static boundaries, but is constantly engaged in the kaleidoscopic movement of overlapping in motion. The brilliance is in the motion where a singular space is enhanced, not contaminated, by multiples.
Borders and difference do not dissolve, but they simply develop a different
relationship to the process of enclosure in which they continue to matter.
On a similar point, Ariko Ikehara writes, “some of us Okinawans deploy the expression, Okinawan Lives M
 atter, resonating in relational similitude with the concept, Black Lives M
 atter, overlaying the history of
African Americans onto the Okinawan con/text.”4 Here, difference is not
locked into a binary where it matters as a “fact” in the way that Fanon problematized the “fact of blackness.” Nor does it cease to matter because it
was exposed as a fiction. Rather, the “mixed-multiplying” effect of
“champurū f/actors” allows it to matter in a different way. Ikehara, in this
way, opens up a powerf ul path to Okinawan autonomy—one that she shows
us has been t here all along in plain sight.
“Champurū,” as she explains, is an Okinawan word for mixing and “often refers to the Okinawan way of blending cultures including culinary
ones.”5 Champurū f/actors are t hose “who neither reject nor accept their
lives, but cope with and negotiate the mundane in making life possible for
everyone by t hose who suffered and sacrifice for o
 thers to live.”6 By focusing
on the mundane, she deals a double rejection. First, she rejects traditional
notions of f ree w
 ill, as they “neither reject nor accept their lives.” Second,
she rejects the dialectical oscillation of myth that locks miscegenation
into a binary of tragedy or triumph. Instead, she traces their ability to
“cope” u nder the conditions of colonialism. This coping cultivates a
know-how in which champurū f/actors not only learn how to survive, but
they cultivate a way of living in which they come to thrive. In her reading
of Nakada Tsuyoshi’s Black District Red Telephone Booth, both set in and
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written by an author from the Teruya district in Koza, she writes of one
such character, “Eri.”
 here is a specter of tragedy in Eri’s story, as we learn that she grew
T
up without her parents, being called “blackie” by the neighborhood
kids. But the story exceeds the trope by giving her a “normal” Okinawan life of challenge and chance because of her grandmother’s
attitude and action that defuses the stigma of Eri’s “blackness” and/or
“mixed-ness” in the Okinawan context. Eri is raised like a common
Okinawan child without silencing the fact of life/blackness that, in
fact, makes her Okinawan-ness come alive as a child of Okinawa. Eri
defies both the narrative and character of black-Okinawan female by
not only surviving in the story, but also thriving as one who holds the
key to the f uture of Teruya and Koza, both places predetermined as
fixed and past in the story and in real life.7

I bring this book to a close by reengaging the words of the “father of
Okinawan studies,” Ifa Fuyū, some seventy years ago with Ikehara’s quotation above. If Okinawa is, like many others, at the forefront of a new sense
of the global, it is b
 ecause of the historical experience of mixed-race subjects who were born u nder conditions in which, as Ifa wrote, Okinawans
knew that they were “not in a position to determine their own fate amidst
the whirlwind of current world affairs. . . .”8 This man who devoted his life
to the desperate attempt to eke out even a modest form of Okinawan autonomy u
 nder Japanese colonialism, died in desolation as he caught a
glimpse of the formation of a new postwar empire. As Okinawa’s figurative “father,” he was bereft of the power to even “command [his] descendants to be in possession” of the ability to “determine their own fate.”
Hence, he concluded that “[t]he only choice Okinawans have is to throw
themselves before the w
 ill of their descendants after them.”9 Not then, and
not now, have Okinawans been able to self-determine.
Precisely b
 ecause this is the case, it is time to look to how Okinawa’s
descendants have not only learned to survive, but thrive in a vacuum of
sovereignty. I read an answer to Ifa’s last w ill and testament in the quotation shown earlier from Ikehara. Eri is raised as a “common Okinawan
child,” but this does not mean that she is forced the impossible, that is, to
become a global citizen in a world of enclosures from which Okinawa is
barred from entry. Rather, she becomes Okinawa’s possibility. By not
“silencing the fact of life/blackness,” the grandmother “in fact” enables
Eri’s “Okinawan-ness come alive as a child of Okinawa.” She embodies
the kaleidoscopic movement of Koza at the crossroads of the Asia Pacific
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whereupon Okinawa’s brilliance is finally able to shine upon the brilliance
of others.
In this passage, the grandmother, who would have been a contemporary
of Ifa, did for her d
 aughter as a proxy for what her own d
 aughter could not
do for Eri. She exercised autonomy in perhaps the most intimate and power
ful way possible by claiming her own descendant as one of her own. That
she was black did not matter in the sense that the decision was not surrendered to the logic of a patriarchal monoethnic form of Japanese state
sovereignty. Rather, it mattered for her as an Okinawan woman who was
empowered to make a decision without relying on a transcendental power
to reaffirm w
 hether or not it was the right one. And without hesitation,
she reclaimed Okinawan life for her descendants after her.
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Nearly fifteen years ago, a friend and I dreamed of what it would be like to
publish a book. We both registered anxiety about a most peculiar part:
the acknowledgments. We noticed how some Okinawan authors hardly
acknowledged anyone. Was it that t hese authors w
 ere ungrateful? In retrospect, I realize what we were discussing was Okinawa’s fraught relationship with representation. What of the people who helped not because
they envisioned some form of recognition by proxy of this book, but b
 ecause
they wanted to form a social possibility outside of public recognition?
What of the p
 eople whose influence is all the more pervasive precisely
because it goes undetected? It is t hese people who breathe life into this
book, and to whom I am most grateful.
But as readers of these pages have seen, this book is not about the
power of Okinawa’s back channels per se, but about rethinking the ways it
comes into contact with institutional power. The production of this very
book itself has been made possible with the help of countless individuals
who gave me a part of their lives in institutional settings. Ueno Chizuko
was a tough yet loving Ph.D. advisor at the University of Tokyo who suggested the topic of this book to me many years ago. Kang Sang Jung’s
seminars helped me put it into the context of postcolonial Japanese studies.
Brett de Bary and Naoki Sakai gave me an intellectual home at Cornell
University that was nothing short of magical. Together, they give students
just the right amount of space to roam free and dream of a new world
while being there to offer guidance when needed. Satya Mohanty and
Derek Chang allowed me to explore identity politics and trans-Pacific
studies in unconventional ways. Learning the continental tradition from
the backdoor of feminist theory with Paula Moya at Stanford University
was the best way to bring everything home—literally in the Bay Area,
where I was able to engage in trans-Pacific grassroots community building. My colleagues in the Department of East Asian Studies at New York
University provided me the most precious gift of departmental support
147
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and stability: Eliot Borenstein, Laurence Coderre, Ethan Harkness,
Tom Looser, Yoon Jeong Oh, Moss Roberts, Robert Stoltz, and Xudong
Zhang. That a department can reach consensus through hearty discussion without resorting to a vote restores my faith in a government. I am
also thankful to the faculty in Japanese language, who open up their
classrooms to me and put on events loved by my family: Yukiko Hanawa,
Kazue Kurokawa, Mayumi Matsumoto, Kayo Nonaka, and Tsumugi Yamamoto. Alejandra Beltran, Candace Laning, and Stacy Sakane are lifesavers who keep me on track. Beth Katzoff, NYU’s East Asian Studies
librarian, ordered essential texts for this book with much-appreciated
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Book Colloquium Program held in July 2017 who gave essential feedback
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encouragement along the way.
Finally, a word of thanks for the cover image that stands as the only
photograph used in this book. Too often is Okinawa, particularly at the site
of miscegenation, visually given to capture the fascination of the world at
large when the impacted individuals are never able to see themselves as
such. Not sure what to do, I turned to the photographer and scholar Arakaki Makoto. He took the cover image for me on February 4, 2018, the
day Nago City citizens elected a mayor who supposedly “consents” ( yōnin)
to building a new base in Henoko. That a p
 eople who never once asked
for the U.S. military to come to their islands have come to be read as
offering their “consent” to new base construction is a testament to the
twisted nature of liberal democracy. Sometimes when language becomes
exhausting, images such as these can be enigmatically beautiful. The U.S.
military fence looks down on Okinawans who nonetheless endeavor to live on
as they comingle with the dead incapable of transcendence to the other
world. Thank you, Makoto.
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Preface
1. “Tomiyama” was her f amily name when she was involved in the
 hildren of Peace Network, and “Hirano” after she moved to mainland
C
Japan. She now goes by “Higa.”
2. Noiri Naomi, Seiyā Midori, Terumoto Hirotaka, and Yonamine
Masae, Amerajian sukūru: kyōsei no chihei o Okinawa kara (Tokyo: Fukinotō
Shobō, 2001), 98–99.
3. Tomiyama Malia, “Yūki,” Buraku kaihō 477 (November 2000): 11. For
more on this network in the context of mixed-race Okinawan history, see
Ōshiro Yasutaka, “Kokusaiji ni kansuru mondai to taiou no jidai kubun
shian,” Okinawa chiiki fukushi kenkyū: Nihon shakai fukushi gakkai dai 49 kai
zenkoku taikai kaisai kinen gō (October 20, 2001): 3–29.
4. Norma Field provides a well-k nown account of the sexual implications of mixed-race in U.S. military–occupied Japan from personal experience. Reading the following passage, one can get a sense of why mixed-race
individuals might avoid each other u
 nder t hese circumstances. She writes:
“The subtle shame that clung like an odor to t hose years of American male
presence in the form of military occupation marked Okinawa as a place I
would unintentionally avoid. T
 here, the ubiquity and the seeming sempiternity of American bases made the shame more palpable than on the mainland. Seventeen years a fter Okinawa’s reversion to Japan, I find myself
recounting my first, recent visit t here to a friend from a classical literat ure
research group. We are drinking. He is surprised: I h
 adn’t been t here as a
child? I am not sure what I am being asked. W
 hether, after all, I was
illegitimate? Or more simply, being a half-breed of my generation, I must
surely have been t here where my kind are concentrated? Many years into my
growing up, I thought I had understood the awkward piquancy of biracial
children with the formulation, they are nothing if not the embodiment of
sex itself; now, I modify it to, the biracial offspring of war are at once more
offensive and intriguing b
 ecause they bear the imprint of sex as domination.” Norma Field, In the Realm of a D
 ying Emperor: Japan at a Century’s End
(New York: Vintage Books, 1991), 39.
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5. Hāfu refers to an individual with half-Japanese and half-foreign
ancestry. For a thorough genealogy of this term, see Hyoue Okamura, “The
Language of ‘Racial Mixture’: How Ainoko Became Haafu, and the Haafu-gao
Makeup Fad,” Asia Pacific Perspectives 14 (Spring 2017), https://w ww.usfca
.edu /center-asia-pacific /perspectives/v14n2/okamura. Okamura conjectures
that hāfu probably came from the introduction of the terms “half-caste”
and “half-breed” into the Japanese lexicon. Although hāfu appeared in the
1930s, he shows how it became circulated in the realm of popular culture
starting from the 1960s. He writes, “[b]y the 1980s, though, haafu had
become the most fashionable racialist label for mixed-blood p
 eople in
Japan.”
6. Tomiyama Malia, “Amerajian o ikiru,” Akemodoro, no. 19 (2000): 23.
7. The following articles were published in 2012 by Hirano Malia in the
“Ochibo” series of Okinawa taimusu: “Amerajian,” July 2; “Yankī gō hōmu,”
July 16; “Mori no naka no ki,” July 30; “Nayamashii Eikaiwa kyōshitsu,”
August 11; “Watashi no naka no Taiheiyō sensō,” August 25; “Icharibachōdē,”
September 7; “Uchinānchu,” September 20; “Motomerareru baransu,”
October 3; “Meimei,” October 17; “Ryōshin to watashi,” October 31; “Tattoi
tsunagari,” November 12; “Oya e no tegami,” November 26; “Yume no
keikaku,” December 8; and “Aruga mama ni,” December 24.
8. Tomiyama Malia, “Beigun kichi,” Facebook, July 19, 2013, https://
www.facebook.com/photo.php?f bid=481134368644277&set=a. 117687014989016
.24618.100002431539882&type=3&theater.
9. kichi no otoshigo
10. “Amejo” is short for “Amerikā jōgū” and means someone with an
affinity for America. “Ame” comes from the English “America” and “jo”
comes from the Okinawan “jōgū,” as in “saki jōgū,” or someone who savors
alcohol. It is likely that mainland Japanese who do not understand the
Okinawan language interpreted the “jo” to mean “woman,” as it has come to
mean “woman of the Americans.” Fluent in the Okinawan language, Higa
understands the nuances of this term that conveys discrimination t oward
women mediated by a mainland Japanese gaze.
11. Naoki Sakai and Hyon Joo Yoo, eds., The Trans-Pacific Imagination:
Rethinking Boundary, Culture, and Society (Singapore: World Scientific
Publishing Company, 2012), 11.
12. Sakai and Yoo, Trans-Pacific Imagination, 8, 9, 12.
Introduction
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black-Okinawan mixing through the lens of a Chicana feminist theory of
language with breathtaking results. Ueunten, Ikehara, and Uehara Carter
all take community building as central praxis of their scholarship and forge
t hese connections as they excavate them.
5. Okinawa, 1972–1995: Life That M
 atters
1. My discussion of self-determination here should be read as a philosophical examination and not a political criticism of the actual movements
for and around self-determination in Okinawa. Although I choose not to use
this term, it does not take away from the meaningful content of t hese real-life
movements.
2. Arasaki Moriteru, Okinawa Gendaishi (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten,
1996), 26–27.
3. Quoted in Tomohiro Yara, “Withdrawal of US Marines Blocked by
Japan in the 1970s,” trans. Gavan McCormack, The Asia-Pacific Journal 11,
no. 47: 4 (November 22, 2013), http://apjjf.org/2013/11/47/ Yara-Tomohiro
/4037/article.html.
4. Yara, “Withdrawal of US Marines.”
5. Ibid.
6. Victor Argy and Leslie Stein, eds., The Japanese Economy (London:
Macmillan Press, 1997), 11.
7. Shimabukuro Jun, “Okinawa shinkō taisei”o tō: kowasareta jichi to sono
saisei ni mukete (Kyoto: Hōritsubunkasha, 2014), 5. Different from the
military-industrial complex in the United States, postwar Japan fed its
appetite for capitalist growth with state-driven construction in public works.
In 1993, Japan outspent the United States on such construction by a ratio of
2.6 to1, or in proportion to relative land area, 32 to1. And just as Eisenhower
warned how political contributions and lobbying from defense contractors
would skew public policy, Japan’s unique construction state also deeply
affects the workings of its political machinery. Gavan McCormack, The
Emptiness of Japanese Affluence (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 33.
8. Shimabukuro observes that postwar Japan operates in a circular
system between the center of government in Tokyo and peripheral municipalities through a “politics of interest returns” (rieki kangen seiji). Jockeying
between the center and periphery occurs in three ways. First, officials from
the peripheries routinely pay their respects to Tokyo, and aging bureaucrats
(amakudari) from Tokyo are sent off to spend their golden years in serv ice of
the peripheries so as to make room for new blood in the capitol. Second, the
seniority system allows second or third-generation Diet members from
long-standing conservative blocs to nominate candidates to represent
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political parties that yield high returns for their local constituents. The third
is a combination of the two. Shimabukuro, “Okinawa shinkō taisei” o tō, 28.
9. Ibid., 272.
10. For a first-hand account of this incident, see David Vine, Base Nation:
How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harm American and the World (New York:
Henry Holt and Company, 2015), 256–259.
11. Shimoji Yoshio, “Don’t Cry for Okinawa’s Economy,” The Japan
Times 31, 2013.
12. Tomochi Masaki, “Zenkichi tekkyo oyobi zenhojokin teppaigo no
Ryukyu (Okinawa) keizai ni kansuru ichi kōsatsu,” Ryukyu Dokuritsugaku
Kenkyū 3 (2006): 23.
13. Tatsuro Yoda, “Japan’s Host Nation Support Program for the
U.S.-Japan Security Alliance: Past and Prospects,” Asian Survey 46.6 (2006):
939.
14. Yoda, “Japan’s Host Nation Support Program,” 937.
15. Ibid., 942.
16. For more on current discussions on autonomy in its various forms,
see Arakaki Tsuyoshi, Okinawa no jikoketteiken: sono rekishiteki konkyo to
kinmirai no tenbō (Tokyo: Kōbunken, 2015). For more on t hese debates from
the immediate post-reversion period, see Ryan M. Yokota, “Reversion-Era
Proposals for Okinawan Regional Autonomy,” in Rethinking Postwar Okinawa:
Beyond American Occupation, ed. Pedro Iocabelli and Hiroko Matsuda
(Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2017), 59–79.
For more on Ryukyu independence, see Matsushima Yasukatsu,
Ryukyu dokuritsuron: Ryukyu minzoku no manifesuto (Tokyo: Bajiriko, 2014).
Matsushima, together with Oyakawa Shinako, Tōbaru Kazuhiko, Teruya
Midori, and Tomochi Masaki, has founded the Association of Comprehensive Studies for Independence of the Lew Chewans (ACSIL), thereby
launching the contemporary independence movement.
17. “Jichiken kyōka 35% nozomu ‘genkōdōri’ hansū waru: Ryukyu
shinpō kenmin ishiki chōsa,” Ryukyu shinpō, January 1, 2017.
18. Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de
France, 1977–1978, 64–65.
19. Matsushima Chōgi, “Okinawa kaihō to Uchinānchu: ‘Henkan
funsuika’ ‘kyōtei funsui’ ka,” Jōkyō (December 1971): 90.
20. Matsushima, “Okinawa kaihō to Uchinānchu,” 90–91.
21. Ibid., 91.
22. Ibid., 90.
23. Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de
France, 1978–1979, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 55.
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24. It is worth noting h
 ere Kant’s writings on globalization and miscegenation are identical in design as derivative of the teleological judgment
presented in the latter half of the Critique of the Power of Judgment. Dif fer
ent from the Critique of Pure Reason concerned with the supremacy of
human reason, the problematic of this third critique is centered on how to
secure the internal unity of human reason over the infinite expanse of
Mother Nature. Kant’s answers with a philosophy of enclosure that
regulates the boundary-crossing movement of circulation and mixing. For
him, not only must this movement occur, but it must occur in a way in
which the unity of the state or self is reinforced as a result. Hence, it is no
coincidence that in this context he lodges a discussion of miscegenation and
attempts to theorize a form of racial mixing that produces the universality of a
white male subject as it exists in a constellation of other races. See Immanuel
Kant, “Of the Different Races of Human Beings,” in Anthropology, History, and
Education, ed. Robert B. Louden and Günter Zöller, trans. Mary Gregor et al.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 82–97. Also, for a discussion
on how the Kantian “transcendental self ” is inimical to “self-morphing
matter,” specifically as it relates to the experience of pregnancy and racial
mixing, see Christine Battersby, The Phenomenal W
 oman: Feminist Metaphysics
and the Patterns of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1998).
25. Tosaka Jun, “The Principle of Everydayness and Historical Time,”
trans. Robert Stolz, in Tosaka Jun: A Critical Reader, ed. Ken C. Kawashima,
Fabian Schäfer, and Robert Stolz (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell East Asia Series,
2013), 15.
26. Matsushima Chōgi and Tanigawa Ken’ichi, “Okinawa=kokka o koeru
mugen senritsu,” Jōkyō 3 (1971), 213.
27. Tosaka, “Principle of Everydayness,” 14–15.
28. Matsushima and Tanigawa, “Okinawa=kokka o koeru mugen
senritsu,” 223.
29.	Here, Tosaka is perhaps most closely aligned to Benjamin in his critique of idealism. In a similar spatial metaphor that he presents in his translation essay, Benjamin writes:
Just as a tangent touches a circle lightly and at but one point, with this
touch rather than with the point setting the law according to which it is to
continue on its straight path to infinity, a translation touches the original
lightly and only at the infinitely small point of the sense, thereupon pursuing its own course according to the laws of fidelity in the freedom of linguistic flux.
In this passage, the tangent does not touch the circle in order to suture
it internally according to a “law” that fixes its meaning infinitely throughout time, but it touches upon the circle so as to unleash the “freedom of
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linguistic flux,” or language in motion. This is why Benjamin prioritized
syntax over grammar in his theory of translation. Walter Benjamin, “The
Task of a Translator,” in Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, ed. Hannah
Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Shocken Books, 1985), 80.
Benjamin goes on to develop a fuller critique of Kantian idealism in his
Trauerspiel with a modified version of Platonic idealism. Benjamin’s “idea”
is still transcendental in the sense that it lies beyond human access, but unlike Kant’s idealism (where this limitation serves as an enabling possibility
for the limitless creation of knowledge in a human-centered world), it
points to the failure of representat ion itself. This failure is what I have be
referring to as allegory. Precisely because of the inaccessibility of the idea,
humans are driven all the more passionately into its representat ion through
different arrangements of phenomena. He writes, “The representation of
an idea can u nder no circumstances be considered successful u nless the
whole range of possible extremes it contains has been virtually explored.”
Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne
(London: Verso, 1998), 47. H
 ere, “successful” is “virtual,” and therefore
never actualizable because it is humanly impossible to exhaust the infinite
number of ways of representing the idea through phenomena. As humans,
we do not live forever, and it is therefore our destiny to fail at representa
tion. However, for Benjamin, this failure is a veiled gift from God b
 ecause
it is only by being reminded of it that we can be liberated from the cruel
belief that we w
 ill someday gain access to the truth. For as Benjamin sees it,
it is the cruelty of this promise—always seeking to defer the imperfection
of the h
 ere and now to the perfection of the f uture of infinite time—t hat
keeps h
 umans imprisoned in a self-imposed phantasmagoria.
Relating this to the visual image of a mosaic, he writes: “The value of
fragments of thought is all the greater the less direct their relationship to
the underlying idea, and the brilliance of the representation depends as
much on this value as the brilliance of the mosaic does on the quality of the
glass paste.” Benjamin, Origin of German Tragic Drama, 29. The “fragments” h
 ere are pieces of a mosaic or phenomena in the representat ion of
an idea. The purpose of the fragment is to draw attention to each individual piece in terms of its failure to provide a unified representation of the idea.
Mosaics invite the viewer to move from piece to piece by drawing attention
to the constant failure of achieving a smooth unification of the whole. The
eye cannot sit still because the fragment disrupts the experience of totality.
We are invited to go from piece to piece without rest. Although we most
certainly attempt to look at the mosaic as a whole, the experience of the
mosaic itself would simply not be the same without the motion of jumping from piece to piece. In other words, the mosaic invites motion, much
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like the idea in its capacity as a monad that puts together phenomena in
“their endless dance of (re)juxtaposition.” James R. Martel, Textual Conspiracies: Walter Benjamin, Idolatry, and Political Theory (Ann Arbor: The
University of Michigan Press, 2013), 46. It is only through motion that
t hings can matter.

30. Shimabukuro Jun, “Okinawa shinkō taisei”o tō, 21. Italics are mine.
31. Noiri Naomi, “Amerajian wa chanpurū no kōsei yōso ni natteiruka?,”
in Okinawa/Hawai: kontakuto/zōn toshite no tōsho, ed. Ikue Kina, Ishihara
Masahide, and Yamashiro Shin (Tokyo: Sairyūsha, 2010), 335.
32. Tonegawa Yutaka, Kiyan Marī no seishun (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō,
1988).
33. Suzuki Teruko, Deteoide kijimunā (Narashino: Yū Kosumosu, 1990).
34. Noiri, Seiyā, Terumoto, and Yonamine, Amerajian sukūru, 98–99.
35. Tomiyama Malia, “Amerajian o ikiru,” Akemodoro, no. 19 (2000):
11–26.
36. Fija Byron and Patrick Heinrich, “ ‘Wanne Uchinānchu—I Am
Okinawan.’ Japan, the U.S., and Okinawa’s Endangered Languages,” The
Asia-Pacific Journal 5, no. 11 (November 3, 2007), http://apjjf.org/-Patrick
-Heinrich/2586/article.html.
37. Mitzi Uehara Carter, “Routing, Repeating, and Hacking Mixed Race
in Okinawa,” in Hapa Japan: Identities and Representations, ed. Duncan R.
Williams (Los Angeles: USC Press, 2017), 133–146.
38. “Eigo ya shitsumon osame kutsū: Amerikakei Uchinānchu shinpo,”
Ryukyu shinpō, December 7, 2014.
39. Tanaka Midori J., Harukanaru maboroshi no chichiyo (Tokyo: Kōyūsha,
1982), 69–70. “Amirikā” is the pronunciation for “American” in Okinawan.
40. Tanaka, Harukanaru maboroshi no chichiyo, 69.
41. Ibid., 73.
42. Ibid., 73.
43. Maeshiro Morisada, Makino Hirotaka, and Takara Kurayoshi, Okinawa no jiko kenshō: teiden “jōnen” kara “ronri” e (Naha: Hirugisha, 1998), 33.
44. Maeshiro Morisada, Ōshiro Tsuneo, and Takara Kurayoshi, Okinawa
inishiatibu: Okinawa hatsu/chiteki senryaku (Naha: Hirugisha, 2000), 52–53.
45. Takara Kurayoshi, Ryukyu ōkoku (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2009), 6–7.
46. Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals; Ecce Homo, trans.
Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale, ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York:
Vintage Books, 1989), 45.
47. Tanaka, Harukanaru maboroshi no chichiyo, 176.
48. Ibid., 231, 243.
49. Ibid., 238.
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50. Ibid., 182.
51. Benjamin, Origin of German Tragic Drama, 233.
52. Josei Jishin
53. Tanaka, Harukanaru maboroshi no chichiyo, 249.
54. Ibid., 256.
55. This reminds me of a similar account given by Mitzi Uehara Carter
of her mother’s response to an ethnographic interview on Okinawa and U.S.
military bases in which she stated, “I mostly just tell him what he wanna
hear.” This informs Uehara Carter’s approach to a critical ethnography in
militarized spaces. Uehara Carter, “Nappy Roots and Tangled Tales:
Critical Ethnography in a Militarised Okinawa,” in Under Occupation:
Resistance and Struggle in a Militarised Asia-Pacific, ed. Daniel Broudy, Peter
Simpson, and Makoto Arakaki (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars
Publication, 2013), 8. Her piece is important b
 ecause it shows how the dance
between unofficial and official modes of speech circulate throughout the
Okinawan diaspora and racialized communities trans-Pacifically.
56. Benjamin, Origin of German Tragic Drama, 66.
57. Ibid., 65.
Conclusion
1. “Henoko ‘chiji shiji’ 83%, shinkichi kensetsu 76% hantai, honshi
kinkyū yoron chōsa” Okinawa taimusu, April 7, 2015.
2. Chinen Seishin, “The H
 uman Pavilion,” trans. Robert Tierney, in
Islands of Protest: Japanese Literature from Okinawa, ed. Davinder L. Bhowmik
and Steve Rabson (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2016).
3. As Samuel Weber writes in reference to Benjamin’s The Origin of
German Tragic Drama, “what is dislocated is not just the unity of a character,
but the unity of character as such.” Weber, “Taking Exception to Decision:
Walter Benjamin and Carl Schmitt,” Diacritics 22, nos. 3/4 (1993): 15.
4. Ariko Ikehara, “Third Space as Decolonial Con/Text: Okinawa’s
American Champurū,” Journal of Transnational Asian Studies 1, 1: 1 (Fall
2016), http://t ransnationalasia.rice.edu /Content.aspx?id=105
5. Ikehara, “Okinawa’s American Champurū.”
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7. Ariko Ikehara, “Champurū Text: Decolonial Okinawan Writing,” in
Rethinking Postwar Okinawa: Beyond American Occupation, ed. Pedro Iocabelli
and Hiroko Matsuda (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2017), 141–142.
8. Ifa Fuyū, Okinawa rekishi monogatari: Nihon no shukuzu (Tokyo:
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